Author: halyna.repetska@gmail.com

  • How Ukrainian Feminist and LGBT+ Organizations Work during the War

    Translated from Ukrainian by Natalia Volynets.

    “Being asked “What kind of a feminist am I now?” I say I am a practical one.

    A situationally-practical one.”

    Svitlana Dubina, Vis

    The escalation of the war and the beginning of the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has changed the daily lives of every one of us. From Kharkiv to Lviv, from Kyiv to Mariupol, from Zaporizhzhia to Vinnytsia — we are forced to quickly change our plans, daily activities, and usual worldview.

    NGOs, feminist organizations, and communities dealing with LGBT+ issues involve people who constantly counteract violence, inequality, and discrimination.

    The war has intensified these issues while revealing new obstacles and creating new challenges.

    We talked with Ukrainian feminist and LGBT+ organizations to hear about what they are doing now and how they can be supported.

    Feminist Workshop

    Western Ukraine has become a refuge for many people. Evacuation trains carried the most vulnerable population groups, covering thousands of kilometers to get them from constant explosions and rocket attacks to relative safety.

    Hospitable Lviv, which is usually associated with old buildings and the Rynok Square impregnated with the aroma of coffee, seems to have been centered around the train station during the war. People came here from the east of the country, from here they went to Poland, and here volunteers met people with hot food.

    The Feminist Workshop has been operating in Lviv since 2014. This non-governmental organization (NGO), which enhanced the formation of the feminist community in Lviv, is now widely known. In peacetime, its employees were involved in educational activities among teenagers, filmed a video blog, and organized fem schools.

    Back in 2019, the Feminist Workshop started a dialogue on the complexity of the militarization perception through a feminist lens. The “(ir)relevant” project analyzed and criticized various forms of violence and its counteraction options under total militarization. Today, this position remains relevant, and the activists focus on direct assistance to women with children and elderly women, and joined the information war.

    First of all, this means providing housing for women facing difficulties, as well as for feminist activists who were forced to evacuate to Lviv. Finding housing for a long time period is very difficult as the city is crowded, but the women working at the Feminist Workshop created a fem-apartment, where one can live for free for up to six months.

    Ivanka, one of the volunteers who recently joined the team, helps take care of children. It is psychologically difficult for women to pay enough attention to their children and, at the same time, not to be in constant stress. In addition, they need to address numerous issues that arise during resettlement — finding housing and work, paperwork, and humanitarian assistance, all of which is much easier to do when there is someone to leave your children with so that they are played with and taken care of.

    The Feminist Workshop also pays attention to older women, which is another vulnerable group with more disabilities. Age gradually affects them and they may have limited work options (if any) or face health issues, and, hence, they need medications and care. The elderly are physically unable to stand in long queues for humanitarian aid or similar things; therefore, through cooperation, the women organized to provide elderly women with necessary items. In addition to food, this includes daily support, if needed, networking, and emotional support.

    These busy activities require constant support. If you want to join as a volunteer, you can write to the team. You can also donate to support the projects and humanitarian aid by following the link.

    Women’s Perspectives

    Another team that has always operated in Lviv is Women’s Perspectives. Registered in 1998, this was one of the first feminist organizations in Ukraine. During the entire period of its work, it has implemented over 30 projects and assisted more than 5,000 people.

    The organization’s priorities include gender equality, combating domestic violence and human trafficking, and supporting women’s and human rights organizations. The priorities have not changed since the beginning of the full-scale war, unlike the forms of their manifestation and organization.

    Almost immediately at the beginning of the war, the team found a large room, provided by business owners. The typical office center has turned into a shelter for women and children. They can spend the night here before going further, or stay longer, if needed. They can get medicines and food or psychological counseling (for both adults and children). Importantly, children have one more option: non-formal education classes. The team realizes that a large number of people staying in one place are difficult not only for the hosts, but also for the displaced people themselves. Therefore, the team redirects them to safe regions in Ukraine that are not as densely populated as Lviv, and transfers them to a shelter for internally displaced persons.

    As the war progresses, the number of shelters seems to decrease. It is becoming increasingly difficult to find humanitarian aid or housing. Although some cities (such as Kyiv) have become safer compared to February, a large part of the country is still a dangerous combat zone. Dnipro, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Mykolayiv are frequently shelled, and it is unsuitable to return there, especially for those with children, and many people have no home to return to. Aware of these new war challenges, which will not simply disappear, Women’s Perspectives wants to create two more shelters. They will differ from the existing one in that they will function not as temporary shelters, but as long-term and comfortable shelters for women with children who cannot return home.

    The organization requires facilities, appliances, and medicines for displaced people. To donate, please follow the link.

    Lviv is now crowded and busy. Organizations, associations, and entire cultural projects are being relocated here; humanitarian goods pass through Lviv; and people rest here before crossing the border and try to plan their further lives.

    Insight and “Marsh Zhinok”

    The NGO Insight and the Marsh Zhinok (Women’s March) initiative are also active during the war. Insight has always supported the LGBT+ community, which is its major task that is still relevant today. However, before the war this was mostly with an informational support blog; now there is a whole set of issues on the organization’s Facebook page, including searching for shelter, medical and psychological assistance, and so on. There was established cooperation prior to the war, like support with trans-transition, but now all these processes face new challenges.

     Marsh Zhinok has never positioned itself as a volunteer organization, but exclusively as a feminist initiative about women and for women. Its work relies on this principle and now, though many consider assistance a volunteer activity, the representatives themselves talk about it as something that they simply must provide.

    From their first days, the organizations have been working at a crazy tempo. Two lines were set up to provide help and psychological support: one for the LGBT+ community and the other for women. They offer crisis psychological assistance and psychological consultations, for which they created simple application forms, as well as consultations on legal issues, including regarding lost housing, paperwork, going abroad, etc.

    “From the first days of the war, we started looking for a place for shelters in the west of Ukraine, where people could spend a night or stay longer, get necessary things and medicines. Currently, there are three such spaces, two in Lviv and one in Chernivtsi,” Taisiya Gerasimova says.

    There are seven people on the team now and, in addition, 12 volunteers who constantly help with organization, finding housing, coordinating people, and providing humanitarian assistance.


    Photo of a shelter in Lviv

    “Organizing humanitarian aid is a serious challenge. There are a lot of requests, especially from women with children, elderly women, and those who are not able to buy essentials.

    These are people who were evacuated from dangerous areas and who lost their jobs and homes. Every day, a team of volunteers sends 100–130 shipments to different parts of Ukraine, where delivery service is available.

    We tried different approaches to collecting applications for help. For some time, the application form was constantly open, and we could receive 3,000 applications a day. We could not handle such an amount, neither financially nor physically. So now we have come to the point when we open the form for a limited time. In the 40 minutes that the form is open, we receive about 150 applications.

    I would also like to talk about the humanitarian hub volunteer team — almost 60 people! Almost all of them moved to Lviv because of the war. Most found the organization via our social media pages or our shared posts about searching for female volunteers, while some came with a friend, and several people live in our shelters.”

    Organizing humanitarian aid is a small world, where everyone has their own tasks: find people to help with procurement, packaging, or delivery; people who process and distribute applications; and people who take care of others. Some people do this in Ukraine and some work from abroad. Everyone has faced new challenges.

    Taisiya Gerasimova notes that their focus on supporting transgender people still has a clear mechanism, despite becoming more difficult due to the war. This includes providing medicines that cannot be bought in pharmacies, advice on crossing the border, and assistance with other medical and legal issues that arise in the process. Gradually, in all spheres, things are getting back to normal in Ukraine, but this was not the case in the first weeks of the war, since there were many questions and applications that needed to be urgently addressed.

    Despite a higher level of European tolerance, LGBT+ people face numerous challenges. These are both general, such as finding housing and work or paperwork, and more localized issues, such as registration (living together may be not allowed if people are not officially registered as a couple), receiving specific medical care (for example, for trans people), and psychological support. The Insight team helps with all these issues in cooperation with European organizations that joined during the war and are using their own resources.

    Insight and Marsh Zhinok operate at their own expense. Finding funding for rental housing and to purchase items is a separate challenge. In the first month, private donations from Ukraine and around the world helped a lot. However, as time passes, the global community’s interest is also gradually declining — they do not realize the scale of the humanitarian crisis, which is now pervasive in Ukrainian society. If you would like to join and help, you can donate to Insight and Marsh Zhinok here and here.

    Sphere and Kharkiv Pride

    Sphere and KharkivPride operate similarly to Insight and Marsh Zhinok. They also have two activities: women and feminist optics, and the LGBT+ community.

    Currently, the team consists of 11 employees scattered not only throughout Ukraine but also around the world. There are those who remained in Kharkiv despite daily shelling, and there are also those who were forced to leave; hence, most of the projects are organized remotely.

    Many projects that started before the full-scale invasion were reformatted as the war escalated. Some of the ideas seem less relevant now, while others require significant funding. The budget has been redistributed considering urgent needs, and funds have been allocated for humanitarian aid. The humanitarian assistance provided by these project teams includes essentials and remittances that cover the cost of basic goods for women and LGBT+ community members.

    During the war, LGBT+ chats were created and eventually identical groups appeared for women. All this is realized in the “equal-to-equal” format as the main trigger that is being worked out is war. Prior to the full-scale invasion, psychological assistance was one of the work areas and did not actually stand out among others, but now it is the main task. The only thing that support groups and professional psychological counseling do not work with is rape in war.

    One of the humanitarian aid areas that has already been provided is support for women at the front: contraception, menstrual cups, personal hygiene products (including pads, tampons), pregnancy tests, medications, etc. The police and volunteers made it possible to transfer this assistance to female combatants and civilian women in the combat zone.

    Currently, Sphere and KharkivPride are gradually resuming their typical activities. They support their own project-hub, conversation clubs in Ukrainian, speaking clubs in English, psychological support groups, and educational broadcasts on current topics. You can support them by following the link.

    La Strada

    Ukrainian communities work in all areas. Not only physical support (babysitting, bringing some food, provide transportation) is important. Psychological, legal, and informational support are also crucial. That is what La Strada is about.

    Its major activities include informing and counteracting violence, discrimination, and human trafficking. It declares feminist values and works relentlessly. It did not stop working during the COVID-19 pandemic and continued helping in the most difficult times.

    “The war has radically changed our work,” Alyona Krivulyak, director of the Hotlines Department, says. There are two lines: the National Hotline for the Prevention of Domestic Violence, Human Trafficking, and Gender Discrimination and the National Hotline for Children and Youth.

    The war has created new obstacles. Before, the team worked in an office in Kyiv, but now its members are scattered all over the world. It was important to keep the same phone numbers available and make sure that everyone is safe, has a stable Internet connection, and is psychologically able to work. The team could not return to the office since it is dangerous. For the first three weeks of the war, they provided consultations only through La Strada webpages, responding to inquiries and messages. For instance, they created a whole series of publications , providing information on how to evacuate to different EU countries.

    Since March 11, the hotlines have resumed their work and now work 24/7 while involving all possible resources.

    The key issues have not changed: violence, both domestic and gender-based, and protection of children’s interests and rights. However, there is one “but.” During the war, the number of appeals has significantly increased. This is due to the general tension, increase in the number of those having access to weapons, and increase in the number of cases of violence (psychological and sexual). The result is that the hotlines, social networks, and e-mail operate literally day and night.

    Prior to the full-scale war, the National Hotline for Children and Youth operated from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. Now it operates day and night since the huge challenges for society and children in need of psychological help should be properly addressed.

    The number of appeals to the Hotline for the Prevention of Domestic Violence, Human Trafficking, and Gender Discrimination has also increased. Women began to experience more violence and more fear due to the increased accessibility of weapons, and if previously a quarrel could end in beatings, now there are even more dangerous threats with weapons.

    Most often, appeals come from war victims. La Strada has had experience with internally displaced persons since 2014, so this is not a new category of people for them; the only change is that the number of their appeals has significantly increased. To date, there are many inquiries about how to evacuate from combat zones, leave the temporarily occupied territories for the territory controlled by Ukraine, register as an IDP, obtain IDP status, get social benefits from the state, safely get abroad and not face possible human trafficking, take children abroad, adapt to living abroad, what status to obtain, and so on — all these issues currently constitute the largest category of appeals.

    However, the issue of domestic violence has by no means become less relevant as the number of respective appeals is still large. There are many concomitant factors that are directly related to the war and negatively affect domestic violence victims. In particular, considering active combat zones, a woman facing domestic violence in her family has almost no one to turn to. She also has no possibility to undergo a forensic medical examination to be able to prove anything later since hospitals are destroyed or used by the occupiers for their own purposes.

    The constant availability of telephone consultations is crucial. This helps to accompany victims at each stage. La Strada strives to organize everything so that a victim of violence does not communicate with the occupying authorities, with the exception of emergency medical care.

    Of course, the war shifts the focus in the country. In particular, military support and protection of territories have become crucial. Other issues seem to be much less relevant, and focus on the external enemy prevents solving internal challenges. Even prior the war, the police did not do their job very well and sometimes ignored women’s complaints about domestic violence, but now the number of such complaints has statistically increased. Female victims themselves also believe that their own security is not so relevant and, during the full-scale war, are ashamed to seek help, appealing to the fact that Ukraine is at war and, hence, all structures should focus on saving the country, supporting the military, and defending from the enemy.

    Another issue is the rape of Ukrainian women by Russian Federation occupiers. So far, there have not been so many such appeals, but there are some. Representatives of organization themselves consider their sample of such cases unrepresentative as not all women survive the rape, not all of them have an opportunity to leave the occupied territories, and not all of them dare to seek help.

    If you want to support La Strada, you can do so by following the link.

    JurFem

    Legal consultations, which are one of La Strada’s activities, are the focus of the JurFem Ukrainian Women Lawyers Association. JurFem was founded as a space for women lawyers, which later turned into a systematic network of female judges, lawyers, and other professionals in this field. The association has its own membership terms, goals and objectives, and charter.

    During the period of the Russian Federation’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, JurFem has become one of the largest information spaces. It provides legal advice on a number of the most pressing issues that have arisen during martial law and that everyone has faced in one way or another, including the status and rights of internally displaced persons, border crossing issues (women with children, orphans, and husbands), the difference between refugee status and temporary protection status, and the work of courts, notaries, and law practices.

    The organization covers issues such as violence, sexual harassment, etc. Its website provides articles on what to do if one has experienced sexual violence or witnessed it, how to properly record it, and who to turn to for help. There is also a rape hotline. If a victim of sexual violence can receive legal advice, a professional female lawyer is assigned in the required region, and, if necessary, an individual security plan is drawn up and information on shelters, NGOs, and psychologists in the region is provided.

    There are several ways to help JurFem: share their articles and contacts, join if you are a female legal expert, and donate to support the project.

    Vis

    Another city that has hosted many people is Vinnytsia. It has also been attacked by the enemy, but so far it is relatively calm and one can walk the cozy streets to the playgrounds or along the Southern Bug River, or admire the light and music fountain. Vinnytsia welcomes and gives comfort and peace, but all this is created by female public figures, organizations, and volunteers. One of these public organizations is Vis (Axis).

    Vis has operated since 2010. Its initial primary purpose was to ensure equal rights and opportunities for people to be active and exist in all spheres of life. Gradually, the tasks were formulated more clearly: support for girls and women and their leadership; informational and educational activities in the field of human rights; raising awareness of the problems in combating various types of violence; and developing volunteering and employment assistance for people in difficult life circumstances. The latter task has become one of the priorities during the war.

    Prior to the war, Vis and Women’s Perspectives held a femencamp for girls aged 18 to 23. With support from the Ukrainian Women’s Fund, Vis implemented information projects, such as information and support bots for girls, an anti-violence advocacy campaign, participation in women’s marches, forums, etc. Long and effective cooperation over many years with various NGOs, foundations, and organizations has contributed to the widespread popularity of and support for Vis.

    From the first days of the war, Vis and other local NGOs organized a humanitarian center. One week after the start of the war, donor organizations, which were also previously known for feminist activities, began to offer their help and resources. The humanitarian center, which emerged almost spontaneously, was later systematized. First and foremost, people needed food, medicines, and hygiene products. Vis managed to organize a more individualized approach so people can get what they really need. This possibility to choose also contributes to psychological well-being: instead of constantly standing in queues for a standard set of basic products (which are decreasingly available during the war and, hence, the number of items in a social set is also decreasing), a person can choose what they need.

    Vinnytsia is a big city, hosting many organizations, both governmental and private, non-governmental ones. Almost from the first days of the war, all of them reorganized their activities to provide more substantial assistance to people in accordance with the new needs. However, there are still gaps, some of which have become the focus of Vis.

    For example, humanitarian aid is often provided only to registered IDPs, and until they are registered, they cannot claim help. However, the need for food, medicines, hygiene products, and baby food cannot wait. In addition, many foundations provide one-time assistance. This helps if a person can find a job and arrange a new life for the future, but there are currently few job vacancies and basic needs remain unmet. The problem of housing is also relevant in Vinnytsia. There are few shelters; most people are forced to rent an apartment, and most of their money is spent on this, which makes it impossible to provide for other needs.

    There is a problem of women and children staying not only in cities, but also in various small villages. If cities are already more or less organized in terms of assistance and providing better food and psychological support, such opportunities are simply non-existent in rural areas. Vis wants to focus specifically on this issue as, according to its data, about 170,000 internally displaced persons live in Vinnytsia Oblast now (as of May 16, when Vis representative Svitlana Dubina was interviewed – Ed.). It can also a safe assumption that many of them have not registered. Even with humanitarian aid, the situation is difficult in rural areas: most resources are available directly in cities, and few reach villages. Another problem is psychological support. The only thing left for people in villages is online counseling and psychological support hotlines, but not everyone is aware of such lines or sure if they work. Access to information is extremely important nowadays; therefore, it is currently a highly relevant issue to provide information and psychological support to all possible vulnerable groups regardless of their location. Svitlana and her team plan to go to the villages of Vinnytsia region with this mission.

    As for general informational and educational work, this one of Vis’ major activities prior to the war has slightly decreased now. All the campaigns planned for March 8 (International Women’s Day) were canceled due to the war. However, for example, the team created a feminist calendar, and now copies are distributed to those who care.

    Currently, two issues are particularly relevant. First is organizing specific psychological assistance. Volunteers and team members always communicate with people who coming to them, but this is not enough, as people often need not only support, but also expert help. The second issue is traveling to villages to provide humanitarian, informational, and security assistance.

    “There are resources — we need forces to fulfill them,” Svitlana says. As the war develops, unfortunately global attention decreases, while the number of issues increases. To follow Vis activities and to support the organization, please use the link.

    Ukrainian Women’s Fund

    Among those who helped Vis at the beginning of the war was the Ukrainian Women’s Fund, which supports women’s and feminist organizations. Fund representatives implement both their own ideas (in Ukraine and abroad) and support similar projects. This usually includes funding socially important projects that are somehow related to women: training courses, educational or informational flash mobs and events, and sociological and socio-cultural research. The war has slightly shifted the focus, but did not change the nature of the team’s activities.

    In the first month of the war alone, the Ukrainian Women’s Fund awarded 37 rapid response grants to various Ukrainian women’s and feminist NGOs. This support enabled organizations to provide humanitarian assistance, including food, medicines, personal hygiene products, household items, and children’s items.

    Recipient organizations of the Ukrainian Women’s Fund are scattered across Ukraine. Segmentally, they support women with disabilities, adolescents, women with children, and the elderly. Despite the possibility to leave the country, all the above categories of citizens are vulnerable. A separate group is those female activists who have stayed in their cities and continued working, even despite shelling. For security reasons, the fund does not publish the full list of assisted associations. Representatives of these associations do their job every day. The fund strives to structure its support and provide funds for real needs.

    If you want to support the Ukrainian Women’s Fund, and with it many Ukrainian feminist organizations, you can do so by following the link.

    NGO Girls

    The NGO Girls operates with support from the Ukrainian Women’s Fund, UNICEF Ukraine, and the Heinrich Boell Foundation’s Office in Ukraine. This is a small team running a social and educational project for teenage girls. Currently, it is mainly focused on local assistance to women with children in Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast, in particular, targeted financial support to victims from Irpin district.

    NGO Girls also provides traditional humanitarian assistance while focusing on small children: diapers, wet wipes, and baby food, along with a standard list of food and medicines. All this is provided to children, women, and the elderly. The organization does not purchase or supply military items.

    Prior the full-scale invasion, thanks to Girls, many educational activities were organized and educational lectures were held in open areas, schools, hubs, etc., because the NGO’s main goal is to encourage girls to consciously build their lives, know themselves, their bodies, and their physiology, and be psychologically mature. Currently, the priority is information warfare on social networks and support for those in need.

    You can donate to NGO Girls by following the link or ordering a lecture.

    GenderZed

    There is a significant increase in the number of various organizations located in the west of Ukraine. In addition to those that have always worked there, there are now those that have evacuated and relocated to western regions. However, life is also busy in other parts of the country. For example, unconquered Zaporizhzhia continues living and working, despite the fact that most of oblast is occupied.

    This is where GenderZed is based. It is a human rights organization working on a wide range of issues related to sexual orientation and gender identity, gender inequality, overcoming stigma regarding the LGBT+ community, and overcoming gender inequality and gender-based violence. Special attention has always been paid to women’s rights and feminist values. A separate area of work is in preventing HIV and sexually transmitted infections. The GenderZed space always provides HIV testing and a free health safe box for men, which includes an oral HIV test, condoms, lubricants, and an information booklet.

    In peacetime, GenderZed was an active participant in all events related to the LGBT+ community, including informational support, gradual overcoming of stigma through educational activities, participation in prides, etc. With the escalation of the war, its activities did not decrease but their focus slightly shifted. Since February 24, the whole team has switched to remote work. In the first days, it disseminated information about the invasion and, when possible, provided psychological support to its audience.

    Later, the organization started providing humanitarian aid to LGBT+ people in need. This was enabled by the overwhelming support of the international community, which disseminates information and donates money for the needs of LGBT+ people.

    The whole team now processes applications for assistance in their free time. Hence, the work is almost round the clock, which is quite difficult, both emotionally and in terms of resources. There are a lot of appeals coming from the temporarily occupied territories and regions affected by rocket attacks. The scale of the tragedy is very large, and even if it sometimes seems that it is getting calmer, people’s need for psychological support is only growing, because the war is still ongoing.

    However, the organization has not stopped doing its main work. It continues educating and informing, as well as testing for HIV, syphilis, and hepatitis C. The front line is very close, but the challenges that were relevant before the full-scale war have not disappeared with its escalation.

    Prior the full-scale invasion, the organization had been planning a new project for lesbians and bisexuals called “Girls for Girls.” February 24 put these plans on hold, but now the project has finally been launched, promoting hygiene and understanding the female body, safe sex between women, and the importance of safety. In addition, a Telegram bot has been created specifically for lesbians and bisexuals that provides an opportunity to follow a quest on women’s health, raise awareness, and get a fem-box similar to the one that has existed for some time in the men’s organization.

    On its social media pages, GenderZed publishes information that can be useful during the war, such as seeking shelter, humanitarian assistance, opportunities to help the army, etc. All this is systematized and summarized to ensure quick and easy access at any time.

    If you would like to support GenderZed activities in Zaporizhzhia, you can do so by following the link.

    KyivPride

    At one time, GenderZed joined the organization of the first Pride in Zaporizhzhia. Zaporizhzhia Pride did not manage to become a completely independent and well-known project; however, KyivPride and KharkivPride are currently active in Ukraine.

    Since the beginning of the full-scale war, KyivPride has continued its activities, but has almost completely changed the way it helps LGBT+ people in Ukraine. Of course, information work has remained the most relevant, including through social networks, but now it also involves cooperation with well-known publications and news agencies from more than 15 countries, including BBC News, TIME Magazine, New York Times, GAY Times, and Pink News. Europeans have a lot of stereotypes and even terrible notions about the state of the LGBT+ community in Ukraine, because the issue has never been widely covered. The war and, as a result, the dissemination of information have helped to reduce stereotypes and organize assistance to the community.

