Category: LGBT

  • Defend the Motherland without discrimination: LGBT+ people in the armies of the world and Ukraine

    Workplace diversity policies are not a whim but a way to help employees realize their professional potential to the best of their ability. This principle is especially true for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is engaged in active combat operations and does not have the luxury of “throwing away” human resources because of individual characteristics that are not directly related to performing duties.

    According to research, at least 3% of people in the United States identify as LGBT+, and 8-11% report homosexual behavior or awareness of homosexual attraction.[1] There is no such research available for Ukraine. Still, one can assume that the percentage of people with non-heterosexual orientation is not country-specific, so the proportion in Ukraine should be around the same.

    In Ukraine, homosexuality or bisexuality is not a condition for removal from service, and same-sex romantic or sexual relationships are not prosecuted and do not breach military law. Therefore, it can be assumed that homosexual and bisexual persons enlist in the Ukrainian army evenly in accordance with their percentage of the population. This means that at least 3% of the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (more than 9,000 people as