    During the war, about 400,000 hryvnias have been spent on targeted assistance, including for food, medicines, hygiene items, other essentials items, and household goods. More than 650 queer people have received assistance and continue receiving it; the application form is still available.

    In Kyiv, together with GAU, KyivPride opened a shelter for LGBT+ people and their families. This is important not only in terms of how many people could have lost their homes, but also in terms of psychological condition. After all, unfortunately, not everyone and not everywhere is ready to rent an apartment to a homosexual couple or settle such people. Besides, not all of them want to stay in the city, especially as it was dangerous in Kyiv for a long time since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Hence, KyivPride began to organize its own evacuation trips to the west of Ukraine and abroad.

    Another activity is psychological assistance. There are support groups three times a week, involving trained psychologists who have experience working directly with the LGBT+ community.

    KyivPride not only helps in terms of resources, but also focuses on its primary goal. For instance, a joint KyivPride and WarsawPride is planned for June 25. The Prides will unite and hold a joint march for peace and freedom in Ukraine and against Russian aggression. It is not possible to hold Kyiv Pride in the usual format, because this is dangerous, but the Warsaw community is supporting the march against the war and for freedom and human rights.

    “We provide space to the voices that need to sound louder.”

    Support KyivPride by following the link.

    From Kharkiv to Lviv, from Kyiv to Mariupol, from Zaporizhzhia to Vinnytsia — we have all changed our plans and daily activities and abandoned the usual for the sake of the needed. Everyone works tirelessly, providing shelter and basic needs. Anyone in need can apply.

    Support feminist and LGBT organizations in Ukraine

    I need shelter or humanitarian aid

    I need psychological or legal support

  • Sexual Violence During the War: What Do We Know About It and How Can We Counteract It?

    Translated from Ukrainian by Galyna Kotliuk.

    Sexual violence is an instrument of war used by the Russian Federation occupiers to harm the Ukrainian population, suppress resistance, and demotivate the army. Some incidences of rape have become known after the liberation of Ukrainian cities and towns, even more of them we will hear after the eastern regions of Ukraine are liberated. However, some women and men, even being trapped in the occupied territories and in the active combat zone, are looking for an opportunity to talk about the violence perpetrated by the Russian Federation’s military.

    It is important to understand that sexual violence is not just about rape. It is any act of a sexual nature committed without a person’s consent. This includes forced nudity, compulsion to watch an act of sexual abuse, sexual slavery, prostitution, genital mutilation, etc. All these actions are defined as war crimes – a violation of the laws and rules of war.

    Alyona Kryvulyak, director of the La Strada-Ukraine National Hotline, notes that many victims of sexual violence committed by the Russian Federation occupiers have been ignoring this traumatic experience. Thus far, they have needed to satisfy their basic needs or solve urgent problems: relocation, adaptation, humanitarian aid, employment, etc.

    What do we know about the crimes of the Russian Federation occupiers?

    The news about Russian soldiers raping women, men, and children began to emerge from the first days of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Sexual violence in the occupied territories is widespread, but at the moment it is not possible to count the exact number of cases.

    Organizations such as the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, and La Strada-Ukraine are documenting sexual violence in Ukraine. “The cases we have documented are characterized by unspeakable, deliberate cruelty and violence against Ukrainian civilians. Rape, murder, and other violent acts against people in the Russian forces’ custody should be investigated as war crimes”,

    said Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch.

    It is extremely difficult to document all allegations of violence and obtain new testimonies from survivors due to the ongoing fighting and occupation and isolation of many towns and villages. Reports of atrocities against civilians come from people who could leave the occupied territories or after the liberation of certain areas.

    In early March, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba spoke about numerous cases of sexual violence in occupied cities. After that, Ukrainian Members of Parliament also began to report that Russian Federation soldiers deliberately and purposefully shot at women and children because Ukraine did not surrender. According to them, women of all ages – from the youngest to the oldest – have been gang-raped and sometimes killed.

    The cases reported in the media are strikingly cruel and inhumane: the occupiers killed men and raped their wives in the next room, forced people to watch acts of violence committed against their relatives, etc. Some women and girls became pregnant as a result of sexual violence perpetrated by the occupiers. The psychological help hotline reports rapes of children, both girls and boys. Children often die from their injuries, and violence is intentionally committed in front of their parents. It is important to note that Russians commit sexual violence against men and the elderly.

    Lyudmila Denisova, who served as Ukraine’s ombudsperson from March 2018 until May 2022, says that the Russian Federation uses rape and other forms of sexual violence as a warfare tactic – systematically, everywhere, and with tremendous brutality. Therefore, these cases cannot be explained as a vice of certain individuals. The occupiers also brag to their relatives and friends in Russia about atrocities committed, as has been proved by their conversations intercepted by the Security Service of Ukraine.

    Some the occupiers’ wives support and encourage them to commit atrocities. A conversation was recorded where a wife of a Russian military serviceman “allowed” him to rape Ukrainian women, provided that he will use condoms and will not tell her anything. Another occupier’s wife described to him in detail how she herself would like to join the abuse: she would mutilate women’s genitals and carve stars on their backs.

    Why do the military rape civilians?

    The International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict names the motives of the aggressor, including the achievement of military objectives. When sexual violence is perpetrated in a mass manner, it is considered part of a large-scale attack on civilians or is an act of genocide. Such crimes can be committed by direct or indirect command, as well as when commanders systematically “close their eyes” and ignore violations of the rules by their subordinates. Sexual violence can also be used to weaken and gain control of a community. It can be a kind of torture that the aggressors use to punish, humiliate, and intimidate their victims or force them to disclose information. Importantly, sexual violence against civilians can be a reward for soldiers. This method also makes soldiers become accomplices in crimes, tying them to a group.

    Dara Kay Cohen, author of Rape During Civil War, writes that sometimes in military conflicts, gang rape becomes a ritual to acclimate novice fighters to violence. This is especially relevant in patriarchal societies, where maturity and courage are associated with violence and domination. The researcher points out that rape as a form of forced socialization is often used in non-voluntary military formations, one that are formed through forced conscription. Rape as a warfare method is much less common among military personnel who become part of an army of their own accord.

    Among the personal factors is the constant stress soldiers face during combat, which they seek to relieve. They can be driven by hatred of their enemy, the desire to avenge their fallen comrades, or to exercise power over the weak, thus symbolically regaining control of their own lives.

    What do world statistics say?

    Soldiers committed rape during 20th century wars with different intensity and different motivations. It could have been as a result of the direct order of a commander (as a strategic tool of war to intimidate the civilian population and to demoralize enemy troops) or from combatants’ own desire. The extent and scale of this war crime is impressive. Here are just some of the most famous examples.

    • The so-called “Rape of Nanjing” in December 1937 – the siege of a Chinese city by the Japanese army, six weeks of killings and mass rapes. At least 20,000 women, children, and the elderly were raped during the occupation.

    • In 1945, the Soviet Red Army committed nearly 2,000,000 rapes in the conquered part of Germany, including more than 100,000 cases during the Battle of Berlin. The Soviet command ignored and concealed these facts.

    • According to Bob Lilly, a historian at Northern Kentucky University who gained access to the archives of U.S. military courts, American soldiers committed nearly 14,000 rapes in England, France, and Germany between 1942 and 1945. This resulted in a military discipline problem, which was actively counteracted.

    • Mass rapes took place during the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, during the war in Liberia (1989-2003), and in many other countries. Rape has also been reported as a way of waging war during the Tigray War in Ethiopia (2020-2021).

    Rape as a typical instrument of war used by Russian Federation soldiers

    Sexual crimes committed by the Russian Federation military are systemic and intentional. Over the last 30 years, they were perpetrated in Chechnya, the Republic of Georgia, Syria, and other countries. The behaviour of Russian Federation soldiers is the same everywhere.

    Ichkeria. The rape of women during both wars for Ichkeria’s independence was massive and public. Russian Federation commanders watched these crimes and sometimes participated in the acts of violence. According to Human Rights Watch, detecting and documenting rapes of Chechen women was a very difficult process since sexual harassment is a taboo topic in Chechen society, and thus many survivors remained silent about the violence they had faced. However, some testimonies were documented. Women residents of the city of Aldi said that the Russian military first raped Chechen women and then killed them. It is also known that rapes had a repeated nature: women were taken from one household to another to be raped.

    According to the residents of Sernovodskoe village, the Russian Federation military raped several dozen men in an open field. Nothing like that had happened in Ichkeria before; only cases of sexual violence against men in prisons had been known about, but such kinds of mass and public crimes had not before been committed by the military. Information about the rapes was publicized much later, since this type of violence is considered one of the most severe in the Caucasus region.

    Journalists and human rights activists who were covering the events in Ichkeria reported that at the beginning of the Second Chechen War in 1999, large units of camp guards, officers, and privates were relocated to Ichkeria. They systematically committed rapes first in camps and then against civilians. This is the old Gulag method of destroying an individual. In the war against the Chechens, rape was used consciously and intentionally.

    Republic of Georgia. During the war in South Ossetia in 2008, the Russian Federation military kidnapped, raped, and killed young women and men. This has been documented in eyewitness testimonies. One Georgian woman, whose name has not been disclosed, appealed to the Court of Justice of the European Union. According to her, non-Georgian soldiers broke into her house located near the conflict zone during the Russian-Georgian war. They raped and robbed her.

    Syria. According to a UN report, in Syria, Russian Federation “peacekeepers” together with Syrian pro-government forces raped children, women, and men in order to punish communities that were opposing them. Civilians were first raped during property searches and ground warfare, and then at checkpoints and detention facilities. Boys and men were forced to have sex with each other and with other relatives. They were also raped with various objects.

    Why little is said about sexual violence

    In 2014-2015, residents of the eastern regions of Ukraine began to report the rape of women in the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) Zone. There are still no official statistics on rapes committed during the eight years of fighting and occupation in the eastern regions of Ukraine. It is extremely difficult to record all the crimes as some of the victims have died and some who are now in safety are afraid or ashamed to talk about their experiences. Perpetrators who are located in the occupation zone or in the Russian Federation are extremely difficult to prosecute.

    According to La Strada-Ukraine director Alyona Kryvulyak, in the three months of the full-scale invasion, their hotline received 17 reports about sexual violence committed by the Russian Federation occupiers: 16 reports from women and one from a man. Until recently, sexual crimes committed by the occupiers were regularly reported about by the Commissioner for Human Rights Lyudmila Denisova.


    Alyona Kryvulyak

    However, these are not representative statistics: the published data do not correspond to the scale of the crimes, which is difficult to assess for several reasons. According to Alyona Kryvulyak, the first and foremost obstacle is the great fear of reporting such crimes. Many people who have suffered from sexual violence perpetrated by the Russian Federation soldiers are not ready to talk about it because they are uncertain about their safety and the general situation in the country. Even if the town where the crime took place has already been liberated, the citizens are still afraid that the Russians may return.

    The second reason is gender stereotypes, which are still prevalent during the war. People are afraid of condemnation and for their public reputation. Some survivors of sexual violence may have faced victim blaming, which is quite wide-spread in Ukrainian society.

    La Strada has been working with issues of sexual violence during the war since 2014, and the organization’s employees say that there were only a few appeals before and after the full-scale Russian Federation invasion. Although the state is now making a major contribution to record and document cases of violence, and the media are making every effort to raise awareness of the problem, the shame and fear of talking about it still remain.

    What does international and Ukrainian legislation say?

    The sexual violence perpetrated by the military is punishable. Punishment is imposed as a result of legal proceedings in the International Criminal Court in The Hague, started by Ukrainian tribunals or national courts. Therefore, it is important to record crimes and gather as much evidence as possible to bring the perpetrators to justice.

    Lilia Oliynyk, a lawyer and member of the JurFem: Support for Victims of Sexual Violence and All Forms of Gender Discrimination initiative, says that there are various international and national tools for regulating sexual crimes during war.

    For example, the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949) stipulates in Article 14 that prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their personality and their honour. It also states that “women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex.”

    The Principles of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), namely Article 27, stipulate that “women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”

    Article 75 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (1977), prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.” Article 76 also postulates direct protection of women from “rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault”, and Article 77 guarantees the protection of children “against any form of indecent assault.”

    According to Khrystyna Kit, head of the JurFem Association of Women Lawyers of Ukraine, it is important to realize that the responsibility for sexual violence committed during a conflict or war lies not only with the perpetrator, but also with the military command of the unit where a perpetrator served at the time of committing a crime. Article 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides for a commander’s liability for war crimes, crimes of genocide, and crimes against humanity.


    Khrystyna Kit

    As for Ukraine’s national legislation, legal liability for violating the laws of war is articulated in the Criminal Code of Ukraine. According to Lilia Oliynyk, Article 438 guarantees punishment for the ill-treatment of prisoners of war or civilians, for using means of warfare prohibited by international law, and for other violations of the laws of war. Such actions are punishable by imprisonment of up to 8-12 years. If combined with intentional murder, the crimes are punishable by imprisonment for 10-15 years or life imprisonment.

    Article 442 of the Criminal Code also provides liability for the crime of genocide, which is defined as “an act intentionally committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group by killing the members of such group or causing them serious bodily harm, inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to decrease or prevent births within the group, or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

    Depending on the circumstances of the sexual violence committed by the military, it can also be classified as other war crimes, namely intentional murder, torture or inhuman treatment, intentional infliction of severe suffering, serious bodily injury or health damage, infliction on persons under the control of the opposing party physical injuries that cause death or seriously endanger health of such persons, or encroachment upon personal dignity, including abusive and degrading treatment.

    Lawyer Maria Zheltukha emphasizes that the president must sign the bill “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on the Implementation of International Criminal and Humanitarian Law” № 2689 of December 27, 2019. This document will provide criminal prosecution for international crimes, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.


    Maria Zheltukha

    The expert notes that it is also necessary for Ukraine to ratify the Istanbul Convention [transl.: Ukraine ratified the Istanbul Convention on June 22, 2022]. This document will help prevent cases of gender-based violence and ensure the investigation of such crimes and the punishment of perpetrators. In addition, the convention will provide legal and psychological help and services to overcome psychological trauma for people who have been sexually abused, including those involved in conflict.

    How do Ukrainian officials fight sexual violence?

    Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Olha Stefanishyna is currently working on reorienting government resources to create centres of psychological, medical, and legal services to citizens who have suffered sexual violence committed by the Russian Federation occupiers. Stefanishyna is also facilitating expanding cooperation with the UN to prevent and effectively respond to sexual violence during the war.


    Olha Stefanishyna

    Human Rights Commissioner. Lyudmila Denisova collects and records cases of sexual violence committed by the Russian Federation military in the temporarily occupied territories and in the war zone. In April, a special telephone hotline for psychological help was launched, where those in need can find help from five expert professionals. Importantly, in May 2022, Ukrainian media representatives signed an open appeal to Denisova demanding that she change her rhetoric when reporting sexual crimes during the war, which are published on her official pages, and to avoid excessive descriptions. [transl.: Parliament relieved Ms. Denisova of her duties as the Human Rights Commissioner on May 31, 2022]


    Lyudmila Denisova

    Government Commissioner for Gender Policy. Kateryna Levchenko creates brochures and booklets that instruct what to do in case of witnessing rape or experiencing sexual violence. She is currently working on establishing an international platform that will help ensure decent treatment and respect for the human rights of survivors.


    Kateryna Levchenko

    Psychological advice: how to protect yourself, survive, and manage trauma

    Rapes in peacetime and during war have completely different aims, and thus the approaches to helping victims of violence need to be different, because common methods are no longer effective.

    A psychologist and volunteer who works with people who have experienced violence by the Russian Federation military suggests the following advice. It is important to mention that no advice guarantees safety and recovery. The human body can have different reactions to stress, but whatever the situation, a person should never blame themself.

    1. The currently available information proves that nothing can stop the occupiers from sexual violence. Age, gender, appearance, or the presence of children nearby are no restraints for them. In an occupied city, it is necessary to try not to attract the occupiers’ attention and, if possible, to stay in shelters.

    2. In a situation that threatens to escalate into violence, you should try to assess the power balance and the degree of threat. Resisting and fighting back against rapists can lead to injury or death. Life is the highest value and preserving it should be the highest priority.

    3. In critical stressful situations, activate a protective mechanism called dissociation, a feeling of detachment from reality, as if the brain exists separately from the body. This feeling can be used to enhance self-preservation mechanisms, and thus you should try to amplify it. Maximum emotional and physical detachment helps to survive traumatic events.

    4. Survivors of violence should leave the scene as soon as it possible. If there are trustworthy people nearby, ask for help.

    5. Take care of yourself in a safe place. If there is water available, take a shower, use wet wipes (but not alcohol-based), give yourself some basic medical care. You can lie in a fetal position in order to feel the ground and come to your senses.

    6. Help from people you trust is important. These can be relatives, friends, psychologists, or volunteers.

    7. If you have enough resources, try to save your clothes and all other things that can help in the investigation of the crime. After stabilizing your state of body and mind, you should apply to the police to record the crime and increase the chances of bringing perpetrators to justice. You should be especially careful and consider all the risks: if the occupiers find any evidence, a person might face other immediate dangers.

    8. If you know or see that a person you love or know has been abused, you should offer your help. This should be done as carefully as possible, asking about what is needed, not about what has happened. If nothing is needed, just be there for support.

    What should you do if it is not possible to see a doctor?

    The Euromaidan SOS initiative, Ukrainian Bar Association, and obstetrician-gynaecologist Natalia Lelyukh have developed recommendations for rape crime survivors in case medical care is unavailable.

    Treating genital injuries

    Use alcohol-free antiseptics, a baking soda solution (1 teaspoon per 0.5 litters of water), clean water, alcohol-free baby wet wipes, Triderm ointment, Levomecol ointment, Triacutan ointment, Bepanthen ointment, or use chlorhexidine once.

    Do not use alcohol-based antiseptics and wipes, hydrogen peroxide, panthenol, oil, or other oil solutions.

    If there are any vaginal antiseptic or antibacterial suppositories, apply them for 5-6 days. If there are injuries to the mucous membrane, bleeding, or hematomata, it is advised to start applying suppositories every other day.

    WARNING! The dosage for all these products is indicated for adults. Teenagers need to consult a doctor to adjust the dosage (if it is not possible to get a consultation, carefully read the product instructions).

    Preventing infectious diseases (gonorrhea, chlamydia, trichomoniasis). If possible, the following medications should be taken: metronidazole 500 mg – twice a day for 7 days; ceftriaxone 1 g – intramuscular injection once; azithromycin 2 g – one time. All of the medications can be used during pregnancy in any trimester.

    Preventing unwanted pregnancy. Take any hormonal contraceptive in the following dosage (the active ingredients are present in most brands of contraceptives): 0.1 mg ethinylestradiol + at least 0.5 mg levonorgestrel (drospirenone, dienogest). Take the same dose again in 12 hours. This contraception is most effective if the drug is used in the first 24-72 hours after unprotected contact.

    How to document evidence of sexual violence committed by the occupiers

    Usually, documenting crimes is difficult, especially sexual ones, in occupied territories and in active war zones.  Khrystyna Kit, head of JurFem, emphasizes that according to international practice, victims’ testimony may be sufficient evidence of sexual violence crime in the absence of any other additional evidence from other witnesses, documents, medical records, photographs, or any other potentially corroborating evidence.

    Lawyer Lilia Oliynyk says that, first of all, it is important to provide survivors with psychological and physical security, help them restore their equilibrium, and find strength to proceed in court.


    Lilia Oliynyk

    In peaceful times, it is sometimes difficult to document sexual crimes based on medical investigations and examinations. However, regarding sexual violence committed by the Russian Federation soldiers during the war, the standard of proof is different: biological or forensic examinations are not required.

    It is important to know that it is not always necessary to immediately contact police, since this can also pose a danger if the victim is in occupied territory. It is important to secure your personal safety, paying special attention to a personal physical and psychological condition.

    According to the expert, during the war, the focus shifts from the issue of a victim’s consent (the fact of consent or non-consent) to the fact of coercive circumstances. In other words, it is not required to confirm the use of force by a criminal to prove the absence of consent or the fact of resistance. Instead, what is important is to find sufficient evidence to prove the existence of coercive circumstances. For example, occupation is a circumstance that makes it impossible to give real consent.

    La Strada-Ukraine lawyers, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, and the Government Commissioner for Gender Policy prepared instructions on how to gather evidence of sexual violence during the war. Experts advise to document the crime if possible: take photos and videos, write down contacts of possible witnesses. Apart from that, it is important to remember or take notes of the following details: the crime scene, the date and approximate time, and details about the soldiers who committed the violence, such as their names or call signs, approximate age, appearance, rank and their conversations with each other.

    ATTENTION! It is very important to be especially careful and consider all the risks: if the occupiers find this evidence, the person will be in danger.

    The next step will be to apply to law enforcement agencies (police or prosecutor’s office, contacts are listed below). In this case, it is important to ensure that the report is registered and criminal proceedings have been opened. It may also be required to visit a health care facility in order to document the results of the violence. At the hospital, it is necessary to get a medical certificate and keep it. When seeking psychological help, it is also required to obtain conclusions of psychological expertise describing a person’s psychological state after the trauma.

    These materials will provide evidence for courts in Ukraine and The Hague so that the invaders will be punished and the survivors will receive adequate compensation.

    Where should you call to get help?

    If rape or sexual assault has occurred, seek medical help at 103.

    It is also necessary to report the crime to the National Police (102), the Prosecutor General’s Office (0 800 507 001), and the government hotline (1547).

    People who are located in the temporarily occupied territories and cannot seek help from the local authorities can report a crime to the Office of the Prosecutor General by calling 38-096-755-02-40 or by e-mail conflict2022.ua@gmail.com.

    Information for further investigation can be submitted on the website of the Office of the Prosecutor General or via Telegram bots @stop_russian_war_bot and @war_crime_bot.

    For legal aid, you can contact the Free Legal Aid System Contact Centre (0 800 213 103), Jurfem (38-068-145-55-90), or the human rights initiative Euromaidan SOS Telegram bot @ESOSdoc or by e-mail evromaidansos@gmail. com.

    For psychological and legal assistance, contact the National Hotline for the Prevention of Domestic Violence, Trafficking of Human Beings and Gender-Based Discrimination: 116, 123, or 0-800-500-335.

    The Aurora online platform provides special psycho-therapeutic support to people who have experienced violence, including sexual violence during the war. The platform provides expert support from psychotherapists to help overcome traumatic experiences, restore emotional balance, and psychological resources to rebuild life. You can also seek advice from medical professionals to address urgent health issues and ask for professional help from lawyers. Anyone can apply for free support, regardless of gender and age, by completing an anonymous form on the “Break the Circle” website.

    NGO Divchata [transl.: Girls] provides free psychological help to victims of sexual violence. Contact them by mail at helpgodivchata@gmail.com or by phone at 38-073-460-38-60.

    For psychological support from Masha Efrosinina’s project, send an e-mail to a.kariakina@mashafund.org. For psychological help from the “Tell me” organization, contact them via email at tellmecomua@gmail.com.

    Consultations with psychiatrists from the NGO Forpost [transl.: Outpost] can be provided by calling 38-096-839-76-17, or in Telegram at the same number or username @forpostcenter.

    The collective trauma of Ukrainian society

    Obstetrician-gynaecologist and researcher of sexual violence Halyna Maistruk believes that the Ukrainian health care system was not ready for what was happening in the territories temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation.

    “Only now is the Ministry of Health of Ukraine beginning to develop forms and questionnaires that doctors can use to describe and document cases of sexual violence. In peacetime, a doctor could only record and describe the fact of rape, which had to be followed by a forensic expert’s investigation, since the evidence base in court would not be sufficient without it. Now a doctor will not just record, but also will be able to confirm the fact of rape. The process is complicated by the fact that in peacetime, doctors rarely worked with gang rapes. And even if the perpetrators would never be identified, a doctor’s conclusion should be enough for sexual violence to be documented as war crimes,”

    the expert explains.

    Halyna Maistruk adds that, due to the ongoing war, it is extremely difficult to verify crimes committed by the Russian Federation military, and preparing statistics for lawsuits at international courts might take years. According to her, Ukrainian society will receive severe collective trauma, which might take a very long time to overcome.

    How should the media write about sexual violence?

    Many stories of people surviving sexual violence have become known due to media reports. However, not everyone risks disclosing and talking openly about the details of the occupiers’ crimes. Sometimes the media pursue clickbait headlines, trying to catch the audience’s attention at the expense of people who have experienced or witnessed rape.

    Hromadske Radio and Divoche.media have created a joint article to help Ukrainian media work with the topic of sexual violence in a more respectful and ethical way. The experts –

    human rights activist Larysa Denysenko, editor-in-chief of Hromadske Radio Tetyana Troshchynska and editor-in-chief of Divoche.media Oksana Pavlenko – give the following advice.

    1. Follow the “do no harm” principle, even if it seems that this is the minimal harm that will protect others from sexual crimes.
    2. Base your work on the principle of trust. Journalists should listen to the story of a person who has trusted them, but should not play the role of an investigator.
    3. When it comes to verifying a story, it is necessary to record it carefully, but not to arrange a journalistic investigation. According to international law, a survivor’s properly documented story of sexual violence needs no further confirmation.
    4. The media should not intentionally provoke tears, but if a person cries, you should be prepared for it and not be afraid.
    5. Do not try to find any errors in a person’s story. Even if the interviewee confuses some details of their story or forgets certain moments, it does not mean that the person is lying. Contradictory or unclear moments can and should be clarified, but in a delicate and respectful manner.
    6. It is important to remember about personal data protection: do not publish photos and videos that may reveal a person’s identity or place of residence, do not publish any links to a person’s social media, and do not take any photos of the interviewee’s family.
    7. Moreover, a journalist’s duty is to make sure that the person understands the consequences of their frankness.

    It is worth mentioning certain aspects noticed by the media representatives who asked the ombudsperson [Human Rights Commission Lyudmila Denisova – Ed.] to change her rhetoric in covering issues of violence. In particular, they ask for the following.

    1. Disclose only verified information. Check the facts before publishing.
    2. Check and think through every word to avoid creating sensational tabloid news kinds of messages.
    3. Avoid excessive detail in describing crimes.
    4. Use correct terminology and vocabulary: e.g., use the word “survivor” instead of “victim.”
    5. Ensure the confidentiality and safety of survivors, remembering that they can be easily identified if they live in small villages or towns.
    6. Remind about survivors’ support networks (e.g., human rights protection, professional psychological assistance).

    In her expert commentary for Gender in Detail, psychologist Halyna Hook, a volunteer in the mental health crisis service, identified seven principles for properly covering cases of sexual crimes.

    1. Prioritising the traumatised person’s interests above collective (public) interests. The needs of a person who has been abused – their security, privacy, autonomy, and personal freedom – are an absolute priority when disclosing socially significant information.
    2. Informed consent and the principle of its reversibility. Professionals who accompany an abused person have to obtain the person’s informed consent to disclose their story, and  consent can be revoked at any stage. Even if all the materials have been prepared and the work has been done, the person has the right to say “stop.”
    3. Competent intervention. To work with issues of violence, comment on or cover them in the media, one needs to have the necessary knowledge, skills, and relevant experience (the practice of “asking a psychologist for an opinion about …” is quite common today, but often violates this principle).
    4. Confidentiality and anonymity. Information materials on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ill-treatment should protect the survivors’ rights to confidentiality, anonymity, and privacy.
    5. Necessary and sufficient information. Whenever it is possible, media professionals should avoid telling stories of people who have been abused, even if they have their informed consent. It is recommended to refer to official statistics already published, talk about common trends, and discuss the situation in general, not the experience of separate individuals.
    6. Impartial and non-discriminatory approach to coverage. A gender-sensitive approach should be applied when informing society about the Russian military’s ill-treatment of civilians, especially about crimes of sexual violence. Subjective judgments and comments about the degree of traumatic experience of people of different genders or ages should be avoided.
    7. Social significance of information. When disseminating information that deals with sensitive or traumatic topics, it is important to remember that sexual violence is not a residue of war, but a weapon used against the whole society. It is necessary to focus not on individual cases, but on educating the audience, explaining the causes and consequences of certain events, and giving generalized recommendations and useful sources of information as well as professional (and, if required, legal) support.

    Conclusions

    Sexual violence is used as a weapon of war. For the occupiers, this is an easy and effective way to achieve their main goal: to destroy the morale and patriotic spirit of Ukrainian society. When Russian soldiers rape civilians, it is not about sexual interest, but about feeling a sadistic “victory”, establishing control, and in some perverted sense, winning the war. Rape and sexual violence during a conflict are not about sex; they represent power, domination, and humiliation.

    Life is the greatest value, and preserving it must be a priority. The well-being of survivors is also an unconditional priority. Once the survival and well-being of citizens is ensured, the goal of society and government must be to achieve justice and punish perpetrators at the international level and to stop the shameful practice of sexual violence as a weapon of war worldwide, once and for all.

  • Defend the Motherland without discrimination: LGBT+ people in the armies of the world and Ukraine

    Workplace diversity policies are not a whim but a way to help employees realize their professional potential to the best of their ability. This principle is especially true for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is engaged in active combat operations and does not have the luxury of “throwing away” human resources because of individual characteristics that are not directly related to performing duties.

    According to research, at least 3% of people in the United States identify as LGBT+, and 8-11% report homosexual behavior or awareness of homosexual attraction.[1] There is no such research available for Ukraine. Still, one can assume that the percentage of people with non-heterosexual orientation is not country-specific, so the proportion in Ukraine should be around the same.

    In Ukraine, homosexuality or bisexuality is not a condition for removal from service, and same-sex romantic or sexual relationships are not prosecuted and do not breach military law. Therefore, it can be assumed that homosexual and bisexual persons enlist in the Ukrainian army evenly in accordance with their percentage of the population. This means that at least 3% of the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (more than 9,000 people as of the beginning of 2022, before mass mobilization to counter the Russia’s full-scale invasion, and much more after it began) are homosexual or bisexual. Thus, they all are the target audience of potential anti-discrimination policies.

    The rights of LGBT+ military personnel in the EU and the U.S

    Since 2018, LGBT+ people have been free to serve in the military in all EU countries. NATO policy prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, and since 2002, it has extended benefits for military families to same-sex military families. Since 2019, NATO has had a Diversity and Inclusion Action Plan until 2023, focusing primarily on gender equality and nationality equality within the organization. The organization introduced the official International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia (May 17) in 2020.

    In 2021, NATO headquarters hosted the first internal conference on LGBTQ+ perspectives in the workplace.[2] Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg delivered a speech in which he noted that “every member of the LGBTQ+ community at NATO is a valued member of our staff and family.”[3]

    This inclusion was preceded by a struggle, first of all, for the recognition of the LGBT+ community as such. In this text, I will briefly focus on examples from the United States and Germany.

    American society was quite conservative after World War II, and media products that openly targeted homosexual men could not be disseminated. Therefore, health and fitness magazines targeted the audience by publishing visual materials depicting male bodies. In 1956, the Finnish artist Touko Valio Laaksonen submitted his drawings to Physique Pictorial magazine and signed them “Tom.” In 1957, they were first published under the pseudonym “Tom of Finland”, invented by the editor. Since then, Tom’s work has become iconic and greatly influenced queer culture in general and erotic art. Tom painted erotica with men of his liking: tall, strong, engaged in physical labor, in a police uniform, or the outfit of a sailor or a soldier. His works influenced the self-awareness and imagery of the homosexual community, previously dominated by male femininity. They also probably indirectly contributed to the inclusion of the LGBT+ community in power structures.


    Tom of Finland. Untitled. 1974

    Simultaneously, as part of the human rights “track”, Vietnam War veteran Leonard Matlovich became the second openly gay person to come out after Harvey Milk. Being white, Matlovich started with anti-racist activism and later realized the similarities between racial and sexual orientation discrimination. He came out in 1975, first to his superiors and then to the media, making the front page of The New York Times and the cover of Time.

    At the same time, he had to defend in court his right to remain in the army. Initially, he was offered to stay on the condition that he would never practice homosexuality again, which Matlovich did not agree to. The trial lasted until 1980, and Matlovich eventually won – he was reinstated and even promoted. In return, the army offered him to resign with financial compensation. Given the risks of being discharged again for another arbitrary reason and a possible appeal to the conservative Supreme Court, Matlovich chose to accept the money. During his military retirement, he went into business and continued to engage in activism, including fighting for the rights of HIV-positive people, which he was himself since 1986.

    In 1993, the anti-homosexual personnel policy was somewhat eased by introducing the compromise principle of “Don’t ask, don’t tell.” It was assumed that closeted homosexual and bisexual men could serve if they remained closeted, and their superiors could not question or provoke them to come out. This policy was repealed only in 2011, and only then did homosexual and bisexual people gain the opportunity to be open during their military service.


    The cover of Time magazine with Leonard Matlovich. 1975

    In Germany, the LGBT community’s struggle for recognition, particularly in the military, also has a long history, burdened by 12 years of Nazi dictatorship. The biopolitics of the Third Reich were not limited to anti-Semitism and racism; they included strict health and family reproductive behavior requirements. In general, even before the 1930s, “immorality” and conspiracy were often equated in society, and gays were described in the same negative terms as Jews. Section 175 of the 1871 Criminal Code, which explicitly criminalized sexual acts between two men, was amended in 1935 to cover all homosexual behavior, including dating and flirting. Often, SS officers disguised themselves as gay to catch real ones. Between 1933 and 1945, more than 100,000 people were arrested under the new edict of Section 175. After the fall of the Third Reich and the release of people from concentration camps, the conservative Adenauer government came to power, which did not seek fundamental changes, so people from this group were repeatedly sentenced to prison. In the GDR, homosexuality was decriminalized in 1968; Germany abandoned the Nazi version of Section 175 in 1969, but it was wholly repealed only in 1994. A long struggle for the recognition of rights preceded the repeal.

    Society’s conservatism influenced the official policy of the Bundeswehr. It was believed gays in leadership negatively affected morality and posed a security threat. In 1984, General Gunther Kissling was forced to resign because of suspicions of homosexuality. Discrimination at lower levels was much more widespread and less publicized.


    Extract from a forced medical examination, which indicates a ‘ban on promotion’. 1987

    Nevertheless, the community’s struggle for its rights continued, including in court. In the late 1990s, at least two German soldiers, Winfried Stecher and Werner Buzan, tried to defend in court their right to serve.[4]

    It was only in 2000 that the Bundeswehr allowed women to serve (earlier, they could only serve in medical corps) and openly gay people to hold leadership positions. In 2002, the unofficial group Queer BW was founded to demand an official apology and rehabilitation for those affected by this discriminatory policy. They had to wait 18 years for an apology, until 2020.[5] At present, service members who experienced harassment during their military service can seek compensation for the harm they endured.


    The logo of the Queer BW initiative

    LGBT+ military personnel in the world’s armies

    Latin American countries have not yet reached the top of inclusivity indexes, but they have been making rapid progress in recent years in the rights of the LGBT+ community. Pride in São Paulo, Brazil, is considered the largest in the world, and the marriage rights of same-sex couples in the military are ensured.[6] However, Brazilian military law prohibits sex in the service, as such. In Mexico, homosexuality has been decriminalized since the second half of the 19th century, and homosexuals have been allowed to serve in the army since 2012. However, domestic homophobia in these countries is still a significant problem. On the other hand, Argentina is a champion of LGBT+ rights in the region, which lifted the ban on homosexuals serving in the military in 2009.

    China’s policy of inclusiveness concerning LGBT+ in the military is unclear, and information on this topic is partially limited.[7] However, it is known that the Chinese army’s personnel policy seeks to attract as many citizens as possible to serve, and it is likely that closeted homosexuals are fully employed, while open homosexuals risk dismissal.

    Conservative and homophobic countries in Asia and Africa cannot tout inclusion in the military: in Uganda, homosexuals are potentially subject to the death penalty; in Iran, homosexual behavior often entails forced transition to the female gender.

    LGBT+ military in the USSR and in Ukraine

    After the fall of the tsarist regime, the new Soviet government discarded all imperial criminal law, particularly prosecuting homosexual behavior, following the German model. At the same time, the attitude towards LGBT+ people in the Russian Empire was conditionally tolerant for those times, without high-profile criminal trials (recall the Oscar Wilde trial in the UK). For public and/or influential people, public intolerance was limited at best to rumors and at worst to administrative measures (dismissal from office, expulsion from the capital). Criminal trials concerned only ordinary people and were initiated mainly based on third-party complaints.

    The new Bolshevik government moved beyond this moderate intolerance: through the direct abolition of imperial legislation, the decline of the church’s influence, and a general attitude of emancipation and liberalization in gender and sexual issues. The proclaimed gender equality and affirmative action of “women’s departments,” the legalization of abortion, the “glass of water theory” that separated sex from love, and the development of a system of “children’s hearths” (extended-stay kindergartens) were naturally accompanied by a more tolerant attitude toward homosexuality.

    Over time, the emancipatory program of the first years of Soviet rule began to wind down gradually, and in 1933, the USSR criminalized homosexuality again. The article of the criminal codes of the Soviet republics entitled “Sodomy” provided for punishment for sexual relations between men. At the same time, the prison world developed practices of establishing hierarchy through sexual domination and ritual impurity attributed to victims of such domination and to the objects of prison life they touched. These firmly entrenched negative associations with homosexuality. Following a series of camp uprisings in the early 1950s and the relative liberalization of Soviet policy after Stalin’s death in the second half of the 1950s, the Gulag system was gradually dismantled, with large numbers of prisoners released and reintegrated into society. The homophobia they brought with them from the prison environment quickly spread further.

    The Soviet army did not explicitly ban homosexual men from service. However, those convicted under the relevant criminal article were not drafted into the military, and confessions of homosexuality to a medical commission could in practice be qualified as a psychiatric disorder and exempted from service. Nevertheless, closeted homosexuals apparently joined the army on a general basis. Little research has been done specifically on this topic because of its great taboo, but it is logical to assume that in combination with hazing (a practice of bullying in the army that is extremely common everywhere), the slightest hint of homosexuality was likely to be punished at least informally.

    In independent Ukraine, criminal penalties for “sodomy” were abolished in 1991. The legal framework of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as the successor to the Soviet one, also does not contain explicit prohibitions to serve. In 2016, Ilovaisk veteran Oleh Kopko was the first person to come out in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At that time, everything was limited to an article in the media as part of the “Tolerance Journalism” project.[8] The coming out went unnoticed by the public. The second coming out in the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2018 got better coverage. Viktor Pylypenko, a veteran of the Donbas Special Forces Battalion of the National Guard of Ukraine, did it. During Anton Shebetko’s photo exhibition “We Were Here”, dedicated to LGBT+ combatants, Viktor gave a video interview in which he talked about himself.[9] The same year, the Union of the LGBT military was formed. The following year, a column of LGBT+ military personnel and their supporters participated in the Equality March in Kyiv.[10]


    Oleh Kopko


    A column of LGBT military personnel at the 2019 Pride

    The union makes more than a dozen different demands, including legal recognition of same-sex partnerships and inclusiveness of the LGBT+ community in army regulations and statutes. The need to regulate the rights of the partner in the event of a servicemember’s death has become more urgent during the full-scale war. In 2022, a petition to the President of Ukraine received 25,000 votes and was considered.

    Article 51 of the Constitution of Ukraine explicitly defines marriage as “based on the free consent of a woman and a man,” and it is impossible to amend the Constitution during martial law, so marriage equality will have to wait at least until the end of martial law.

    Despite that, there are no obstacles to introducing registered civil partnerships, a close analog of marriage. The relevant draft law, No. 9103, was registered in the Verkhovna Rada and is under consideration. However, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine does not support it, citing Article 51 of the Constitution of Ukraine and the Internal Service Statute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which do not prescribe commanders to register a couple where one or both partners are military personnel. The ministry did not specify the barriers to improving the statute. The ministry also stated that there is no data on the number of servicemembers who cannot officially formalize a same-sex partnership.[11]

    At the time of the study, there was a de facto ban on transgender people serving in the military. According to the 10th version of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10), which is in force in Ukraine, transgenderism is classified as a personality and emotional disorder (item F64 – “gender identity disorder”). According to Article 18 of Annex 1 to the Regulation on Military Medical Examination in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, personality and emotional disorders F50-F69 are grounds for declaring a person unfit or partially fit for service.[12] However, a transgender person may still serve in the military before they begin their transgender transition and receive the diagnosis. Starting January 1, 2022, the World Health Organization recommends switching to the new ICD-11 classification, where transgenderism is moved from the group of mental disorders to the sexual health conditions called “gender nonconformity.”

    In Ukraine, transition to the new classification at the time of this text has not happened yet, and the relevant changes to the regulations have not been made. Partial fitness for service in wartime allows transgender people to serve in the army. As far as the author knows, there are such cases.

    People diagnosed with HIV are officially recognized as unfit or partially fit for service under Article 5 of Annex 1 to the Regulation on Military Medical Examination in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.[13]

    The problem of homophobia, biphobia, or transphobia in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is being recognized gradually and slowly. Back in the early 2000s, for example, the official response of the Ministry of Defense to an information request from NGO Nash Svit stated, “There are currently no psychological support programs for gay and lesbian servicemembers in the Armed Forces of Ukraine due to the absence of this problem […] As for positions related to personnel training and promotion, homosexuality can be considered as a limitation in conjunction with other moral and business qualities of a serviceman.”

    However, the response to later requests was profoundly different, in particular in 2017 of the Main Department of Moral and Psychological Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: “As part of legal training of the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, issues are mandatory related to observing the rights and freedoms of servicemembers, the procedure of military service, as well as the mechanism for ensuring social and legal guarantees for these categories of Ukrainian citizens. It should also be noted that the State Program for the Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine until 2020, approved by the Presidential Decree No. 73/2017 dated 22.03.2017, provides for the necessary conditions for a gradual change in the mentality of the military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine based on European values. In order to implement the above, it is planned to amend the legislation of Ukraine to eliminate any form of discrimination in the military service.”[14]

    Research on the LGBT+ situation in Ukraine’s military service

    In early 2022, I conducted a mini-study of the situation for LGBT+ military personnel in Ukraine. It was the first study in Ukraine to focus on this issue, as the movement of LGBT+ servicemembers only recently emerged. However, the topic of unlawful treatment of colleagues due to homophobia or transphobia was raised by respondents of the study “Invisible Battalion 3.0. Sexual Harassment in the Military Sphere in Ukraine”, which involved one homosexual man and one transgender woman who ended their military service before transition. Back then, the respondents named problems, among others, such as harassment and prejudice against servicemembers by colleagues based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, in particular, a noticeable deterioration in attitudes toward a non-heterosexual person after coming out without any other reason for the deterioration, demonstratively unaddressed threats, and homophobic attitudes toward people suspected of homosexuality due to a lack of visible sexual attention to women.[15]

    As part of the 2022 study, I conducted 10 interviews with 7 men and 3 women who belonged to the LGBT+ community and were active military personnel.[16] The respondents reported that they had personally experienced homophobia and had heard of such cases. The research methodology did not allow us to establish the actual prevalence of such cases. Still, subjectively, the respondents noted them as common, as a general norm of attitudes towards LGBT+ people. The high level of homophobia, low understanding of what homosexual orientation is, and low level of general culture create at least some discomfort in the service.

    And then you go to the canteen at lunchtime. Everyone looks at you and says, ‘Oh, it’s him, it’s that one.’ And every single day, I eat and they point at me, and they say something about me, and I hear it. Then, in the smoking room, they ask such slippery questions as ‘and what?’, ‘and who?’, like trying to surface some kind of truth, but it’s my personal business whether I want to share it or not. But I’m generally irritated that they exposed me.” (Respondent 1)

    They said ‘this is how you discredit the Army, you demonstrate to others that everyone here is like that.’” (Respondent 6)

    Otherwise, a person may face dismissal, physical violence, and even incitement to suicide. The lower a soldier’s rank, the harder it is for him to be open about his orientation. Respondents do not recommend conscripts and other lower-ranking soldiers disclose their orientation at all, advising them to delete personal data from their phones, etc. Respondents now perceive homophobic problems as almost unavoidable after coming out. The military personnel responsible for moral and psychological support are currently unable to systematically provide qualified assistance to LGBT+ people due to their low general qualifications, overload with paperwork, and lack of knowledge about the specifics of the LGBT+ community, even if they want to help.

    “And if it happens that everyone is against it, well, I’m putting it mildly, if the unit commanders don’t approve it, the department and so on, it is very difficult. It will be very, very hard, and no one will help you with this issue.” (Respondent 3)

    “But I will say this, if there was direct harassment, well, I probably wouldn’t have lasted long. I would have started to break down.” (Respondent 4)

    “What exactly will happen: he can be beaten, he can be humiliated, he can be humiliated in front of the whole platoon, he will simply not be able to live here, he will be verbally insulted. I don’t know… I just haven’t encountered it directly, but, in principle, I understand from what other guys say about what they would do to a gay man – it’s just horrible.” (Female Respondent 7)

    Inclusivity for LGBT+ people in the military workplace

    The Hague Center for Strategic Studies defines inclusion as a guiding principle that maximizes the benefits and minimizes the risks of diversity.[17] It is the best option among other guiding principles compared to acceptance, tolerance, exclusion, and persecution. The Center identifies the following types of inclusive policies:

    • Leadership, training, code of conduct. The top-down approach works best in the army because of its hierarchical nature. Policy coming from the leader counteracts the risks of harassment. Mutual respect should be explicitly stated in the statutory documents.
    • Support networks and mentoring. Associations that provide support to their members can be a resource. Such associations may even be funded from the state budget in some places.
    • Combating discrimination. The prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity should be explicitly stated and enshrined in law.
    • Recognition of relationships. The state should recognize same-sex relationships through the institution of marriage and/or registered partnerships. This point is especially relevant for today’s Ukraine, where active hostilities are taking place.
    • Recognition of gender. Transgender individuals may wish to have their gender officially recognized by the state and other institutions, including the army. Procedural issues related to changing documents, access to hormone replacement therapy, and surgical sex reassignment procedures should be consistent with the regulatory framework and internal logic of military service.

    The Center notes that these practices are currently being implemented in different armies around the world in an unsystematic manner and are not tested for effectiveness, so it is difficult to identify any countries whose best practices are worth emulating. In contrast, the center’s research team formulated three strategies to provide a more focused vision.

    • Mainstreaming – developing new inclusion policies and increasing the inclusiveness of old policies
    • Managing – dedicated effort and an accountability approach
    • Measurement – tracking and evaluating progress

    In 2014, the Hague Center for Strategic Studies ranked the armies of 103 countries in terms of inclusiveness towards the LGBT+ community. Ukraine was ranked 52nd in this index (the study was conducted one time, so the index has not been updated). New Zealand ranked first, followed by the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Australia. According to the study, including LGBT+ people in the military correlates with the degree of human development and indicators of democracy and, of course, with the general public acceptance of the LGBT+ community. In some countries, such as Croatia, Israel, or South Africa, LGBT+ people are better accepted in the military than in society at large.

    Illustrations: Tom of Finland, Time, Deutsche Welle, Queer BW, Radio Liberty, Suspilne, Hromadske.

    This publication was prepared by the expert resource Gender in Detail with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

    The Resilience Program is a 30-month project funded by the European Union and implemented by ERIM in partnership with the Black Sea Trust, the Eastern Europe Foundation, the Human Rights House Foundation and the Human Rights House in Tbilisi. The project aims to strengthen the resilience and effectiveness of war-affected CSOs and civil society actors affected by the war in Ukraine, including independent media and human rights defenders.

  • Narratives in Ukrainian politics about the LGBT+ community

    Intro

    The institutional provision of equal opportunities for exercising human rights and freedoms by representatives of all social groups is an essential value of any democratic state. The fundamental principle of non-discrimination is underlying Ukrainian legislation and secures equal opportunities.

    This principle prohibits any discrimination against individuals or groups in a wide range of social relations. It also ensures equality of rights, freedoms, and opportunities; equality before the law; and respect for the dignity of every person. Accordingly, these provisions apply to and should be enshrined in national legislation and all regulations.

    More details about the legal (non-)recognition of homosexual relationships and some legislative restrictions on human rights related to sexual orientation have already been discussed in our previous materials.

    This text aims to analyze the narratives about the LGBT+ community in the external communication of national public figures, state institutions, and political parties. In addition, we analyze the legislative activities of members of the most prominent political factions represented in the Verkhovna Rada, their positions on certain bills aimed at improving the situation for or protecting the LGBT+ community, and homophobic statements and bills they initiated or supported.

    Why is this important? First, the messages and actions of the individuals holding such positions do not reflect their own values or positions but their positions as people’s representatives. Accordingly, to a certain extent, they broadcast public sentiments and “voices” of their constituents. Second, official communication and activities of national public figures not only represent but also, to a great degree, “set the tone” and influence public opinion. Their narrative about LGBT couples impacts the visibility of the whole community, its appearance in the media, and public attitudes toward it. Therefore, there is no doubt that the official communication of public figures, state institutions, and political parties is inextricably linked to public sentiment.

    This article analyzes the political narratives of 2019-2023.

    Position on the LGBT+ community in the parties’ electoral programs

    An analysis of the official position of political parties that are part the 9th Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine about the LGBT+ community should begin with the content and narratives of their electoral programs as the primary source of the declaration of their positions and ideological beliefs.

    Thus, the Servant of the People party’s program,  consisting of 16 sections and priorities as bullet-point statements in each, does not mention protection of LGBT+ rights. One of the paragraphs in the “National Identity and Civil Harmony” section states: “We will protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, ensure equal rights and opportunities for men and women in Ukrainian society.” The presence of such an item is better than the absence of any. However, a more specific item and the recognition of the problem of discrimination against LGBT+ people would be much better and increase its visibility.

    The electoral program of the Holos party includes 23 subsections and also does not contain specific references to ensuring equal rights and opportunities or providing adequate legal protection for LGBT+ people. However, in the first subsection, “What does Ukraine sound like?”, they repeatedly emphasize that their goal is to “return the person to the center of the state,” regardless of their ideological beliefs or other characteristics. However, the party’s program does not provide a specific mechanism for achieving this goal.

    The program of the European Solidarity party, like the above-mentioned parties, refers to equal opportunities for women and men and does not clearly mention protection of LGBT+ rights.

    The program of the Batkivshchyna party does not mention equal rights and opportunities for different social groups and the implementation of the principle of non-discrimination.

    Although as of September 2023, the program of the now defunct OPFL faction is not publicly available, the attitude towards the LGBT+ community that they had when they entered the Verkhovna Rada can be assumed from the words of former party member Yurii Boyko. In an interview, he clearly outlined the party’s position: “As for same-sex marriage, it is not even being discussed. This is such stupidity that is unacceptable for our Christian society.”[1]

    Thus, an analysis of the election programs of the political parties that won the majority of seats in parliament in the 2019 elections showed that advocacy for the LGBT+ community was neither a priority nor a separate area of work for any of the parties. It is worth noting that we found no overtly homophobic statements or positions in the programs analyzed. Some referred to implementing the principle of social justice and equality of all social groups in Ukraine. However, these ideas were presented as value guidelines rather than priority work areas with a specific mechanism of action.

    The existence of such references, albeit only at the ideological level, is undoubtedly better than the absence of any. However, it would be much better to specify the problem of discrimination against the LGBT+ community and actualize the issue of proper protection as a separate item in the program.

    It is quite clear why naming the problem of discrimination is necessary: as long as the problem is not stated and “highlighted,” it remains invisible to the majority of society. As long as the challenges posed by no legal recognition of homosexual couples as families are not being discussed, most of society does not even notice them. Accordingly, problems that are not verbalized and actualized cannot be solved.

    Membership of Ukrainian political parties in international liberal democratic associations

    The affiliation of a political party with international political associations, alliances, or organizations is one way, but definitely not the only way, to assess its ideological and value orientation. It is an indicator allowing us to evaluate whether a party is friendly towards the LGBT+ community, at least declaratively. One such association is the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), a European transnational political party that adheres to liberal democratic values and unites parties that share them.

    The Ukrainian political party Holos joined ALDE in 2020, the first parliamentary party of this Verkhovna Rada convocation to do so. According to Holos, to become a member of this association, a party must prove that it shares the values of liberal democracy, rule of law, tolerance, human rights protection, and the principles of a market economy. For its part, membership in ALDE provides access to networking with European parties with similar values and a European political elite.

    The Servant of the People (SP) party was the second Ukrainian political party to join the Alliance, in 2022. According to Olena Shulyak, the party’s chairperson, this decision was not spontaneous: “Joining the ‘political family’ of the ALDE party as a full member is one of the key priorities for the Servant of the People in international politics.” The issue of accession became especially relevant after Russia’s full-scale invasion. In addition to being an indicator of shared values and beliefs, membership in the association is now seen as an important political step that promotes better integration into the European political community.

    In addition to the fact that the ALDE’s unequivocal support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and integrity strengthens our country’s position in the international arena, the membership of two Ukrainian parties in ALDE also impacts decisions made within the Ukrainian political arena. For example, on May 28, 2023, ALDE adopted a resolution supporting the legislative initiative of Holos and SP MPs to submit a draft law on civil partnerships. This was the first international statement of this level calling for support for the draft law.

    Although this resolution does not de jure impose any obligations on Ukraine and is only advisory, de facto, it could influence the adoption of the draft law. The European community’s call to support registered partnerships for same-sex and different-sex couples demonstrates the importance of this issue for the Alliance and the European political community, which observes liberal democratic values. This Alliance position also legalizes the significance and relevance of this issue in Ukrainian society. For Ukraine, which is fighting for its place in this community, adopting the draft law is a logical and expected step for implementing European legislation into Ukrainian national legislation.

    Homophobic statements and legislative initiatives of individual party representatives

    Despite the fact that the programs of the above-mentioned political parties do not contain overtly homophobic positions, and some of the parties belong to liberal democratic associations, the positions of individual party representatives sometimes contrast. This is manifested in their homophobic statements, legislative initiatives, or unwillingness to support bills aimed at improving the situation of the LGBT+ community.

    Two draft laws submitted by SP MPs Heorhiy Mazurashu and Olena Lys on July 22, 2020, are vivid examples of how the positions of the party and its representatives diverge sharply. The first draft law proposes amending certain legislative acts on protecting the family, childhood, maternity, and paternity. In the draft, the authors define “homosexuality, pornography, sexual products, transgenderism” and introduce the concept of “propaganda of homosexuality or transgenderism,” although they do not yet define it. In addition, the authors propose replacing the word “gender” with “equality of rights and opportunities for women and men” throughout. In the explanatory note, the authors justify their proposal with the “danger” that “gender ideology” allegedly poses.

    The second draft law proposes amendments to the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses regarding liability for propaganda about homosexuality and transgenderism. In the explanatory note to the draft law, the authors express concern about “aggressive propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism aimed at destroying the family institution” as one of the “immoral threats of our time” as a justification for its adoption. In the note, they also misinterpret the concepts of gender and gender equality and view them as inherently “explicit or implicit propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism.”

    At the same time, in his comments to Suspilne, co-author of the draft law Heorhiy Mazurashu notes that, generally, he is “far from thinking that they [transgender people and the LGBT+ community] should be treated in any way biased, or subjected to any discriminatory actions.”[2] Commenting on the draft law to Radio Liberty, he reiterates his “calm and civilized attitude towards people with different sexual orientations and gender identities.”[3] Mazurashu explains that he is concerned about the risks of “propaganda of homosexuality or transgenderism.” Therefore, he and his colleague propose introducing a fine of 1,000 tax-free minimum incomes (UAH 17,000) for individuals and 3,000 tax-free minimum incomes (UAH 51,000) for legal entities.

    Another draft law initiated Heorhiy Mazurashu proposes amendments to the Budget Code of Ukraine to prevent spending budget funds on promoting pedophilia, homosexuality, and transgenderism. In addition to Mazurashu, the group of initiators of the bill includes other members of the SP party Anatoliy Drabovsky, Serhiy Kuzminykh, Artem Kultenko; and non-partisan MP Viktor Myalyk.In the explanatory note to this draft law, the authors appeal to the government’s obligation to develop and protect the family institution. Other arguments are that “propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism poses a threat to public 

    health,” leads to “violation of the right to freedom of scientific research,” and “violation of the right to freedom of expression and freedom of religion.” In conclusion, the authors argue that “homosexuality, transgenderism, and pedophilia destroy public morality.” As a solution, the MPs propose a draft law that would potentially strengthen protection of family, childhood, maternity and paternity and prevent budget expenditures promoting “pedophilia, homosexuality, and transgenderism.”

    In the comparative table to this draft law, the authors define what they mean by “pedophilia, propaganda of pedophilia, homosexuality, propaganda of homosexuality, transgenderism, propaganda of transgenderism.” They consider the production, distribution, and/or public use of products containing LGBT symbols to be a kind of “propaganda of homosexuality.”

    All of these draft laws were withdrawn from consideration. Human rights defenders note that their content is very similar to the narrative from Russian legislation, which considers “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations” a crime and introduces a fine for it.[4] In particular, the human rights NGO Our World commented on the above-mentioned legislative initiative as “support to Russian policy” and a willingness to “stand under the banner of the Russian-led movement for traditional values.” Although they believe that the real chances of passing this law, even at the time of its submission, were close to zero, the very existence of such legislative initiatives poses certain risks. These narratives are inconsistent with the ideological guidelines declared by the party in its election program and with the basic principle of non-discrimination enshrined in national law. Such initiatives go against the European integration process and Ukraine’s international obligations to ensure equality of rights and freedoms and combat xenophobia and intolerance.

    In addition to the human rights community, some national public figures and institutions criticized the draft law. In particular, the office of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights commented that the initiative of the draft law on fines for “propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism” contradicts constitutional norms and international legal standards and “aims to discriminate against members of the LGBTI community and violate their right to respect for honor and dignity.”[5]

    In response to this draft law, MP Inna Sovsun submitted an alternative one that proposes including in Ukrainian legislation a ban on funding programs and activities that contain signs of direct or indirect discrimination or intolerance against individuals and their groups, depending on the characteristics that such individuals or groups possess. In justifying the need to adopt the draft law, the author also mentions that her colleague’s draft law contains outdated, incorrect terms and promotes stigmatization and discrimination against people based on their sexual orientation and gender identity. However, this draft law was withdrawn from consideration like the previous ones.

    (Non)support for the draft law on civil partnerships

    Another way to check whether the actions and positions of party members are consistent with the party’s official position is to analyze their (non)support for draft laws aimed at protecting the rights of the LGBT+ community. The latest and probably one of the most visible draft laws in the field LGBT+ rights protection is the draft law on registered civil partnerships. Our previous publications have already discussed the importance of adopting this draft law and the opportunities the LGBT+ community may gain (Zavhorodnia’s first text for ERIM). In this article, we will consider in more detail Ukrainian politicians’ reaction to the draft.

    After a petition demanding to “legalize same-sex marriage” on the website of the President of Ukraine gained 25,000 signatures, MP Inna Sovsun of the Holos party registered a draft law on civil partnerships for same-sex and different-sex couples. The list of initiators includes 18 MPs: 7 from Holos and 11 from SP, including Oleksandra Ustinova, head of the Holos parliamentary faction, and Olena Shulyak, head of the SP party. At the time the draft law was registered, its author, assessing the chances, noted that “given the support of the two factions, adoption of the draft law is quite realistic.”[6] She also expressed special gratitude to Dmytro Gurin, a Servant of the People party member, who helped collect signatures from his faction’s MPs. The petition in support of the bill quickly gained 25,000 signatures.

    After considering the draft law at a Youth and Sports Committee meeting on March 7, 2023, the majority of committee members decided to support the draft law. The committee considered creating a new institution of civil partnerships as an important step towards European integration, so it recommended that the Verkhovna Rada adopt the draft law. A report by the Our World Human Rights Center notes that it was entirely unexpected that the committee chair, Andriy Kozhemiakin, a member of the Batkivshchyna faction, would support the draft law.[7] The report states that at the committee meeting, the MP said that although he supports Christian values, he perceives this draft law as an opportunity to “do something to move away from Russian bonds” and therefore supported this decision.

    The Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the EU was the second to consider the draft law at a meeting and unanimously supported it. Among the MPs who voted for it were representatives of different political factions: Mezentseva (SP), Halaychuk (SP), Vintoniak (SP), Nalyvaichenko (Batkivshchyna), Klympush-Tsintsadze (European Solidarity), and Liubota (SP).

    The Committee on Digital Transformation was the next to support the draft law. In its expert conclusion, the Committee provided several recommendations for finalizing the draft and improvements for its implementation. The draft’s author, Inna Sovsun, expressed willingness to participate in further discussions on this issue.

    The Committee on Social Policy and Veterans’ Rights also supported the draft law. Among those present at the committee meeting who voted in favor were Tsyba (SP), Nikorak (European Solidarit), Strunevych (SP), Arseniuk (SP), and Babenko (Bila Tserkva Razom). In contrast, First Deputy Chair of the Committee Tsymbaliuk (Batkivshchyna), committee member Tymoshenko (Batkivshchyna), and subcommittee chair Ostapenko (European Solidarity) abstained.

    Position on Pride parade

    Another “litmus test” for better understanding whether the value of equal rights and opportunities is only declared in the party’s statutory documents or they are backed by actions is an analysis of the parties’ response to the Pride month that took place in Ukraine in May-June 2023. Among the largest political factions represented in the Verkhovna Rada, only Holos temporarily customized its logo to reflect the symbols of Pride, thus expressing support for the LGBT+ community. Other political factions did not react to Pride month.

    Political allies of the LGBT+ community

    In the fall of 2021, the Allies in Action Coalition recognized opinion leaders, activists, and politicians who publicly support diversity and inclusion. One of the seven nominations was “The Friendliest Politician,” which was awarded to Inna Sovsun, a member of the Holos party. The friendliest civil servant was former Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights Lyudmyla Denisova. In response to this, Sovsun said that she was pleased to receive such an award, but it also means that “the competition in this nomination is very weak.”[8]

    As of September 2023, the situation has not changed dramatically. On the webpage of the Civil Partnership Advocacy project created by the NGO Fulcrum, the list of public figures who support the draft law on civil partnerships includes only Inna Sovsun (Holos) and Dmytro Hurin (SP) from among all MPs.

    Conclusions and recommendations

    Thus, having analyzed the official positions of the largest political factions in the current convocation of the Verkhovna Rada, we conclude that promoting LGBT+ rights is still not a priority for any of the factions. In general, parties declare the equality of citizens as one of their values in electoral programs, but for the most part, it is an ideological guideline rather than a clear direction of work with a defined set actions to achieve specific results. That is, parties are declaratively tolerant towards the LGBT+ community but are not ready to take active steps to support it, promote its interests, and improve its situation.

    In addition, some party members fail to follow even this position, which is demonstrated by their homophobic legislative activities. The most striking examples cited in the article are the draft laws on “propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism.”

    The draft law on registered partnerships, registered in 2023, has become a vivid litmus test for determining the values of MPs and the consistency of their actions with the party’s declared ideological beliefs. The positive results of the draft law’s consideration in four committees suggest its adoption is possible. Nevertheless, it is still awaiting consideration by the main committee.

    One more observation is the clear association of homophobia with Russian political culture after the full-scale invasion. It has become clear that the narratives of “homosexual propaganda and gender ideology” are rooted in Russia and are completely alien to the European community. Therefore, homophobia in Ukrainian politics is even more obviously perceived as a threatening rapprochement with the aggressor, while tolerance and protection of the LGBT+ community are one of the necessary steps towards European integration. Accordingly, we hope that the logical choice for MPs when considering the draft law on civil partnerships will be approximating our legal standards to international ones.

    This publication has been produced by Gender in Detail with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

    The Resilience Programme is a 30-month project funded by the European Union and implemented by ERIM in partnership with the Black Sea Trust, the Eastern Europe Foundation, the Human Rights House Foundation and the Human Rights House Tbilisi. The project aims to strengthen the resilience and effectiveness of war-affected CSOs and civil society actors affected by the war in Ukraine, including independent media and human rights defenders.


    [1] Being an ally. Who supports diversity in Ukraine and why. Focus, 30.11.2021.

    [2] We did it! My draft law on civil partnerships for same-sex and different-sex couples is already registered in the parliament and is designated number 9103. MP’s notes | Sovsun, 13.03.2023.

    [3] Situation of LGBTQ in Ukraine in 2023. Our World LGBT human rights center.

    [4] “Servant of the People” followed the footsteps of russian colleagues and intended to ban “propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism.” Hromadske, 22.07.2020.

    [5]July 22 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine registered the draft law “On amending the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses regarding liability for propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism” № 3917. Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, 27.07.2020.

    [6] “Natures mistakes”. Why the draft law against LGBT propaganda was registered in the parliament and how human rights defenders comment? Suspline:news, 23.07.2020.

    [7] MP Mazurashu explained why he initiated “penalties for propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism.” Radio Svoboda, 22.07.2020.

    [8] Razumkov, Boyko, and Poroshenko – on marijuana and gay marriages. NV, 12.07.2019.

  • Transgender People in Ukraine during the Full-Scale War

    Transgender people in Ukraine, like everyone else, risk every day being killed by Russian weapons. Unlike cisgender citizens, they face additional challenges, such as specific medical needs; transphobia in society, the media, and among loved ones; complications related to military service; etc. Trans people who were forced to become temporary migrants in other countries face a striking difference between the trans transition system in Ukraine and abroad, transphobia and misunderstanding in shelters, and lack of resources for survival. Yet they fight, volunteer, work, engage in art, go to rallies and marches in other countries, and continue helping Ukraine in any way they can.

    Like in any other group, among trans people there are also those who do not want to invest in winning. However, since this group is traditionally marginalized in any society, that is, alienated, transgender people often receive much more criticism for the actions of its specific representatives than happens in other cases. Non-binary and gender non-conforming people generally go unnoticed; on the one hand, this is good as they are thus less subjected to general hatred, but on the other hand, restrictions on their rights and opportunities are even higher than those of trans men and trans women.

    The Ukrainian trans community, of course, primarily seeks victory over Russia. In addition to the common desire of all Ukrainians to stop the rabid colonizer neighbor, trans people have a doubly negative attitude towards Russia. “The Russian World” uses transgenderism as one of the major factors of fear. The president of Russia often intimidated Russians with the image of transgender people (“transformers” in his words) to turn them against Ukraine and the so-called “collective West.”

    In July 2023, Russia passed a law completely banning any medical procedures for trans transition, for transgender people to adopt, change the gender marker in documents, etc. Similar laws have been passed in some U.S. states and in some African and Asian countries, and digging a little clearly reveals the Russian traces in that. Attempts to submit anti-LGBTQI+ and anti-trans draft laws were also made in Ukraine (Zavhorodnia’s article on politics 2023), but, fortunately, none of them made it to a vote.

    A Brief Chronology of Trans Issue in Independent Ukraine

    The first document regulating transgender transition in Ukraine was Order #57 in 1996. It allowed taking any transgender transition steps only from the age of 25 and provided for mandatory sterilization, a stay in a psychiatric clinic, and a medical board review. Without genital surgery and a humiliating public analysis by a group of doctors, it was impossible to get permission to change the gender marker in documents. The situation was complicated by the fact that there was only one commission in the country and people had to spend additional money on a trip to the capital to pass it.

    In 2011, the new Order #60 entered into force. In fact, it involved few changes. Transgender people also had to spend 30-45 days in a psychiatric hospital to receive a preliminary diagnosis, which was then confirmed or denied by a medical board. Based on commission results, a person gained the opportunity to perform surgical operations. A denial could be challenged in court.

    Usually, the commission considered vaginoplasty for transwomen and mastectomy and hysterectomy for transmen to be a sufficient number of operations. After the operations, the person went before the commission again and only then received permission to change their documents. In addition, there were a number of contraindications, in particular “sexual disorders,” which included homosexuality.

    Only in 2016, thanks to the active work of trans activists and the support of the Minister of Health Ulyana Suprun, a new trans transition protocol was approved based on orders #972 and #1041. This protocol mandated some medical intervention (usually hormone replacement therapy) and a psychiatric diagnosis, but a stay in the hospital is not required, and any family doctor can issue a certificate to a trans person to change their documents — there is no longer a single commission. Besides, now, with certain restrictions, transgender transition is also available for teenagers from the age of 14.

    Yes, the protocol is still far from perfect and there is still much work to do, in particular regarding recognizing non-binary people and implementing the 11th edition of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). However, Ukraine abandoned forced sterilization earlier than some EU countries, and thanks to the inclusion of family doctors in the transition protocol, trans people can receive the necessary treatment quite quickly, without queues and months or years of waiting.

    Social Needs and Problems Facing Transgender People in 2022-2023

    During Russia’s full-scale invasion, the main issues facing transgender people have become very acute. In February-March 2022, trans people forced to leave Ukraine often faced discrimination and misunderstanding by the border services. Some border guards had never seen people whose appearance differs from the photo in their documents and does not correspond to the gender marker specified. Transwomen who did not have time to change their documents could be recorded as men fleeing mobilization, while many people heard for the first time of the existence of transmen. Victims of discrimination turned to LGBTQI+ organizations.

    The organization Gender Stream carried out a great deal of related work. Its activists advised border guards, helped people pass border control who had the legal grounds for doing so, and supported transwomen who had not yet changed their documents but were in the process and in communications with military enlistment commissions.

    Unfortunately, there were also cases of illegal border crossing by transwomen. The singer Zi Famelu illegally left for Germany and gave numerous media interviews about the terrible transphobia in Ukraine. She did not ask for help from any of the Ukrainian organizations that could solve her problems regarding documents, while her stories for the Western press involve numerous inaccuracies and exaggerations. Of course, transphobia does exist in Ukraine, but not at such a staggering scale as Zi describes.

    In total, non-governmental organization (NGO) Nash Svit (“Our World”) recorded 77 hate crimes based on sexual orientation and gender identity in 2022, of which six cases were described as transphobic. Mostly, this included violence by parents against transgender teenagers or young people, and cases of sexual violence against transgender women, physical attacks, and transphobic insults were also recorded. These were only the cases that victims reported to the organization’s monitors.

    Often, victims of transphobic violence do not know that crimes must be recorded or are so used to transphobia and abuse that they do not consider what happened to them to be a crime. In 2023, one of the largest cases was an attack on transgender soldier Helen Mark in Lviv on August 15. Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets and LGBTQI+ organizations KyivPride and Gender Stream joined the case.

    At the same time, transgender journalist and military volunteer Sarah Ashton-Cirillo was appointed as the English-speaking spokesperson for the Territorial Defense Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This caused a huge wave of transphobic reactions on social media, in particular from Right Sector activists and less-known far-right groups. However, this appointment demonstrates that Ukraine, albeit slowly, is moving towards the supremacy of human rights and non-discrimination.

    In addition to right-wing radicals and some radical feminists always react to the visibility of transgender people. “Gender-critical” or trans-exclusive radical feminists (TERFs) hold the same transphobic views as conservatives and, sometimes, consciously or unconsciously support their views. For example, Maria Dmitrieva, leader of the largest radfem Facebook community Feminism UA (14,000 members), supported the content of military blogger Yevhen Karas, who is known for not only his homophobic and transphobic statements, but also his hatred of feminists, sexism, and organizing massive online attacks on female activists.

    In Ukrainian TERF circles, the concept of “trans docs” is popular, which is how participants call activism for transgender people’s rights, informing about transgenderism, or news related to it. Fortunately, they do not have as much influence on the country’s political situation and public opinion as, for example, in the USA, UK, and European countries. Most often, their activities do not go beyond social media, especially during the full-scale invasion.

    On the officially conservative side, several new players have appeared over the past year and a half. In addition to Karas, who is also a regular contributor to Censor.Net and Vsi Razom (“All Together”), transphobic rhetoric was promoted by the Freikorps volunteer unit on its YouTube channel, blogger Neautorka, Catharsis channel, the Association of Sexologists and Sex Therapists of Ukraine (did you expect to see a name like that on this list?), Aleksey Arestovich, Iryna Fedyshyn, and others. Some posts addressed the entire LGBTQI+ community, but many focused specifically on transgender people.

    Interestingly, all these resources mainly responded to news from abroad, for instance, many posts touched on American trans people and the U.S. laws that limit their rights. Also, Ukrainian conservatives were outraged by advertising campaigns involving transgender people in other countries, European prides and beauty contests, transgender characters in Western media, etc. During the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian LGBTQI+ organizations are engaged in humanitarian work, do not organize public events, and have become less visible; hence, conservative movements pay less attention to them.

    Meanwhile, attacks on activists mainly take place online. Demonized images of Edward Rees, Marharyta Kovalova, Michelle Karas, and others appear in the campaign materials of Ukrainian anti-trans movement figures. The main accusations look like the renewed rhetoric of American conservatives: transgender people are pedophiles who want to seduce and convert children into transgenderism and take away women’s rights. There are unique Ukrainian narratives as well: merging the LGBTQI+ movement with communism and claims that trans people work for Russia and seek the defeat of the Ukrainian army. The statements, of course, lack evidence. However, as I have already mentioned, when stories about transgender military personnel appear in the media, conservative bloggers start actively looking for ways to denigrate them and devalue their service.

    Trans* Ukrainians and the Army: How Trans* Status Affects the Issue of Conscription. Transgender Soldiers

    The number of transgender and non-binary personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as the number of LGBTQI+ military personnel in general, is unknown. Stories have recently appeared in the media of non-binary mortar person Antonina Romanova, transwoman Oksana Surchok serving in an assault unit, non-binary military member Kafa from the 93rd Mechanized Brigade Kholodnyi Yar, and others. Being openly trans in the military is hard for many reasons, and potential transphobia from colleagues is far from the most important ones. During service, it is not easy to continue hormone replacement therapy (HRT) and military personnel often take a forced break from treatment, which can have a very negative effect on physical and mental health. In addition, a transgender person may face problems when enlisting.

    In February 2023, Human Rights Center Nash Svit published the report “The Battle for Freedom. LGBTQ Situation in Ukraine in 2022,” which, among other things, mentioned the diagnosis F64.0 “Transsexualism” as a condition that exempts a person from military service. With “severe” gender dysphoria, a person is considered completely unfit. On the other hand, this diagnosis can mean unfitness in peacetime and limited fitness in wartime if these conditions are “moderately expressed with unstable compensation or compensated.”

    The “severity of expression” and “compensation” of these conditions should be determined by a special medical commission, for instance, at a regional psychiatric hospital. The next step is confirmation of the conclusion by a military enlistment commission. In practice, few hospitals have staff capable of conducting such an examination, and even more so, one should not expect expertise from the military enlistment commission. Before the start of the full-scale invasion, psychiatric departments in Kyiv and Odesa, which had a lot of experience working with transgender people, did not specify the severity of transgender expression in their medical reports.

    This report, published by numerous media outlets, caused a negative reaction, primarily from radical opponents. After all, the material was presented as if all transgender people were eager to leave the country and were using their diagnosis for this, whereas transwomen, transmen, and non-binary people fight and often face misunderstanding and discrimination during voluntary mobilization if their appearance does not match the gender marker in their passport.

    According to Nash Svit, there are trans people who fight while concealing their transgender status. They have already received documents with their preferred gender marker, are stealth (do not tell anyone that they have transitioned), and serve as a cisgender male or female. I am also aware of the story of a transgender man who volunteered for the army at the start of the war, and none of his comrades knew that he was a transgender person.

    Medical Needs and Issues of Transgender People

    Problems with medications are not limited to the military. Transgender people who stayed in Ukraine faced a shortage of hormonal drugs, especially at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Most of the drugs disappeared from pharmacies as they are not produced in Ukraine and imports were limited. Currently, the situation has somewhat improved thanks to the established supply and support of international organizations such as Convictus and ILGA or Ukrainian LGBTQI+ organizations and initiatives bringing hormones to Ukraine on their own. This is a huge and complicated job since transgender diagnoses are not included in any state protection programs like care for HIV patients or people with disabilities. In addition, the Ukrainian transit protocol does not specify the names of drugs that should be prescribed to patients; hence, it is almost impossible to organize mass supplies of medicines to Ukraine at the international level.

    Many transgender people had to postpone officially transitioning and changing documents for several years because psychiatric hospitals did not accept patients during the COVID-19 lockdowns. This also led to the issues described previously, such as transgender women already being on HRT for some time still had male documents and could not evacuate. Another complication was added during the full-scale invasion: many friendly family doctors, psychiatrists, and endocrinologists who were both documenting the transition and consultations on HRT and preparing for operations left to go abroad – of course, not all of them, but many. Besides, already in 2022-2023, public organizations were conducting training in trans*specific medical work, but there is a lack of specialists. The cost of healthcare and medicines has significantly increased compared to 2021, making life very difficult for transgender people who lost their homes and jobs due to the war.

    Implementing ICD-11: Current Status

    In the 11th edition of the International Classification of Diseases, the diagnosis “Gender Dysphoria” or “Gender Nonconformity” was removed from the psychiatric disorders section and moved to the sexual health section. In essence, this is the depathologization of transgenderism, which can later lead to the adoption of laws on self-identification, that is, greatly simplifying the process of trans transition. Many countries in Europe and the world have begun working according to ICD-11 principles even before its introduction and gave transgender people the opportunity to change their gender marker in documents without a psychiatric examination. In Ukraine, ICD-11 implementation was supposed to start in 2022. It officially entered into force on January 1, 2022, but it does not work in practice yet. The Ukrainian medical system is to adapt to the new ICD by 2027.

    According to trans activist Inna Iryskina, “implementation of the 11th edition of the International Classification of Diseases does not require the mandatory update of clinical protocols to its diagnostic codes. These are two separate processes.” Iryskina, who works with the NGO Insight on processes to implement ICD-11, insists on developing a new protocol, although this is not mentioned in official documents.

    “Hypothetically, a situation is possible when the diagnosis of trans people will take place according to the 2016 protocol with a psychiatric examination and ICD-10 codes (with the same F64.0 ‘Transsexualism’), while in statistical reporting it will go under ICD-11 codes (‘Gender Nonconformity’).”

    Currently, according to Inna, the first draft of translating ICD-11 into Ukrainian is ready. In the future, various experts are planned to be involved in its finalization. Also, with experts’ participation, perspectives will be discussed and specific implementation plans developed. The Insight team joined these processes, which, however, will definitely not be fast, in particular because of the war. Still, the activist considers implementing ICD-11 as inevitable in Ukraine for Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO.

    Transgender Ukrainians Abroad

    Transgender people who left Ukraine after the start of the full-scale invasion face specific challenges that are different from the lives of trans people in Ukraine and from the situation facing cisgender refugees. Many of them return to Ukraine because they cannot overcome these problems. Even if people have lost their homes in Ukraine due to the war, they seek refuge in LGBTQI+ shelters in Kyiv and other cities as they do not find opportunities to comfortably exist abroad.

    In European countries, there is no centralized program to help LGBTQI+ refugees from Ukraine. Sometimes, they can get support from local organizations, such as a place in a friendly shelter or in an apartment with local LGBTQI+ people, but usually transgender people live with other refugees in shelters and hostels. In these conditions, they often encounter transphobia and violence, which is difficult to avoid since there may be no other place and local authorities are not always sensitive to transgenderism.

    Trans people under 18 or those forced to leave with their relatives for other reasons often have to live in the transphobic environment of their loved ones with no choice or possibility to escape. Refugee families share rooms or small apartments, and if parents have previously resorted to violence, the risk of abuse increases in such conditions. In the KyivPride community, I have observed several stories like this. Before the full-scale invasion, teenagers managed to enroll in universities and leave their abusive parents for another city, starting a transgender transition there. But in 2022, already having visible signs of hormonal changes, they again found themselves in the same room with their relatives.

    According to a Gender Stream study published in August 2023, there is a lack of understanding of intersectionality principles in the placement and care of Ukrainian refugees in Europe. In refugee camps, Ukrainians face transphobia both from their own people and from representatives of other nationalities forced to seek refuge.

    In addition, the European medical system significantly differs from the Ukrainian one, in particular with regard to transgender health. Local doctors do not always accept Ukrainian F64.0 certificates, and patients cannot get drugs for hormone therapy. For example, I had to stop hormone therapy three months after starting it when I ended up in Denmark as a temporary migrant. The Danish medical system is unfriendly to trans people, although the principle of self-identification for changing documents has long been officially introduced there. Still, in order to get therapy, both HRT and surgery, you need to wait for several months to several years: first, for an appointment with a psychotherapist, then for permission for surgical intervention and a place in a clinic. At the first appointment, a trans person can simply be denied continued treatment for gender dysphoria if they are considered “not transgender enough” or if they have mental disorders. This situation is true for other countries as well, in particular ones where right-wing parties and trans-exclusive radical feminists have influence in the parliament and government. The impossibility of continuing trans transition is often the reason why transgender people return to Ukraine, as well.

    Will Transgender People Come Back to Ukraine after Victory?

    As I said in the previous section, many transgender people have already come back home. Others come to Ukraine from time to time to, for example, visit their endocrinologists, get or buy hormonal drugs, or complete the process of changing documents. There are also people who do not plan to return under any circumstances because they have found more acceptable conditions for themselves abroad. For instance, trans women who crossed the border illegally at the start of the full-scale invasion will have no way to return, even if they wanted to. These trans people’s stories end with an application for asylum in host countries involving the prospect of later obtaining full citizenship.

    Conclusions and Consulting

    What is needed for more people to return and have the desire to live in Ukraine after victory?

    First, ICD-11 must still be fully integrated into our health care system. This will not only facilitate the transition process, but also help transgender people with accompanying problems to improve their quality of life. In the new classification of diseases, the attitude to mental health has also been modernized.

    Second, draft law #5488 should be adopted, which introduces the concepts of “hate speech” and “crimes based on intolerance” into Ukrainian legislation and is one of the conditions for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. Transgender people around the world are one of the groups most vulnerable to such crimes, and Ukraine is no exception. If cases of transphobic attacks are investigated properly, aggression will decrease and transgender people will feel safer.

    Third, we need more friendly doctors who know how and are willing to work with transgender people. Unlike many European countries, where transgender health is cared for only in specialized gender clinics, any specialists can do that in Ukraine. But to do so, they need to receive special additional education, in particular, learning the principles of non-discrimination of transgender and non-binary people. This training is occasionally conducted by LGBTQI+ organizations, but there is no specialization at the state level. This is especially felt when it comes to psychiatric and surgical treatment. Therefore, I see the major direction of work with the Ministry of Health here: inclusion of trans issues in medical university programs and creating full-fledged professional development courses for doctors in cooperation with experts from trans organizations.

    Literature:

    Звіт про злочини на ґрунті ненависти за ознаками СОҐІ в Україні 2022 року (для щорічного звіту БДІПЛ / ОБСЄ). Правозахисний центр «Наш світ». 23 квітня 2023 року.

    Дослідження[A1]  становища ЛГБТІК+ біженців і біженок за кордоном. Gender Stream. 24 березня 2023 року. Research of the Situation of LGBTQI+ Refugees Abroad. Gender Stream. March 24, 2023.

    Битва[A2]  за волю. Становище ЛГБТК в Україні 2022 року. Правозахисний центр «Наш світ». 9 лютого 2023 року. The Battle for Freedom. LGBTQ Situation in Ukraine in 2022. Nash Svit Center. February 12, 2023.

  • Feminism in Ukraine is always anti-colonial

    Feminism in Ukraine is always anti-colonial

    This article was first published on the website of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung.

    The colonial expansion of the Russian Empire and its direct successors – the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation – has long been widely ignored by Western intellectuals and politicians and almost completely excluded from critical analysis in the framework of postcolonial studies. This lack of political and academic will to properly address relations between the empire and the countries occupied and colonised by Moscow has created a blind spot right in the heart of Europe. Thus, from the Western perspective, the neo-colonial war started by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2014 mostly had to do with what Freud labels “the narcissism of minor differences”. After the full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, Ukraine was predicted to fall within two weeks and Kyiv be taken in two or three days, according to official Russian propaganda lines, which used to frame Ukrainians as backward, less developed and passive objects of Russian imperial appetites. Those notions are embodied in the colonial ideology of russkii mir, or “Russian world”. Russkii mir is characterised by the idea of Russian national and cultural supremacy as well as the aggressive expansion of Russian “traditional” values that are heavily loaded with misogyny, homophobia as well as the state-sanctioned and supported fight against feminist values and achievements. Although anti-feminism as a well-founded and organised anti-democratic political project can be found in many societies around the globe, it constitutes a quintessential and integral part of the Russian imperialistic project. This essay aims to investigate the level to which anti-feminism is incorporated into the ideology of russkii mir and to show that Ukraine’s anti-colonial struggle includes opposition to the anti-feminist and anti-gender movements.

    Matryoshka – the perfect metaphor for russkii mir

    The perfect metaphor of what russkii mir truly is would be the Russian matryoshka – a set of dolls of decreasing size placed one inside of another, each with beautiful female faces painted on them. Bright and charming on the outside, on the inside they remind one of the medieval torture device known as the iron maiden, with its deadly spikes targeting those trapped in the matryoshka’s interior. The Soviet Union’s purportedly anti-capitalist and anti-colonial façade had effectively masked the darker reality of Russian colonial and genocidal practices towards indigenous populations residing within occupied territories. The deliberate concealment of this reality has obscured a history fraught with systematic racist mass killings, ethnic cleansing, and forced expulsions of Circassians throughout the century-long Russian colonial wars in the Caucasus from 1763 to 1864. Additionally, the tragic episodes of forced deportation and extermination of the Crimean Tatars in 1944 further exemplify the implementation of such policies. Ukraine was no exception and has suffered repeated Holodomors1 (human-made famine imposed to eliminate native Ukrainians and Kazakhs) and Rozstriliane vidrozhennia (political purges of the Ukrainian national elite in 1937–38), as well as complete and total Russification of Ukrainians in the attempt to turn them into mankurts,2 which would be compliant subjects for the Soviet regimeAll of these events were an integral part of the colonial presence in Ukraine. Overall, the Ukrainian language was banned 134 times (!) during 400 years of Russian occupation. The linguicide of the Ukrainian language has always been one of the most powerful and pervasive instruments of Russian colonial strategy aimed at diminishing Ukrainian identity. These practices were rooted in the understanding that the Ukrainian language has become a primarily distinguishing characteristic that highlighted national, historical and cultural differences between Ukrainians and Russians, who though sharing the same phenotype have stood on different sides of the colonial paradigm.

    «Ukrainian women activists advocating for women’s emancipation alongside national liberation.»

    To cover up these colonial practices, the Soviet regime invented the “friendship of peoples” myth, which denied any prejudice based on national or ethnic background within its borders. In its modern modified version, “the friendship of peoples” constitutes the foundation of another imperial construction of three “brother nations” – Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians who together comprise a “Slavic Trinity”, the one “All-Russian” nation united under the rule of the predominant colonial ideology.

    Ukraine as “singing and dancing Little Russia”

    If the nation is an imagined community, as claimed by Benedict Anderson, the Ukrainian nation was re-imagined by Russian imperialism as an orientalised, exotic “singing and dancing Little Russia” – an ambivalent geopolitical construct in which “everything that is good […] comes from the common Russian legacy. Everything that is bad comes from evil, alien influences: Polish, Catholic, Jesuit, Uniate, or Tatar, Jewish, German, and so on”,3 but corruption was, of course, mainly a menace coming from the West. Such a paradigm has created a liminal space in which Russian colonialism could simultaneously claim “brotherhood” with “Little Russians”4 and label Ukrainians as “far-right nationalists and neo-Nazis”5 without causing any disruptions in the colonial logic.

    “The friendship of peoples”, although very prominent, was not the only imperial narrative used to whitewash the Soviet regime. Another one was a myth about women’s emancipation initiated and perpetuated by the Soviet government. Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks proclaimed women’s emancipation and abolishment of gender inequality, which was later anchored in in Article 122 of the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union.6 The Soviet state declared the creation of socialist modernity free of women’s oppression as one of its main and most progressive achievements. In reality, however, this decision was driven by the Soviets’ need to increase their labour force, which could be used to develop the growing economy of the communist state. In the framework of the formal gender equality proclaimed by the Soviet Union, domestic violence – just like sex itself7 – became an issue that was so marginalised and ignored by the state, it eventually ceased to exist in public discourse. In the meantime, women were not relieved from doing all the domestic work and taking care of children, and were thus being overburdened by “the second shift” – a load of domestic chores after their exhausting work in factories or collective farms. In addition to that, they were largely excluded from political decision-making, which had remained deeply rooted in patriarchal power hierarchies. Later, a few years before the collapse of the colonial monstrosity named the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev in his 1987 book Perestroika – New Thinking for Our Country and the World encapsulated the feminine mystique surrounding Soviet women with the idea that women should leave the public space and eventually “return to their purely womanly mission” (Gorbachev 1987, 117) – this idea still remains prevalent in Russian society today.

    Ukraine’s feminist movement is anti-colonial

    For the majority of Ukrainian women the Soviet dominance meant double colonisation of both their national and gender identities. The Ukrainian feminist movement was deeply rooted in the idea of national emancipation and independence – such a position being quite common for all countries experiencing colonial occupation of their territories (in the early 20th century Ukraine was occupied by the Russian Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Poland). Ukrainian women activists were active both in political and cultural spheres advocating for women’s emancipation alongside national liberation. When the Bolsheviks proclaimed the so-called emancipation of women, the names of those who were at the vanguard of the Ukrainian feminist movement were erased together with their decades of activism. Women were instead expected to be forever grateful to the Soviet regime for setting them free from the patriarchal yoke and prove their loyalty to the government through their hard work.

    Collapse of the Soviet Union and the need for “remasculinisation”

    The collapse of the USSR was not only “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century”, as Putin described it,8 but has also led to the decline of patriarchal masculinity, which was directly associated with the decline of Russian colonial hegemony, creating a need for “remasculinisation9 as a direct response to the fall of Soviet imperialism. The Russian Federation, as was its predecessor the Soviet Union, is a society built upon a patriarchal system of values in which “the legitimation of power often demands demonstration of the qualities of a “real man”.10 The “real man” in this case is defined not by what he is but rather by what he is not: he is not effeminate (and thus not homosexual), not non-white and not non-Orthodox.11 This societal demand was fulfilled by Putin who came to be prime minister and then president at the turn of the last century and who has become an embodiment of the new Russian neo-colonial masculinity “necessarily bound up with the enabling of violence – violence sufficient to overcome the considerable military capabilities of colonised societies” (Connell 2016, 306). Putin’s masculinity, with its visual imagery of the Russian Marlboro Man, its verbal aggressive domination of the political sphere and “a series of crude, macho aphorisms which have been collected as ‘Putinisms’” (Wood 2016, 2) has been used “to project the idea that he was capable of restoring Russia’s global stature” (Orlova 2018, 61). Soon Putin’s hypermasculinity as a scenario of power became central to the project of nation building and branding. In this project, gendered discourses have been widely used to create and perpetuate “the border between gendered Us and Others” (Voronova 2017, 219) – the discursive strategy that has proved to be especially successful since the Russian Federation’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. When the Kremlin launched a full-scale war against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Putin stated:

    «The West is trying to destroy our traditional values [my emphasis] and impose its pseudo-values on us, which are supposed to consume us, our people, from the inside; all these ideas that it is already aggressively imposing in its own realm and that lead directly to decay and degeneration, because they contradict human nature.»

    What Putin did not mention in his speech is that these “traditional values” are heavily loaded with anti-feminist rhetoric and homophobia. Russian colonialism has recreated a Manichean world of the Cold War, one in which “traditional values” stand in opposition to “gender ideology”, a concept framed as an exclusively Western invention. Open anti-feminism has been an important part of the Russian political and social system for years. While the Russian Constitution continues the Soviet tradition of proclaiming gender equality de jure (Article 19), the de facto Russian popular culture persists in marginalising feminism as an abnormal and perverted ideology since “normal” women should prefer family and children over the struggle for rights and equality. Anti-feminist and anti-gender discourses perfectly match the anti-Western, anti-democratic and anti-human rights narratives so widespread among Russian society and generously exported to those territories physically or ideologically occupied by Russian neo-colonial politics.

    National innocence menaced by Western sexual perversion

    Quite symbolically, after Putin became president for the third time in 2012, the term “Gayropa” began to be used widely in Russia as a slur referring to European civilisation (as a part of a wider Western civilisation) as opposed to the ultraconservative Russian civilisation, in order to stress the decay and degradation of an LGBTQI+-friendly Europe compared to the “traditional values” of the Russian Federation. Such a framing has marked the beginning of the sexualisation of Russian politics, which uses sexual anxiety to create a myth of national innocence that is constantly menaced by Western “sexual perversion”. In other words, anti-gender and anti-feminist movements have become the Kremlin’s tool for establishing russkii mir as the Russian version of the “politics of eternity”,12 which has imagined Russian nation as a “virginal organism troubled only by the threat of foreign penetration” (Snyder 2018, 57), thus requiring it to be protected against external monstrosities. As pointed out by Leandra Bias, the “[p]ublic bashing of ‘gender ideology’ serves several purposes at once. It serves to justify authoritarianism and repression inside the country; it legitimises aggression as part of foreign policy; and, finally, it creates common terrain with right-wing movements”.

    «Contemporary Ukrainian women and LGBTQI+ individuals play a significant role in the military. They exemplify a shift towards progressive ideals.»

    If Russia sees the collective West as its ultimate enemy and directly opposes it, Ukraine is regarded as corrupted by the West and being under so-called “external control”, as it has been put by Russian state propaganda. Such a framing presents Ukraine as a perverted and effeminate entity juxtaposed to the Russian ultramasculine patriarchy. It can be traced back to the gas dispute of 2006, when a Russian television program described Ukraine as a Mammonish kept woman, a “flighty Ukrainian mistress”.13 The same colonial rhetoric was used against Ukraine just a few weeks before the full-scale invasion when Putin referenced an obscene song lyric to demonstrate his vision of the relations between Ukraine and Russia. His words “Like it, or dislike it, bear with it, my beauty” clearly refer to the lyrics of the song by the Soviet-era punk rock group Red Mold: “Sleeping beauty in a coffin, I crept up and fucked her. Like it, or dislike it, sleep my beauty”. These lines, which directly imply rape and necrophilia, are symptomatic of Russian internal national misogyny and explicitly anti-feminist narratives, both of which constitute an inseparable part of Russian neo-imperial discourses and politics.

    Gender or anti-gender: who is attacking democracy in Ukraine?

    The Russian colonial presence in Ukraine has left deep marks on the cultural, social and political fabric of its society. Even after Ukraine officially proclaimed its independence in 1991, the coloniality of power14 continued to shape the Ukrainian socio-political landscape in social and religious practices, identities, beliefs, representations and other aspects of everyday life. Although anti-feminism was a part of this power matrix, the anti-gender movement has become its core: gender roles, norms and relations mainly defined by woman’s submissiveness, passiveness and domesticity as well as by explicitly homophobic rhetoric were transmitted through Russian-supported media and TV channels in Ukraine and through the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which largely dominated Ukrainian religious life. Symbolically enough, in his sermon on Forgiveness Friday (the last Friday before Lent), the head of the Russian Orthodox Church named gay prides in Ukraine as the reason for Russia’s invasion of the country,15 thus confirming once again the relation between anti-gender discourses prevailing in the spaces dominated by Russian neo-colonial ideology, an ideology that resulted in the unjustified and unprovoked full-scale military violence against Ukraine in 2022.

    Ukrainian feminists have played a crucial role in responding to and challenging anti-gender narratives in their society. They have been at the forefront of deconstructing these narratives by advocating for gender equality, promoting women’s rights, and working to dismantle harmful gender stereotypes and prejudices. The study “Gender or anti-gender: who is attacking democracy in Ukraine”,16 conducted by Ukrainian feminist and human rights organisations La-Strada Ukraine, Women in the Media and Ukrainian Women’s Fund in 2020, reaches the conclusion that the rise of anti-gender ideology was a part of Russia’s information war against Ukraine after the start of the invasion in 2014. The authors of the study analysed the development of Ukrainian social discourses as well as societal initiatives and changes between 2013 and 2020, and pointed out that anti-gender discriminatory rhetoric was presented under the Russian Federation’s typical narrative of “protecting family values”, which claimed they were being threatened by feminists and LGBTQI+ people. Such a consolidation of anti-gender and anti-feminist movements can be defined as a Russian counter-reaction to the Revolution of Dignity, which took place in Ukraine in 2014.

    A new Ukrainian femininity: emancipation as an anti-colonial struggle

    Among other socio-political transformations, the Revolution of Dignity has produced a new kind of Ukrainian femininity – an active female agent who managed to find her place in the male militarism of the protests (Phillips 2014; Martsenyuk 2014). Starting from this period, the coloniality of gender17 in Ukraine started to be challenged by the process of what Ukrainian philosopher Tamara Zlobina has called “gender decay”18 – the rejection of old gender models and the conception of a new emancipatory social rhetoric, which has allowed high social mobility and visibility of women in spheres traditionally associated with men: politics, military services, business and volunteering. Moreover, the role of women in nation- and state-building processes was officially recognised at the highest level and secured by the law: in 2015, the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) adopted the “Law on Amending Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine”, which was formulated to prevent discrimination in the labour market based on gender, gender identity or sexual orientation, and in 2017, the Ukrainian Health Ministry abolished a decree dating back to Soviet times that prohibited women from being employed in 450 professions considered dangerous to women’s reproductive health. Another significant change was Decree No. 292,19 issued by the Ukrainian Defence Ministry in June 2016, which opened up staff positions for privates, sergeants and sergeant-majors to women undergoing military service under contract. The importance of this decree can hardly be overestimated. Before 2016, women who took part in military operations as snipers or gunners were formally registered as cooks, nurses or other non-combat positions, thus limiting their career advancement in the military as well as denying them social benefits that their male peers enjoyed at the time. As of November 2022, there are almost 60,000 women serving in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, with approximately 19,000 holding civilian positions and approximately 41,000 serving in a military capacity. Some 5,000 of the latter group are directly engaged in combat operations.20

    While the Russian Federation officially decriminalised domestic violence in February 2017 and passed a law banning “LGBT propaganda” among adults in November 2022 (which followed the 2013 “gay propaganda” law that prohibited the dissemination of information about “non-traditional” sexual relationships to minors and that was misused to suppress LGBTQI+ rights and activism), Ukraine’s parliament has ratified the Istanbul Convention and unanimously passed a bill banning hate speech in the media against LGBTQI+ people. These two changes to Ukraine’s legislation were adopted after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (in July 2022 and December 2022 respectively) and demonstrate that Ukraine has chosen to build a democratic and just society based on human rights and the rule of law.

    Instead of conclusions

    The logic of Russian neo-colonialism turns the Cartesian ego cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) into the imperial ego conquiro, ergo sum (I conquer, therefore I am).21 This assertion involves not only the colonisation of territories, but also the colonisation of minds and identities. Anti-feminism and anti-gender discourses constitute a central pillar of the ideology of russkii mir and have proved to be an efficient tool of Russian colonial expansion. Conveniently framing gender equality, feminism and women’s rights as well as the support of LGBTQI+ people as a cunning strategy employed by the collective West to destroy the Russian nation, the Kremlin sweeps away democracy, human rights and the rule of law in order to establish its rule based on the “traditional values” of misogyny and homophobia. Ukrainians are today persistently striving to uphold their national identity and advance gender emancipation, drawing parallels with the women’s movement in Ukraine a century ago. Contemporary Ukrainian women and LGBTQI+ individuals play a significant role in the military, combating the influence of a conservative ruskii mir and thus exemplifying a shift towards inclusivity and progressive ideals.

    If we really want to defeat neo-colonial forms of oppression and violence, it is important to confront anti-gender movements and support women’s rights and gender equality worldwide, since without them true democracy, peace, security and stability cannot be achieved. Let us never forget that.

    —–

    Bibliography

    Bias, Leandra (2023), “The International of Antifeminists”, available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/gender/2023/02/24/4808/.

    Connell, Raewyn (2016), “Masculinities in global perspective: Hegemony, contestation, and changing structures of power”, Theory and Society, 45: 303–318, available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44981834.

    Freud, Sigmund (1930), Civilisation and Its Discontents (London: Hogarth Press).

    Gorbachev, Mikhail (1987), Perestroika – New Thinking for Our Country and the World (Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside Ltd).

    Martsenyuk, Tamara (2014), Гендерна соціологія Майдану: роль жінок в протестах. Постсоціалістичні суспільства: різноманіття соціальних змін: матеріали Міжнар. соціологічних читань пам’яті Н.В. Паніної та Т.І. Заславської, available at: http://ekmair.ukma.edu.ua/handle/123456789/3511.

    Orlova, Alexandra (2018), “Russian Politics of Masculinity and the Decay of Feminism: The Role of Dissent in Creating New ‘Local Norms’”, William and Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice, 25/1: 59–86, available at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl/vol25/iss1/4.

    Phillips, Sarah D. (2014). “The Women’s Squad in Ukraine’s Protests: Feminism, Nationalism, and Militarism on the Maidan”, American Ethnologist, 41/3: 414–426, available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027362.

    Restrepo, Eduardo (2018), “Coloniality of Power”, in Hillary Callan (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd), available at: http://www.ram-wan.net/restrepo/documentos/coloniality.pdf.

    Riabov, Oleg and Riabova, Tatiana (2014), “The Remasculinization of Russia? Gender, Nationalism, and the Legitimation of Power Under Vladimir Putin”, Problems of Post-Communism, 61/2: 23–35, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/PPC1075-8216610202.

    Riabczuk, Mykola (2010), “The Ukrainian ‘Friday’ and the Russian ‘Robinson’: the Uneasy Advent of Postcoloniality”, Canadian–American Slavic Studies, 44: 7–24, available at: https://brill.com/view/journals/css/44/1-2/article-p7_2.xml.

    Snyder, Timothy (2018), The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America (New York: Crown).

    Voronova, Liudmila (2017), “Gender politics of the ‘war of narratives’: Russian TV-news in the times of conflict in Ukraine”, Catalan Journal of Communication & Cultural Studies, 9/2: 217–235, available at: https://doi.org/10.1386/cjcs.9.2.217_1.

    Wood, Elizabeth A. (2016), “Hypermasculinity as a Scenario of Power”, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18/3, available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2015.1125649.

    —–

    1 Holodomor is recognised internationally as a genocide of the Ukrainian people by 28 countries: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Moldova, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, United Kingdom, United States.

    2 Mankurt is the term for the unthinking docile slave stripped of his or her memories and identity, which was popularised by Chinghiz Aitmatov in his novel The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years.

    3 Mykola Riabczuk (2010), p. 14.

    4 “Little Russians” is a common way to refer to Ukrainians in Russian colonial vocabulary.

    5 Vladimir Putin’s speech on 24 February 2022, before the start of the invasion, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-24/full-transcript-vladimir-putin-s-televised-address-to-russia-on-ukraine-feb-24.

    6 See https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1936/12/05.htm.

    7 I am referring to the popular catchphrase “There is no sex in the USSR”, which has been used to describe the stigma and shame surrounding sex-related topics as well as the taboo of publicly discussing them.

    8 See https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-historical-russia-soviet-breakup-ukraine/31606186.html.

    9 Riabov and Riabova (2014).

    10 Ibid., p. 26.

    11 Orthodox in the sense of belonging only to the Russian Orthodox Church, since it does not recognise any other branch of Orthodoxy as equal with itself.

    12 See Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom (2018).

    13 Riabov and Riabova (2014), p. 28.

    14 The concept was coined by Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano. See https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/347342/mod_resource/content/… (2000) Colinality of power.pdf.

    15 See https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-08-22/h_de0516e0f59ac2214af21bbb0aaf152e.

    16 See https://la-strada.org.ua/download/gender-chy-antygender-hto-atakuye-demokratiyu-v-ukrayini.

    17 The concept was developed by Argentinian feminist philosopher María Lugones. See https://globalstudies.trinity.duke.edu/sites/globalstudies.trinity.duke….

    18 Lecture “Gendernyi rozpad” (2016), available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RN7-9PVzJYc.

    19 See https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0880-16#Text.

    20 See https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3623578-iz-pocatku-vijni-zaginula-101-zinkavijskova-50-znikli-bezvisti-reznikov.html.

    21 I borrow the term ego conquiro from Eduardo Restrepo’s article “Coloniality of power”.

    —–

    This article is part of the dossier Feminist Voices Connected.

  • Gender misinformation and rape culture

    Media scholars view gendered disinformation as “a subset of misogynistic abuse and violence against women, as false or misleading gendered and sexualized narratives, often with an intent and coordination to prevent women from participating in the public sphere and harm their reputation.”[1]

    Gendered disinformation differs from general disinformation by violating women’s personal boundaries, promoting sexual and physical violence against women, etc. Therefore, gendered disinformation has multiple overlaps with rape culture, i.e., a culture in which sexual violence and other types of sexual abuse are normalized and embedded in a broader context. In such a culture, a woman’s sexual life and corporeality is either directly reduced to an object of male property or, through condemnation as immoral, is subject to attempts of social control, and thus also objectified.

    See more about rape culture in the article by Evhenia Dyshleva

    An example of gendered disinformation in Ukraine is the story of war correspondent Iryna Sampan. After she signed a statement by the NGO Women in Media against the Uncensored Calendar project (nude photography by Channel 5 journalists to raise funds for the army), Iryna was attacked by the right-wing radical group C14 and national russian pro-Kremlin media. The former tried to buy nude photos of her from her friends and sent negative messages about her to her husband, while the latter called her an “escort” and “Zaluzhny’s lover.”[2] In both cases, the mere existence of a woman’s sexual life was used to discredit her position and herself in order to intimidate and control her.

    Such stories are seen not only in Ukraine. In 2021, fake nude photos of Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock appeared in the German Internet segment.[3] In both cases, the fight against gendered disinformation should go beyond merely refuting fakes – it should foster the understanding of why the body and sexual agency belong to a woman only, the acceptance of different forms of sexual behavior, and dismantling the stereotypes of “female” and “male.” It is also important to counteract online and offline harassment at all levels and provide victims with comprehensive support.

    However, gendered disinformation can also be viewed more broadly as the disinformation around feminism and related topics (LGBT+ rights), the instrumentalization of gendered narratives, or women themselves to advance political and other goals.

    An example of such disinformation is the story of Olena Zelenska’s photo shoot for Vogue magazine. American conservative commentators reacted to it by spreading the idea that this photo session was funded by U.S. taxpayers and that it was a misuse of their money, and therefore, aid to Ukraine should be cut. In fact, U.S. aid comes as armaments, and the photo shoot was in no way related to that. Another, less obvious example was some Western feminists’ criticism of this photo session as glamorous and objectifying, on the sole basis that the photo was published in a glossy magazine. Even though there were no signs of objectification or other misogynistic aspects in the photos, as the first lady was in a subject position, in closed and formal clothes, in the setting of the presidential administration. However, a person who has not seen her, but has only read Western feminist criticism, may get a stereotypical (and false) impression. This is yet another example of gendered disinformation, although not malicious, but rather stemming from a dogmatic worldview and conviction of one’s truth despite the facts of reality.

    Vogue cover with Olena Zelenska

    Gendered disinformation can appear not only in the media but in other forms of public life, also. In 2018, the NGO Dukhovnist submitted a draft decision to a Brovary City Council session, which voted to appeal to the Verkhovna Rada [Parliament of Ukraine], the National Security and Defense Council, and other state institutions to remove from legal acts in education and from textbooks the norms and principles of sex education aimed at “overcoming gender stereotypes.” The appeal also called for a ban on “propaganda of various types of deviant sexual behavior,” in particular in the form of “so-called ‘equality marches,’ ‘pride parades,’ ‘gay parades,’ ‘queer culture festivals,’” etc. The reason for the appeal and the decision was the sex education project of Daryna Mizina, a Gender in Detail journalist who also worked with the local Brovary city media. The city council session interpreted the project as “encouraging sexual experimentation” and “promoting masturbation and homosexuality.”[4] The local media editorial office started receiving complaints about Daryna.

    Gendered disinformation can target not only a certain woman, but also a group of women. russian (more often) and Ukrainian (less often) social media claim that since the beginning of the full-scale war, many Ukrainian women have moved abroad to engage in sex work, some brothels have opened with specifically Ukrainian women, this work is more desirable than other types of income, and Ukrainian women spread sexually transmitted diseases, but at the same time fill the state budget, which is not otherwise filled (“Zelensky sold Ukrainian women abroad”).[5]

    Manipulating gender issues and promoting inequality is a constant component of far-right propaganda, as the entire patriarchal ideology is often an integral part of the far-right one. Emancipatory movements, such as socialism, liberalism, feminism, and the movement for the emancipation of the LGBT+ community, have been and are considered hostile by various versions of far-right and hatemongering ideologies. The strengthening of rape culture is a consequence of the spread of such ideologies, and gendered disinformation is their tool.

    Far-right movements, patriarchy, male supremacy

    The Third Reich considered family to be a genuine “cell” of the state. Ludwig Leonhardt, an expert in racial theory, argued that the family is a biological inheritance, and biological inheritance is the reproduction of the race. He authored “Marriage and Racial Hygiene,” which was promoted as a guide for proper marriage.

    Another race theorist, Hermann Paul, believed that “free love” was detrimental to racial health. In general, the gender division in the culture of this era was extremely strong: the man held responsibility for all public affairs, and the woman, as the “keeper” of the family, was responsible for housework, raising children, and serving her husband’s needs.

    The Nazis also defined standards for a woman’s body in reproductive and physiological terms: they discouraged decorative cosmetics, required women to conform to the standards of the Aryan race, and encouraged physical education and hygiene as a guarantee of reproducing a healthy race. Modern dances (jazz, etc.) were banned as encouraging women to become promiscuous.[6]

    The famous far-right theorist of the first half of the 20th century, Julius Evola, considered men and women’s physical dimorphism to be a reflection of spiritual dimorphism. In his view, men and women had their own separate paths in life, and deviation from them was “a conflicting and unnatural way of being.” Manhood could be of two types: a warrior and an ascetic. Womanhood also had two types: a lover and a mother, and both of these types existed as subordinate to men (husbands and sons, respectively). Self-expression in these areas required a woman to forsake everything masculine in her personality, and a man, respectively, to forsake everything feminine. Evola linked all this to ancient traditional cultures, though indirectly, not in the ordinary sense of what should be borrowed from the traditional cultures for modernity, but rather in the spiritual and symbolic sense.[7]

    Our contemporary, the known russian far-right political philosopher and propagandist Alexander Dugin, also did not miss an opportunity to comment on feminism. It is much more difficult to analyze him than previous thinkers, because his philosophy spans from an eclectic mix of very different ideas to a set of words that are only grammatically connected. Nevertheless, it can be deduced that he roots in the legend of the Great Mother, who was allegedly subdued by men, and now women are gaining strength again, and therefore humanity is facing such horrors as atheism, materialism, and progress.[8]

    This is a vivid example of gendered disinformation and an unscientific approach, the promotion of a mythological worldview. On another occasion, Dugin generalized “LGBT+, perverted feral feminism, transgender people, wokeism, cancel culture, and the entire culture of the modern West” as “systematic demonization of the civilizational scale” and an illustration that “counter-initiation powers” have gained access to authority in Western Europe and the United States.[9] One should not look for any other meaning in this than incitement of hatred towards the West and all the mentioned groups and phenomena among all who know that demons are bad.

    Another contemporary conservative thinker is the famous Canadian psychologist and bestselling author Jordan Peterson. In 2016, he participated in a local debate about transgender people on the conservative side, refusing to address people by their preferred pronouns. Peterson was manipulatively comparing transgender people and their allies to left-wing radicals, left-wing radicals to Nazis, and criticized Marxists and postmodernists as just along for the ride. As in Dugin’s case, there is no need to analyze this intellectual mess in detail, because its main purpose is to vent supremacists’ frustration, who feel the loss of male privilege and consider themselves to be affected by the emancipatory tendencies of society in general and by allegedly manipulative women in particular.

    According to Peterson himself, 80% of his YouTube audience are young men.[10]

    Jordan Peterson

    In recent years, U.S. commentators have begun to distinguish male supremacy as a separate social phenomenon. Male supremacists advocate rigid gender roles and protest against feminism. While “ordinary” far-right movements have patriarchal views internal to their ideology, male supremacists focus specifically on the gender aspect.

    The word “incel” (involuntary celibate) did not originate out of the male supremacist community, but it quickly spread there. The incel subculture’ worldview is based on the assumption that women choose attractive men and leave unattractive ones behind, which is expressed in a sharply misogynistic and coarse way. The subculture reduces the image of women to a lustful beneficiary who manipulates men for sex or money. Although this conventionally stereotypical woman has no interest in incels, they still consider themselves better than she is. In their ideology, there is a hierarchy among men, and women are basically below all levels of the male hierarchy.

    This worldview paradigm fits neatly into the rape culture because it assumes that women’s attractiveness and sexual activity globally belong to men and are simply “unfairly” distributed among them, i.e., not in the way incels would like. Since women are not rushing to line up for the bearers of the misogynistic worldview, thus prolonging their celibacy, the view works like a self-fulfilling prophecy. This worldview also belongs to the conservative spectrum, because, according to incels, “before” (i.e., before the onset of feminism), the distribution of sexual “benefits” that women “bestowed” upon men was “fairer.” The incel ideology portrays its supporters as the “injured” party.[11]

    There are no separate statistics on whether incels commit sexual crimes, but some hate crimes are associated with them, which links incels to the “ordinary” far right. In 2020, there was a terrorist attack in the German city of Hanau: the attacker killed nine people in several bars overnight, then returned home and shot his mother and himself. On his personal website, the 43-year-old terrorist published a manifesto in which, among other extreme racist statements, he said that he had never been intimate with a woman.[12] In the United States and Canada, people associated with the incel subculture have also committed several terrorist attacks that killed up to 50 people.

    How russia is spreading conservative and violent narratives

    The regime maintains the patriarchal attitudes of russian society at the level of both federal policy and local practices. A story in 2015 shocked russian feminists: in Chechnya, the head of the local police department forced a 17-year-old girl to marry him, even though he was three times her age and already had a wife. Ramzan Kadyrov himself attended the wedding, and the girl was led by his “right hand man” Magomed Daudov. Despite protests from feminists and the human rights community, the wedding took place, and nothing is known about the girl’s fate after. The Ombudsman for Children’s Rights verbally normalized this situation, in particular with the phrase “some women are wrinkled as early as 27,” which he later had to apologize for.[13] In Dagestan, such cruel misogynistic practices as female genital mutilation have spread in recent years, with more than a thousand girls undergoing this surgery every year.[14]

    Forced wedding in Chechnya

    In addition to reviving traditional patriarchal practices, there are new ones that are quite modern. The “male state” is a confirmed extremist movement, and it has been banned even in russia itself. This is a community of thousands of men, a vivid realization of rape culture, as it seeks to control women’s sexuality. These men publish photos of women without their consent to an audience of thousands, with mocking comments allegedly exposing “whores”, and private harassment, including threatening the women to send porn to their families. This movement is not only misogynistic, it also has a prominent racist focus: if a woman is suspected of having sex with a non-white man, and such suspicions are quite common for the movement, the extent of the abuse increases. For such women, they have coined a separate term: “inkwell.” The members of the “male state” call their ideology “national patriarchy.”[15]

    After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the level of everyday, domestic, and sexual violence increased in russia itself. However, the media and russian psychologists do not associate the war of aggression and the rape of Ukrainian women with patriarchy, instead attributing the increase in aggression to war-related PTSD, thus justifying the violence.[16] This means that the forces that should counteract rape culture are infected with it.

    russia’s patriarchal and conservative policies make it an attractive partner for far-right movements in other countries. Contrary to widespread perception, the Kremlin does not usually directly fund European far-right political parties. Rather, it is a win-win situation: for the world’s far-right, russia is a strong and influential country with a conservative regime. In turn, representatives of far-right forces act as “international experts” for domestic russian “consumption” and perform other useful roles, such as observers at illegitimate “referendums.” However, direct russian support can be found in the area of non-partisan cooperation, while media in different countries systematically pick up disinformation narratives favorable to russia.

    Conservative family policy is a significant part of what russia exports abroad through disinformation narratives.

    The World Congress of Families is a global network of organizations that oppose LGBT+ rights and abortion. It was founded in 1997 by American Christians and russians concerned about the demographic decline. It is believed to be funded by conservative russian oligarchs Konstantin Malofeev (who financed russia’s military intervention in Ukraine and is under numerous international sanctions) and Vladimir Yakunin.[17] In reality, the Congress operates as a tool of russian soft power, not only promoting patriarchal views on family and gender issues, but also spreading pro-russian political narratives. For many years, dozens of politicians from all over Europe have participated in WCF events, and in general, over 700 people from more than 50 countries have joined this network over the past 15 years.[18]

    According to the former French representative of the WCF, Fabrice Sorlen, “this Europe of people and nations will replace a technocratic Europe with a more traditional European civilization; it will promote Christianity in a Europe hitherto dominated by the LGBT lobby. It must unite with Vladimir Putin’s russia to create a version of Europe that stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific.”[19]

    Conservative tendencies are spreading from russia to neighboring friendly countries. In Georgia, Levan Vasadze, a major real estate investor and former board member of a number of large companies in russia, known for his anti-immigrant, anti-liberal, and ultra-religious views, founded the Demographic Revival of Georgia Foundation, which is part of the WCF. In May 2021, Vasadze announced his official entry into politics as the founder of the “Unity, Essence, Hope” social movement. In the same year, he called on the government to cancel Tbilisi Pride, which was actually right-wing radicals violently interrupted.[20] A Moldovan President himself, Igor Dodon, patronized the 2018 WCF Congress in Chisinau.[21]

    Moldovan President Igor Dodon meets with russian Patriarch Kirill

    russian gendered disinformation in Ukraine

    Research by the Ukrainian Women’s Fund shows that in Ukraine, the conservative part of society could also have received support from the russian Federation, and gendered disinformation was the channel of that support. Narratives benefitting russia were broadcast through affiliated structures (in particular, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate), the media, and other religious and conservative organizations and initiatives.

    The researchers imply that in 2013, russia conducted a strategic information operation to prevent Ukraine’s European integration, which was supported by a tactical information operation to prevent the adoption of draft law No. 2342 (On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Preventing and Combating Discrimination in Ukraine) and further expansion of the scope of the law “On Principles of Preventing and Combating Discrimination in Ukraine.” In the russian and Ukrainian media, similar narratives were observed. They were manipulating the concepts of “sexual orientation,” “non-traditional orientation,” “European values,” and “gender” as those that disrupt the family institution in Ukraine. There was also an attempt to form opinion with draft law No. 2342 and further expansion of the scope of the law “On Principles of Preventing and Combating Discrimination in Ukraine” as a step towards the dominance of fascist ideology in Ukraine (which is obviously not a fight against real fascism, but the use of an emotionally charged term to incite hatred).[22]

    russian narratives in Ukraine did not stop after 2014. For example, in September-October 2015, Vitaly Milonov, a member of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly, unleashed a wave of discrimination against the LGBT+ community in the russian media. Simultaneously, narratives similar to Milonov’s (family values are the same as Christian values, the state must protect the family from the LGBT+ community, Ukraine – or russia for Milonov – stands strong in preserving traditional family values, etc.) spread in Ukraine with the common message “joining the EU will lead to the destruction of the family.”[23]

    In 2021, a delegation of the Polish traditionalists Ordo Iuris visited the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation aiming to convince them against ratifying the Istanbul Convention. Polish feminist activist Clementine Sukhanov conducted her own investigation and provided supporting documents that Ordo Iuris is indirectly funded by russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev.[24] In Ukraine, the organization signed a memorandum of cooperation with Ruslan Kukharchuk’s conservative association All Together. [25] Kukharchuk’s other organization, Love Against Homosexuality, had been distributing leaflets as early as 2017 with not only conservative disinformation (the rights of LGBT+ people allegedly contradict human rights), but also with images of St. George’s ribbons on them (the ribbon is a russian military symbol). The organization Katechon took part in the same action. They borrowed the rare Greek word, which has no family or heterosexual connotations, from the think tank of the same name. This think tank is a joint project of the aforementioned Malofeev and Dugin.[26]

    Leaflet of the organization “Love Against Homosexuality”

    A news report about Ordo Iuris’ visit to Ukraine also bore signs of disinformation. It presented Ordo Iuris as “an independent legal organization based in Poland, accredited by the European Parliament… aiming to promote legal culture based on respect for human dignity and rights.”[27] In reality, it is a Polish branch of the international pseudo-Catholic movement Tradition, Family, Property (Tradição, Família e Propriedade), founded in Brazil in 1960, which allegedly promotes the “Catholic crusade.” In fact, it is not subject to the Vatican and has a history of extremism in Latin American countries (in particular, its members allegedly plotted to assassinate the Pope during his visit to Venezuela in 1984, after which the movement was banned in the country). In France, the TFP movement is considered a destructive cult (raising funds for unspecified purposes, obscure hierarchy and structure, and progressing requirements for members). The Canadian Bureau of Immigration and Refugees also lists TFP as a “religious paramilitary group.” The Vatican does not recognize this movement and is conducting an internal investigation into it (in particular, for using exorcism and rumors that all recent popes are controlled by the devil).[28]

    Conclusion

    To summarize, gendered disinformation is a practical tool for spreading rape culture and normalizing violent attitudes towards women and violence as such. Gendered disinformation can be disguised as “conservatism” or “family values,” but it does not lose its cannibalistic nature. russia was and is using gendered disinformation in various forms as part of its imperial propaganda, in particular by clogging the Ukrainian information space and supporting conservative movements and activists in our country and other countries.

    After the russian federation’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine finally ratified the Istanbul Convention, and the prevalence of conservative narratives in the media and public space decreased. This can be explained by the fact that conservative activists have more important things to do and security services are working more effectively.

    Photos: Annie Leibovitz for Vogue, Rene Johnston / Toronto Star / Getty Images, Radio Svoboda, Facebook page of Ihor Dodon, Zorian Kis

  • The history of sexism in the Ukrainian army

    Historically, military structures have been predominantly male institutions, and thus not free from sexism. The Ukrainian army is no exception, but by defending against Russia’s armed aggression, it plays an extremely important role not only in the defense of its own territory, but also in global military, food, and environmental security.

    This requires the army to be as efficient as possible, which includes overcoming prejudices and obstacles that may prevent women in the military from fulfilling their functional duties. In addition, Ukraine is building a tolerant, human-centered society, and gender equality is one aspect. That is why overcoming sexism in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is so important.

    This text is a brief overview of the main manifestations of sexism in the army over a certain period and a presentation of the most egregious cases. The article concludes with recommendations for change that civil society should advocate for.

    The period before Ukraine’s independence

    The specialized website Gender in Detail has already written in detail[1] about the inherited problems of the Ukrainian army, which continue from the Soviet army as its immediate predecessor. Soviet gender policy was only initially aimed at the emancipation of women; it quickly changed to viewing both men and women as a mere resource for an undemocratic state, with few specific differences. In World War II, the USSR actively recruited women as a conscription resource for the war effort, but their contribution is very incompletely reflected in commemorative practices. In general, the visibility of women soldiers and veterans was extremely low.

    Later, in order to stimulate the birth rate and having disguised it as “protection of mothers and children,” women were excluded from any harmful and difficult physical work, including combat positions in the army. This finally cemented the division into “female” and “male” positions and military professions. The Soviet army evolved into the post-Soviet Ukrainian army and existed without significant changes until 2014.

    The historical situation in non-Soviet Ukrainian military formations was not much better. The history of women’s participation in the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen units shows that men’s attitudes toward women who served with them were not fundamentally equal: women were subject to “punishment” and “all sorts of irritating remarks and interference from some male comrades.”

    Olena Stepaniv, the first female officer of the time, admitted that women’s participation in military formations was chaotic, and the role that could be assigned to women consciously remained unclear, given the practical realities of the struggle. By 1919, she herself gradually became opposed to the mass participation of women in combat.[2]

    Later, in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), women served as liaisons, nurses, typists, scouts, and housekeepers, which were mostly auxiliary, albeit dangerous, roles, and did not directly take part in hostilities.[3] Gender inequality also existed here not only in the distribution of functions: women occasionally became mistresses of their immediate superiors. According to historian Marta Havryshko, this clearly hints that men abused their status.[4]

    Olena Stepaniv
    The district leader of the Ukrainian Red Cross in Yaroslavshchyna, a leader of the women’s network of the OUN district “Baturyn” in Zakerzonnia, Maria Labunka (née Rovenchuk).

    In contrast to the Soviet army, where internal policies were largely dictated from above, members of grassroots armed groups were more likely to reproduce behavioral norms and attitudes that they had learned from civilian life. However, in both cases, there was no real gender equality.

    Sexism before 2014

    Until Russia’s military invasion in 2014 and a little later, the Ukrainian army inherited a predominantly Soviet army with all its problems, including the lack of women’s right to hold most combat and leadership positions.

    The military positions that women soldiers could hold as privates, sergeants, and officers were defined by Ministry of Defense Order #337 of 27 May 2014. Women could only hold positions primarily related to the care and maintenance of positions related to combat, such as nurses, canteen managers, telephone operators, or seamstresses, but could not be grenade launchers, machine gunners, service dog trainers, or even interpreters.

    Changes in this area were achieved only in 2016 thanks to the Invisible Battalion advocacy campaign, which showed the strong participation of women in the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) [the name for the Ukrainian army’s military activities in the east after Russia’s 2014 invasion –Translator) since 2014 without proper visibility, legal and infrastructural recognition, and reward.

    Until 2014, the army had a phenomenon typical of low status jobs: the feminization of poverty. The percentage of women gradually increased, but only because men avoided these jobs. Between 2001 and 2006, the total number of military personnel decreased, while the number of female service members increased in all categories. Most of them were wives, daughters, and relatives of military personnel.[5]

    In 2008, the Ministry of Defense introduced the position of “officer in charge of gender policy,” which was filled by a servicewoman, Natalia Dubchak. In 2010, the position was abolished, and Natalia Dubchak became a pro bono advisor to the Minister of Defense on gender policy.[6]

    Ms. Dubchak talks about the attitude of some of her male colleagues to women’s access to military professions: “We drafted two new Minister of Defense orders (developed by my colleagues in the personnel policy department) approving the list of military professions that can be held by servicewomen. Why are there two of them? Because one concerns women officers, and the other concerns women in contract service… I remember these debates, where some representatives of the General Staff Department were sitting and saying, ‘There is nothing for these women to do there, where they are going, they will not want to serve, they will not want to serve. What, they will go to the front line if necessary?’”[7]

    There is a curious story about how really unprepared the army was to incorporate women. The tie, which is mandatory in women’s military uniforms, was attached to the shirt with a special clasp in the shape of a trident, but the uniform designers did not take into account that women’s shirts are fastened on the left, not the right side, so women soldiers had to wear the state symbol upside down.[8]

    Nataliia Dubchak

    There was also gender discrimination in the Ministry of Defense. For example, a woman who worked as a chief specialist in the military policy department, had eight years of experience in the ministry and the “best specialist” award, was fired along with other female employees by the newly appointed director of the department without any legal grounds. Later, she was offered a new position with half the seniority and wage. The department head explained that the woman could not hold the chief specialist position because she had no military service experience. After that, the woman received a position in the ministry, but in a different department. An internal investigation was initiated against her without any grounds. After the investigation was closed, the department head personally threatened that if the woman refused to resign, he would initiate a new investigation and create impossible working conditions for her.[9]

    The guidebook “Actual Problems of Gender Policy in the Armed Forces of Ukraine” (2011), edited by Borys Andresiuk, notes “the ability of women present in the military environment to culturally enrich, ennoble relations in the military team, and stimulate the social and service activity of men.”[10] The word “ability” here points to an allegedly natural trait that women possess, rather than to socialization in the female gender, acquired over the years. The reference to such “abilities” itself is a classic example of benevolent sexism: the positive qualities of women, which serve the male part of the team, are listed. In the same text, there is a reference to Otto Weininger’s Gender and Character, a classic sexist work that influenced traditionalist thought, including Julius Evola.

    It would be unfair to only criticize without noting the positive aspects. The guidebook simultaneously refers to the need to counteract gender discrimination, particularly such aspects as sexual harassment and vertical and horizontal segregation. It is a positive development that the problem was voiced, albeit no steps were taken to address it.

    Natalia Dubchak also pointed out the need to ensure proper medical care for women in the military by introducing mandatory accounting and analysis of the morbidity of women in the military in order to determine the impact of the service conditions in certain positions on their morbidity and reproductive functions; to study the issue and, if possible, increase the number of women’s wards in hospitals.[11]

    This problem has not yet been resolved. On August 22, 2022, Special Operations Forces soldier Andriana Arekhta spoke at the VI International Veterans Forum “Ukraine. Defenders. The Future”, where she described her rehabilitation experience after a mine explosion. In the military hospital where Andriana was treated after her injury, there was no separate female ward in the polytrauma department, and she could only be placed separately in gastroenterology, which caused additional pain when moving from the ward to the operating room.

    Sexism after 2014

    At the end of 2015, with the support of the Ukrainian Women’s Fund and with the assistance of UN Women, the Invisible Battalion study was conducted, which started the advocacy campaign of the same name for gender equality in the security sector. Since 2015, the campaign has achieved the following:

    • Legislative attention to ensuring gender equality in the military (the Ministry of Defense lifted restrictions on combat positions for women, including officers; amendments were made to the Law “On Military Duty and Military Service” to strengthen gender equality; a mechanism for responding to sexual harassment was developed with the participation of the General Staff);
    • Partially overcoming vertical gender segregation in the Armed Forces (the number of female officers has tripled and several women have been promoted to generals);
    • A gradual shift away from paternalistic state policy towards women (the list of 450 prohibited professions for civilian women was abolished, although the maximum cargo lifting limits for women are still in place);
    • The Armed Forces infrastructure is being adapted to the needs of women (female summer uniform and underwear were approved);
    • A partial departure from sexist rhetoric expressed by public figures regarding women in military (the word “defenders” [of female gender, tr.] was added to the name of the state holiday, Defenders’ Day);
    • A noticeable increase in the media visibility of women in the security sector and coverage of the issues they currently face;
    • Including women in the security sector as target groups in the National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 “Women, Peace and Security”;
    • Increased subjectivity of servicewomen and female veterans in civil society (in particular, forming the Women’s Veterans Movement).

    However, there were rollbacks and scandals both during the campaign and in the work of civil society and government agencies to develop and affirm new values, despite the general trend toward overcoming sexism and achieving gender equality. In early January 2016, servicewomen and activists had to picket the Ministry of Defense after the commander of military unit A1314, Major General Serhiy Nayev, commanded on December 5, 2015, to temporarily suspend the recruitment of women for military service on a contract basis.[12] The order was canceled as a result of the campaign, but work on the problem of discrimination against women has only just begun.

    In 2017, an all-army competition was initiated with the benevolently sexist name “Berehynia v pogonakh” [“Goddess in epaulettes” – Editor]. The authors of this ill-timed idea were the Main Military Medical Directorate, the Main Directorate for Moral and Psychological Support of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense Communications and Press Directorate, its central print organ, the Narodna Armiya newspaper, and the Ukrainian Military Medical Academy. The competition was held among military medics and included a file in evening dresses, a demonstration of creative talents, and an assessment of professional medical skills and athletic performance.[13] The competition ran until 2020.

    Participants of the “Berehynia (female guardian) in Uniform 2018” competition.

    Not only representatives of rear units, but also ATO participants took part in the contest. Zaxid.net commented on it: “All participants have gone through selection in their units and institutions. The combat girls wrote tests, swam, and sing for two days. Marine Olena did 32 push-ups in a minute. After the trenches of Shyrokyne [actual combat zone – Translator], it’s a cakewalk for her.”[14]

    A meme from the page “X-press officer

    In 2021, Ukrainian social media were outraged by the official announcement of the Independence Day parade, where cadets of the Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv were preparing to march in the Prussian step wearing high-heeled shoes, which are part of the women’s ceremonial military uniform. After a lengthy scandal that even reached the rostrum of the Verkhovna Rada, the shoes were replaced with more comfortable ones.[16]

    Cadets in heels

    The problem of sexist attitudes toward women in the Armed Forces persists. The media cite examples such as when soldier Lesia Hanzha, transferring from one unit to another, learned that her future company commander was “totally against women,” and reconnaissance platoon commander Yulia Mykytenko testified that after her appointment to this position, male soldiers refused to serve under a woman. She also experienced unethical comments about her after her husband’s death.[17]

    Yuliia Mykytenko

    The issue of sexual harassment in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is worth a separate remark. This phenomenon occurs in all countries around the world in completely different spheres of life, including the military. As elsewhere, victims are reluctant to speak publicly about this issue, and in Ukraine they are also afraid of being accused of discrediting the army in a country at war.

    Currently, servicewomen who have been sexually harassed can only get help from human rights organizations. As of the beginning of 2023, it is known that the JurFem association of women lawyers is handling four such cases, and the hotlines of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) La Strada and Legal Hundred have received two and one appeal, respectively.[18] In reality, there may be many more incidents, but the real numbers are unknown. Human rights organizations can only provide legal support, and the quality of the case remains on the conscience of the judiciary, so there is no guarantee that cases will be resolved in favor of the victims, which also demotivates women to seek help.

    Nevertheless, in recent years, two servicewomen decided to speak publicly about this issue. In 2018, Lieutenant Valeriia Sikal reported long-term systematic harassment by Colonel Viktor Ivaniv. In 2021, Lieutenant Colonel Olha Derkach stated that she had long endured systematic harassment by Colonel Oleksandr Kryvoruchko. In both cases, the women claimed that there were other victims. Criminal cases were opened, but due to the full-scale invasion, both cases were suspended.[19] This is not a promising example for anyone.

    There was some progress in combating sexual harassment in the military in 2021. The Gender Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the NGOs Legal Hundred, Institute of Gender Programs, and Women’s Veterans’ Movement developed a detailed system for identifying sexual harassment cases, responding, investigating, and officially inspecting. The system provided for creating institutional mechanisms for proper response and assistance. At that time, the only specialized response mechanism was a formal hotline, which did not have established systems for processing and storing the data received and responding to reported cases, or qualified employees to handle complaints from victims of sexual harassment. The developments were presented at the “Army Built on Trust” forum organized by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in October 2021, but the mechanism has not been implemented.[20]

    Since the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not have an effective policy on sexual harassment, there is no policy on sexism as such. As a result, military personnel are free to express sexist prejudices against women privately and publicly, without any warnings or consequences.

    In 2023, the sexism of Third Assault Brigade soldiers on the YouTube channel DVIZH gained public attention. A comedian in civilian life, Vitktor Rozovyi compared women who are fighting to children and dogs. The episode also featured jokes about how women can be useful in the army, with a lot of innuendo. Read more about it here.

    After public outcry from women soldiers, no one from the brigade’s office apologized. Viktor Rozovyi continued to joke on his social media, and the soldiers decided to cement their sexist status in the New Year’s issue of DVIZH. A soldier with the call sign “Bot” advised a girl who expressed a desire to serve in the brigade to cook borscht. He then launched into an angry tirade about the war being “a man’s world” and about women who “have intruded everywhere” and want “quotas” and “equal rights.”

    Shortly after the Third Assault Brigade scandal, Anton Chicha, commander of the Kraken assault company, stated his position. “I am against [girls in the army]. I will not take a girl to my company,” Anton said in the YouTube show Viddushivdushu.[21] The fighter noted that there are females in the army who perform many functions. However, Chicha himself is against females in combat positions, allegedly because of their “unstable psyche.”

    Currently, the only resistance to soldiers’ public sexism is society’s reaction, as the command ignores such cases. This aggravates the situation, because civilians’ critique of the military, even if it is for sexism and misogyny, is rejected altogether by the military itself and by parts of society.

    The issue of gender mainstreaming of veterans’ policy remains problematic due to the almost complete absence of such a policy. On the one hand, the register of female and male veterans, which was at the disposal of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs until 2022, has expired, NGOs that provided services to female and male veterans have largely re-profiled to provide volunteer assistance to the army, and a full return to peaceful life is impossible because Ukraine is at war. On the other hand, the Ministry has not yet proposed even an approximate version of a concept of veteran’s policy that could be used to work on gender sensitivity. In the face of such profound ambiguity, the efficiency of further work in this area is questionable, at least until the situation is clarified.

    Gender consulting. Recommendations

    To summarize, the most pressing problems for servicewomen are unequal treatment in combat positions and promotions, lack of an effective mechanism to combat sexual harassment and sexism, insufficient provision of uniforms, armor protection elements according to anthropometric data, medical services and hygiene products, and the lack of a veterans’ policy as such. However, there are other suggestions for gender policy in the security sector.

    Civil society organizations recommend adopting two draft laws that strengthen gender equality in the Armed Forces. Draft law #5713 aims to regulate issues related to parental leave in connection with the birth of a child; compensation for unused leave for persons with children; providing sanatorium treatment, material and other support; equal access to officer positions; and mandatory official investigations in case of signs of discrimination based on beliefs and grounds defined in Article 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine. Draft law #5714 proposes equalizing the rights of men and women in the military in terms of prosecution for military offenses and crimes by lifting restrictions on penalties and punishments for women, such as detention in the brig and detention in a disciplinary battalion.

    It is also recommended to increase the number of staff positions for gender advisors (currently there are 142 in the Armed Forces, but almost all of them are not staffed), and to train and certify female candidates for this position.

    Conclusions

    The problem of sexism in the world’s armies has always existed. The army of independent Ukraine, and the military structures that preceded it, has not been an exception to this rule. This article only briefly outlines the most egregious cases and the most common problems.

    Only systematic work on solving specific problems can improve the situation, and this article outlines proposals for them. The Invisible Battalion advocacy project and other civil society organizations have been working in this area for a long time.

    However, servicewomen themselves are the main stakeholders in reducing sexism in the security sector, as well as the main drivers of positive change. They are fighting for gender equality and a safe and tolerant state by giving a positive example to women who serve after them and by their daily struggle for equal treatment. And they should be supported as much as possible in this endeavor.

    Illustrations: Wikipedia; Vasyl Havryshchuk’s personal archive / Local History; Natalia Dubchak’s personal Facebook page; Alla Kornienko / Zhyttia Obriyii. Khmilnyk News; X Press Officer; Army Inform; Yulia Mykytenko’s personal Facebook page

    This project is implemented with the support of the Swedish Institute.

    [1] Hrytsenko, Anna. How women have changed the Ukrainian army // Gender in detail. – 2019. – October 10: https://genderindetail.org.ua/season-topic/gender-after-euromaidan/yak-zhinki-zminili-ukrainsku-armiyu-1341190.html.

    [2] Baidak, Mariana. Olena Stepaniv: one of the first Ukrainian women soldiers // Gender in detail. – 2021. – March 30: https://genderindetail.org.ua/spetsialni-rubriki/zhinky-yaki-toruyit-novi-shliachy/olena-stepaniv.html.

    [3] Popeliuk, Roksolana. Support Front: Women in the Ukrainian Resistance Movement // Local History. – 2022. – February 1: https://localhistory.org.ua/texts/statti/front-pidtrimki-zhinki-v-ukrayinskomu-rusi-oporu/.

    [4] Havryshko, Marta. Gender Aspects of Sexual Morality in the OUN and UPA in the 1940s and 1950s // Ukrainian Liberation Movement. 2015 – No. 20 – P. 199-213.

    [5] Dubchak, Natalia. Women in the Armed Forces of Ukraine: Problems of Gender Policy // Strategic Priorities. – 2008. – No. 4 (9).

    [6] “Invisible Battalion”: Women’s Participation in Military Operations in the ATO: (Sociological Research) / Edited by Tamara Martsenyuk – Kyiv, 2015. – P. 19-20.

    [7] Ibid. – P. 17.

    [8] Women in a Time of Change, 1989-2009: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, East Germany and Ukraine. – G. Böll Foundation in Ukraine, 2012. – P. 114.

    [9] On the brink: addressing discrimination and inequality in Ukraine // The Equal Rights Trust Country Report Series: 5. – London, 2015. – P. 58-59.

    [10] Actual problems of gender policy in the Armed Forces of Ukraine: Educational and methodological manual edited by B. P. Andresiuk – K.: Research and Development Center of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2011.

    [11] Dubchak, Natalia. Women in the Armed Forces of Ukraine: Problems of Gender Policy // Strategic Priorities. – 2008. – No. 4 (9).

    [12] Plokhotnyuk, Natalia. We are not cooks, but full-fledged fighters: does not war have a female face?” // Kyiv Vechirniy. – 2016. – January 24: https://vechirniy.kyiv.ua/news/3205/.

    [13] Kornienko, Alla. “Berehynia in uniform” // Zhyttevi obriyii. News of Khmilnyk. – 2018. – June 15: https://gazetahm.org/posts/berehynia-v-pohonakh.

    [14] Herun, Yuriy. In Truskavets, military nurses competed in a beauty contest // Zaxid.net. – 2017. – March 10: https://zaxid.net/u_truskavtsi_viyskovi_medsestri_zmagalis_u_konkursi_krasi_n1420215.

    [15] https://www.facebook.com/Xprofficer/posts/pfbid035K2ZjAt8wRWtikFT4Xffe88eRZ7nFo7BpGBRisfZ3VEAAGLQeyKLXQLrsDXBugjBl?__tn__=%2CO*F

    [16] Vyacheslav MasnyiAnna Pogrebna. Parade in heels. Servicewomen have their shoes replaced with lower-heeled boots // Suspilne. News. – 2021. – July 2: https://suspilne.media/144081-parad-na-pidborah-nardepi-vimagaut-vid-minoboroni-provesti-rozsliduvanna-gendernogo-skandalu/.

    [17] Sokolova-Stekh, Anna. Women in the Armed Forces of Ukraine: “The desire to serve is perceived as a whim” // Deutsche Welle. – October 9, 2023: https://www.dw.com/uk/zinki-v-zsu-bazanna-sluziti-sprijmaut-za-primhu/a-66995226.

    [18] NB 5.0. Monitoring of Recommendations and Research Results from the Invisible Battalion cycle / Edited by Tamara Martsenyuk. – Kyiv, 2023. – P. 54-55.

    [19] Ibid. – P. 58.

    [20] Ibid. pp. 61-62.

    [21] YouTube channel VIDDUSHIVDUSHU. Chicha / KRAKEN’s reaction to the Farion scandal / How were collaborators caught and Kupyansk liberated?

  • Sexual Harassment in the Armed Forces in Ukraine and Worldwide

    The problem of sexual harassment and sexual violence in the military exists in armies around the world. It affects not only women, although women suffer from it more often. American researchers Valerie Stander and Cynthia Thomsen believe that sexual harassment is facilitated by inherent factors of the military structure, such as the acceptance of violence in general, deindividualization, complete subordination to leadership, and the still widespread male dominance in this leadership.[1]

    Other researchers, such as Carl Castro, argue that well-developed stress resilience results in less reports of violence, and that team spirit puts pressure on victims and makes them think that by reporting violence they are “betraying” their team.[2]

    The institutional pre-condition that makes harassment or violence against others possible is a position of power. The army in general is a hierarchical structure, and the higher the person in this hierarchy is, the more opportunities they have to commit violence without consequences. The “glass ceiling” still exists in this area, so top positions in the army are occupied mainly by men.

    Sexual harassment is also part of broader issues such as misogyny, toxic masculinity, gender discrimination, lack of professionalism, and, in the case of the Ukrainian army, the Soviet legacy in professional culture.

    “It was a lieutenant colonel. At a long lecture that had absolutely nothing to do with gender, he talked about every possible thing and made a remark that ‘when you are in the army, do not bring women in any case… Never bring women to the training grounds or to the ATO [Anti-Terrorist Operation – Editor] because everyone will fuck them except you. Mark my words, I’m telling you, you’re young, inexperienced – never take them to the training grounds, because everyone will fuck them except you.[3]

    The problem of sexual harassment is accompanied by related negative phenomena, such as homophobia and transphobia, with the use of bullying and violent behavior by men against men.

    The existence of sexual harassment cannot be a reason to discourage women from serving in the military, on the grounds of “protection.” Just as sexual harassment in a civilian job is not a reason to discourage women from earning their own money. However, harassment in the military differs from harassment in the office or at work, primarily because it is not as easy to resign from military service on the grounds of harassment as it is from a civilian job. In addition, the lack of resolving this problem can demotivate women who would like to serve in the first place, and the Ukrainian army needs volunteers.

    The appropriate way to solve the problem is to create effective mechanisms to combat harassment, gender-based violence, bullying, sexism, and discrimination in general. A proper, friendly, trusting atmosphere is the key to effective service for both women and men.

    Exposing the issue of sexual harassment and sexual violence to the public cannot delegitimize the entire Ukrainian army, nor can it delegitimize other armies in the world. This is not only my opinion, but also that of Ukrainian society. In 2020, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology commissioned the Invisible Battalion project to conduct a national representative survey, implemented by the non-governmental organization (NGO) Institute of Gender Programs. According to the survey, 23% of respondents believed that exposing sexual harassment in the army was worthwhile because it was a problem often ignored by the leadership of the Armed Forces; 24% said it was worthwhile because it was perhaps the only way for victims to achieve justice; another 8% said it was worthwhile because discrimination in the Armed Forces exists. Only 17% of respondents believed that publicity can harm the victims, and only 8% explained that publicizing such problems harms the image of the Armed Forces.[4]

    The problem of sexual harassment has also been recognized at the level of the General Staff of Ukraine. Viktoriia Arnautova, Gender Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, publicly stated, “The Armed Forces need to recognize as a civilized institution that this phenomenon exists and respond adequately.[5]

    Sexual Harassment in the Armed Forces in Ukraine and Worldwide

    5 грудня 2024

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    Hanna Hrytsenko

    Hanna Hrytsenko

    sociologist

    Researcher of gender issues and right-wing radicalism, feminist, translator, editor of “Tovaryshka” website.

    The problem of sexual harassment and sexual violence in the military exists in armies around the world. It affects not only women, although women suffer from it more often. American researchers Valerie Stander and Cynthia Thomsen believe that sexual harassment is facilitated by inherent factors of the military structure, such as the acceptance of violence in general, deindividualization, complete subordination to leadership, and the still widespread male dominance in this leadership.[1]

    Other researchers, such as Carl Castro, argue that well-developed stress resilience results in less reports of violence, and that team spirit puts pressure on victims and makes them think that by reporting violence they are “betraying” their team.[2]

    The institutional pre-condition that makes harassment or violence against others possible is a position of power. The army in general is a hierarchical structure, and the higher the person in this hierarchy is, the more opportunities they have to commit violence without consequences. The “glass ceiling” still exists in this area, so top positions in the army are occupied mainly by men.

    Sexual harassment is also part of broader issues such as misogyny, toxic masculinity, gender discrimination, lack of professionalism, and, in the case of the Ukrainian army, the Soviet legacy in professional culture.

    “It was a lieutenant colonel. At a long lecture that had absolutely nothing to do with gender, he talked about every possible thing and made a remark that ‘when you are in the army, do not bring women in any case… Never bring women to the training grounds or to the ATO [Anti-Terrorist Operation – Editor] because everyone will fuck them except you. Mark my words, I’m telling you, you’re young, inexperienced – never take them to the training grounds, because everyone will fuck them except you.[3]

    The problem of sexual harassment is accompanied by related negative phenomena, such as homophobia and transphobia, with the use of bullying and violent behavior by men against men.

    The existence of sexual harassment cannot be a reason to discourage women from serving in the military, on the grounds of “protection.” Just as sexual harassment in a civilian job is not a reason to discourage women from earning their own money. However, harassment in the military differs from harassment in the office or at work, primarily because it is not as easy to resign from military service on the grounds of harassment as it is from a civilian job. In addition, the lack of resolving this problem can demotivate women who would like to serve in the first place, and the Ukrainian army needs volunteers.

    The appropriate way to solve the problem is to create effective mechanisms to combat harassment, gender-based violence, bullying, sexism, and discrimination in general. A proper, friendly, trusting atmosphere is the key to effective service for both women and men.

    Exposing the issue of sexual harassment and sexual violence to the public cannot delegitimize the entire Ukrainian army, nor can it delegitimize other armies in the world. This is not only my opinion, but also that of Ukrainian society. In 2020, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology commissioned the Invisible Battalion project to conduct a national representative survey, implemented by the non-governmental organization (NGO) Institute of Gender Programs. According to the survey, 23% of respondents believed that exposing sexual harassment in the army was worthwhile because it was a problem often ignored by the leadership of the Armed Forces; 24% said it was worthwhile because it was perhaps the only way for victims to achieve justice; another 8% said it was worthwhile because discrimination in the Armed Forces exists. Only 17% of respondents believed that publicity can harm the victims, and only 8% explained that publicizing such problems harms the image of the Armed Forces.[4]

    The problem of sexual harassment has also been recognized at the level of the General Staff of Ukraine. Viktoriia Arnautova, Gender Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, publicly stated, “The Armed Forces need to recognize as a civilized institution that this phenomenon exists and respond adequately.[5]

    A 2015 study of NATO member states’ armies found that 80% conducted regular training to prevent sexual harassment and violence in the military, and more than 60% had policies formal procedures in place and trained personnel to prevent and record complaints of sexual harassment of women or men.[6]

    Let’s take the U.S. Army as an example. The problem of sexual harassment is monitored by keeping statistics on complaints received and through an annual anonymous survey of gender and workplace relations. The first number is much smaller than the number of those who report harassment anonymously: according to 2012 data, 6% of American female soldiers filed complaints about harassment, and about a quarter of them were harassed. Among men, 1% reported harassment through a complaint, and 10% reported it anonymously. The 2018 data showed similar proportions; however, because the problem had been exposed, the number of complaints increased significantly.

    The American experience emphasizes the importance of preventive work and the important role of the unit commander, who should lead this work, facilitate complaints, and, in general, be responsible for a healthy working atmosphere in the unit. Where the commander is insensitive to the issue of sexual harassment, the risks increase.[7]

    In 2020, the case of Vanessa Guillen, a 20-year-old servicewoman who disappeared while on duty, gained publicity in the United States. She had previously told her family that she was being sexually harassed by a sergeant, that complaints against him by other female victims had been rejected, but that she would solve her problems herself. Two months later, the remains of her body were found. The killer was U.S. Army Specialist Aaron David Robinson; his girlfriend, Cecily Ann Aguilar, helped dismember the body and hide the remains. Robinson shot himself during his arrest, and Aguilar was sentenced to 30 years in prison.[8] The investigation concluded that the murder was a direct result of leadership failure and a climate of indulgence in sexual violence and harassment at the military unit. Fourteen other soldiers were disciplined.[9][10] As a result of the Vanessa Guillen case, sexual harassment was included as an offence in the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 2022.

    Mural in memory of Vanessa Guillen

    In Canada, about a quarter of female service members experience harassment or violence during their careers, while the figure for men is about 4%. About three cases of sexual harassment or violence occur every day. After an independent study published a report on “a culture hostile to women and LGBT+ people in the military,” Canadian servicewomen and veterans filed lawsuits against the Ministry of Defense for two years (2016-2017). Many of them received financial compensation after a court decision. The problem of sexual harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces was declared a threat to national security. The Standing Committee on National Security and Defense of the Senate of Canada believes that a culture of conformity, hierarchy, unquestioning obedience to orders, and placing group interests above individual ones created an atmosphere conducive to sexual harassment and violence. To remedy this situation, it is necessary to influence this culture, not just increase the number of women in the army.[11] Between 2015 and 2021, Operation Honor was conducted to comprehensively study the problem and look for ways to solve it.

    In 2021, 13 high-ranking officers in Canada were simultaneously suspended, investigated, or forced to retire due to inappropriate sexual behavior. The military police did not disclose the cases on its own initiative, but answered questions from journalists.[12]

    According to a study by the Research Center for Humanitarian Problems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2011), 10% of women and 5% of men (mostly cadets of higher military educational institutions) experienced sexual harassment in the army.[13]

    In 2020, the authors of the study “Invisible Battalion 3.0. Sexual Harassment in the Military in Ukraine” talked to women who had experienced sexual harassment, sexual violence, sexual violence combined with physical violence, etc. There were cases of offenders damaging personal belongings and even using firearms in retaliation for refusing [intimacy – Editor].

    Sometimes, in cases of sexist jokes or other minor conflicts, the perpetrator might not understand why their actions were wrong, even if they had to apologize to the victim at the request of their superiors. Sometimes the victims themselves did not immediately recognize the unpleasant incidents as harassment or sexism, rather than just interpersonal conflicts.

    This brings us to the need for education on gender equality and anti-harassment. The Invisible Battalion project team developed a training course on Gender Equality and Combating Sexual Harassment in the Military, which is publicly available on the Prometheus online education platform.[14] By the beginning of 2023, more than 23,000 people had registered for the course (90% of them received certificates), and the Department of Military Education and Science of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine recommended that higher military educational institutions and military structural units of higher education institutions include the course in their training plans for cadets.

    However, it is obvious that systematic harassment of subordinates, sexual violence, physical abuse, threats, and harassment cannot be interpreted only as a lack of gender education, but also must be punished accordingly. The researches also documented cases, as well as the fact that it is rather futile for victims to expect fair punishment for the offender. As a structure that was not ready before the war in Ukraine to recruit women into combat positions and provide them with uniforms, the army was also not ready to respond to sexual harassment. Such problems were sometimes not resolved, sometimes ended in physical conflict with the offender, and sometimes led to the dismissal of women from the ranks of the Armed Forces, thus reducing the combat capability of the army by one qualified specialist. The mechanism of resolving conflicts by appealing to the commander does not work when the offender is the commander himself. Victims usually did not consider the option of calling the general “hotline” of the Armed Forces of Ukraine because of the non-anonymity of such appeals and, accordingly, the risk of worsening their situation.

    At the time of the study, only one case of sexual harassment was known when the victim decided to speak publicly and name the offender. In 2018, Lieutenant Valeriia Sikal reported long-term systematic harassment by Colonel Viktor Ivaniv. She stated that when she was serving in military unit A1358, the head of the unit, using his official position, repeatedly tried to force her to have sex. The Main Department of the National Police in Vinnytsia Oblast opened a case of coercion to sexual intercourse. As of early 2024, a verdict had not been reached in the case, and Colonel Ivanov was temporarily promoted and transferred to the Ministry of Defense.[15]

    Among the cases that came to the research team’s attention, sexual harassment was most often perpetrated by higher-ranking individuals and without witnesses; most often, men harassed women, although this was not the only possible scenario. Most of the victims did not tell anyone about the sexual harassment and did not seek help; the project researchers were often the first people to whom the victims confided. If any witnesses were present during the harassment, they usually supported the offender or remained neutral, either by not intervening or by declaring that they could not influence the situation. Women, usually, were not offenders themselves, but they did not always support the offended.

    Illustration to the study ‘Invisible Battalion 3.0. Sexual Harassment in the Military Sphere in Ukraine’

    After the study was published and the topic was brought to the public’s attention, servicewomen began to talk more about this problem. In 2021, Lieutenant Colonel Olha Derkach, an employee of the Chernihiv Regional Conscription and Social Support Center, stated that she had been harassed by her supervisor, Colonel Oleksandr Kryvoruchko, the regional military commissar. As in the case of Valeriia Sikal, a verdict in the criminal case has not yet been delivered.[16]

    Valeriia Sikal and Olha Derkach

    There have also been public statements in which victims did not name their perpetrators but shared their stories. Servicewoman Iryna Bazykina reported to the media that she had suffered sexual and physical violence. After a year of investigation, no criminal offense was found in the behavior of the perpetrator, and the perpetrator absolved himself by saying that “she likes hard sex.[17]

    In a podcast by the Women Veterans Movement published in early 2024, Svitlana, an aerial reconnaissance officer, shared her story, “I literally got into a fight or a struggle with an officer, a commander, but those people whom I considered friends in that unit, they just left, they came out to let the commander have a good time.[18]

    Communications officer and simultaneous interpreter Nadiya Haran went further and spoke about sexual harassment in the Armed Forces to the British newspaper The Guardian.[19] According to her, she left her unit because of a commander who harassed female subordinates and told them that if they refused to have sex with him, he would send their husbands, who were also his subordinates, to their deaths. The problem was brought into the international spotlight by Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar, who promised to personally respond to the statements.[20] It was not possible to verify her promise because she was dismissed from her post a month later.

    Commenting on sexist jokes by a soldier in the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, the Women Veterans Movement claims that “every harassment case goes unpunished.[21]

    In cooperation with the Institute of Gender Programs, the Women Veterans Movement, and the General Staff of Ukraine, the NGO Yurydychna Sotnia worked to develop a mechanism for responding to sexual harassment and gender-based violence in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

    On October 28, 2021, at the Army Built on Trust forum organized by the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Victoria Arnautova, Gender Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, presented a draft mechanism for responding to sexual harassment and gender-based violence. 

    Victoriia Arnautova presents a draft mechanism for responding to sexual harassment

    The mechanism envisages that the victim (or survivor) or a person who has observed inappropriate behavior reports it in person, in writing, or by phone to the hotline. A designated body (department of the Office of the Assistant Commander-in-Chief for Gender Integration), a designated person (gender adviser), or a commander receives the report, which is registered immediately. The next day, the affected person is referred for legal, psychological, and medical assistance (in compliance with personal data protection requirements). Following the report’s registration, an internal inspection commission is appointed, chaired by a representative of the designated body, and the same person also ensures the victim is protected from the influence of the offender. Based on the inspection or investigation findings, a decision is made to bring the offender to justice.

    As of the beginning of the full-scale war, the all the commands had agreed to the mechanism, but it was not adopted and no people were appointed to the gender integration unit positions in the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, who were supposed to perform the relevant duties. As of the beginning of 2024, the situation had not changed.

    What should a servicewoman or serviceman do if she or he is suffering sexual harassment right now? The YurFem Ukrainian Women Lawyers Association developed memo with general recommendations that does not replace individual legal advice in each case but gives an overall understanding of the next steps in the event of a threatening situation.[22]

    The first step is to ensure one’s own safety (leave the room, involve witnesses, etc.).

    The second step is to record the date, time, and place of the incident; record the position and name of the offender; and collect other information about the situation and evidence.

    The next steps are to get psychological, medical, and legal assistance, after which you can agree on your next steps with a lawyer.

    According to Article 110 of the Disciplinary Statute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in case of your rights being violated, you can file a complaint with both the command and law enforcement agencies.

    Sexual violence against servicewomen and servicemen is a military crime and is qualified, depending on the position of the offender, under the following articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine: Article 426-1 “Excess of power or official authority by a military official”, Article 406 “Violation of statutory rules of relations between military personnel in the absence of a relationship of subordination”, or Article 405 “Threat or violence against a superior.” You should consult with a lawyer to determine the crime’s exact qualification, correctly prepare an appeal, and decide on the correct addressee of the appeal.

    NGOs such as YurFem, Charity Foundation Sylni, and Yurydychna Sotnia provide assistance to victims, although, based on the experience of Valeria Sikal, Olga Derkach, and Iryna Bazykina, they cannot theoretically nor practically ensure justice, which is the responsibility of the judiciary and law enforcement bodies.

  • Dealing with violence: the sociology and psychology of the phenomenon

    Dealing with violence: the sociology and psychology of the phenomenon

    “I want a twenty-four-hour truce, during which no rapes will occur,” — these words of Andrea Dworkin make us think about the mundaneness of gender-based violence. Can her dream come true and, if so, when will it happen? In this text, we will try to understand the causes of violence against women. What is the basis of violence? What should be the feminist opposition to violence? And feminist psychotherapy for victims of violence? More on this and other things later in this text.

    A certain phenomenon can only be eradicated by understanding its essence. Researchers from various disciplines (sociology, psychology, criminology, philosophy, etc.) have repeatedly turned to studying the root causes of violence.

    Sociology, cultural studies, philosophy, research on power and ideology

    The two most famous sociological experiments of the 20th century are connected precisely with the topic of violent behavior. The first is the Milgram experiment: its participants shocked actors with an electric shock, the strength of which was gradually increased, the percentage of refusal and the duration of “passing” were measured. Although there are critical remarks about this experiment (the participants could predict that they would not be allowed to experiment with real violence, and could consider themselves participants in a prank), the results of the experiment shocked both the public and the researcher himself. A similar one is the Stanford prison experiment, in which a prison was simulated, and volunteers played the role of jailers. In both cases, the actual subject of the study was the violent behavior of the participants in the experiment, and both times the following conclusions were made: the situation set by the experimenter, which inclines the subject to commit violence, affects the behavior of the individual more than his personal qualities. These experiments were a kind of breakthrough in understanding the topic, because until then the problem of violence was considered from a moralistic position, as a manifestation of some malignancy of the individual who commits this violence.

    In the further development of Western sociological and philosophical thought, the works of Louis Althusser are important, who contributed to the theory of the concept of “ideology”. In the context of the topic of violence, we are interested in his statement that any power apparatus and its practices always materially embody some system of ideas, and therefore, the system of power relations and the set of ideas in the minds of individuals who belong to this system of relations do not exist separately from each other, but on the contrary, they are directly related.

    Later, sociologist Johan Galtung introduced the concept of “structural violence”, distinguishing it from “personal” by the absence of a subject who commits violence, instead its causes are structural (economic or political). This does not necessarily have to be a targeted oppression through the imposition of unjust rules – structural violence can be a consequence of the general imperfection of the system of relations. A category of the population that systematically suffers from hunger and disease is a victim of structural violence.

    This same approach is implemented in the classic works on the sociology of violence – the studies of Michel Foucault. Considering power as something inherent not only to certain social institutions, but also rooted in the minds of members of society, Foucault shifts the emphasis from subjects who exercise power over certain objects to the social relations themselves, which are the bearers of power. Foucault writes about prisons and hospitals as institutions that exercise power and punishment, and notes that these models are internalized by the consciousness of the punished or patient, and that the very notions of norm and abnormality are conditioned by the social context. In particular, at the Salpêtrière hospital, he says, it was common to observe insane women who “in none of the periods of their illness showed any distortion of the ability to understand and were possessed only by a peculiar instinct of violence, as if only their emotional faculties were affected.”[1] This quote vividly illustrates the patriarchal prohibition on women from resisting and generally showing any aggression. Similarly, Pierre Bourdieu introduced the concept of symbolic violence as an attribute of power[2] — the latter imposes meanings that are beneficial to it on the subjugated. Thus, the system of power relations is perceived as legitimate and is not perceived as such that it can be changed.

    Thus, violence in modern sociology and political philosophy is considered as a systemic phenomenon, one of the sources of which is social relations. All these theoretical approaches are easily applied to the concept of patriarchy and gender-based violence as its indispensable component. Overcoming patriarchy and moving to a feminist utopia without violence and discrimination is possible if we realize how this system of violence is constructed.

    One of the latest sociological works is “Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory” by Randall Collins. In this fundamental work, the author examines the micro-level of more than thirty different types of violence, including domestic violence, and analyzes the scenarios in which conflicts occur. Among the forms of partner violence, Collins distinguishes short-term gender-symmetrical violence and long-term male-dominated violence.

    “The difference between casual intimate partner violence and serious abusive relationships is that the former type of confrontation is directed towards protected, limited violence; whereas the latter develops into a pattern of situational tension and sudden release of tension, leading to violent over-acceleration of panic or prolonged use of torture.”[3]

    The structure of social relations does not deprive the individual of free will, and behind each act of violence lies the responsibility of an adult capable person. Therefore, it is important to consider not only the structural, but also the individual level of violence. Psychological research throughout the existence of this science has sought keys to understanding the behavior of victims and aggressors.

    The study of “female hysteria” and the very concept of psychotherapeutic work with psychological problems arose in the 19th century in the works of Jean-Martin Charcot, and then Sigmund Freud[4]. The latter established a connection between childhood psychological trauma and psychological problems in adulthood. However, it is believed that he could not believe the scale of sexual violence against children and women that he discovered, so he renounced his previous theories, and the new explanations he proposed were unsuccessful. However, the work of Freud and his followers laid the foundation for healing psychological difficulties, and psychotherapy emerged and became an increasingly accessible service.

    A patient of Freud’s colleague Josef Breuer, Anna O. (Bertha Pappenheim), was a prominent activist of her time. Her personal resistance to the violence she experienced turned into a long-term political struggle against the abuse of women and girls, and she founded shelters and feminist organizations.[5] From the mid-twentieth century, psychoanalysis began to acquire a feminist dimension. Notable here are Nancy Chodorow, who in her study “The Reproduction of Motherhood” analyzes the mechanism of reproduction of gender-role differences in Western society, and Juliet Mitchell, whose work “Psychoanalysis and Feminism” radically reevaluated the classical version of psychoanalysis.

    Among the modern psychological theories, the most interesting in the context of violence, it is worth mentioning the conclusion that the behavior of the aggressor or the victim can be similar and repetitive. Eric Berne’s research indicates that one of the prerequisites for the repetition of a certain situation (not necessarily violent) is scripted behavior, that is, one that is reproduced according to the same scenario with different people. Knowledge of this reproducibility has brought to psychotherapy the opportunity for the client to get out of the scenario and form new, more constructive ways of behaving. This concept is further developed by the concept of the Karpman triangle – a psychological and social model of human interaction, which assumes that there are three roles in the system of relationships: “Victim”, “Persecutor” and “Rescuer”, and they dynamically replace each other (more on this later)[6].

    Psychologists began to examine the topic of violence and its consequences more closely during and after the Vietnam War, which coincided with the second wave of feminism. Feminists also redefined rape as an act of violence and political control, and surveys have shown the enormous scale of its prevalence.[7] Notable works on this topic include Judith Herman’s books Trauma and the Road to Recovery and Parent-Daughter Incest. They are based on the author’s long-standing work with victims of sexual and domestic violence and present the theory of psychological trauma and the practice of trauma psychotherapy from a feminist perspective. Psychologist Lundy Bancroft, in his book Why He Does It, summarizes his work with men who commit domestic violence. In his view, the problem lies primarily with men and it is they who are responsible for ending domestic violence. The humiliation of a partner, writes Bancroft, is not the result of the dynamics of the relationship, and changing her behavior or trying to better understand her partner does not lead to changes for the better. He insists that in this case it is men who need to adjust, and not their emotions, but their behavior and value system.[8] Michael Kaufman agrees, introducing the concept of the triad of male violence as a set of violence against women, violence against men and violence against themselves. Kaufman recognizes aggression as a toxic part of masculinity, built into the structure of the male psyche by society and upbringing, and suggests getting rid of it.[9]

    Robin Norwood’s book “Women Who Love Too Much” also gained popularity, although it eventually earned a negative reputation among feminists as one that (along with the activities of the author’s support group) caused malignant changes in the lives of affected women.[10] Norwood recognizes the prevalence of the problem of violence and saw its causes in the psyche of women, who, in her opinion, are too dependent on men. The self-help program, developed on the basis of the “twelve steps” program of the Alcoholics Anonymous movement, proposed to change only one’s own perception of oneself as a victim. However, a man, unlike a bottle, is a subject, not an object, ignoring his responsibility for violence and refusing to actively try to demand better treatment from him is not an adequate response to the problem. The woman who attended Norwood’s self-help program remained passive as before, but now she was also strengthened in this passivity ideologically.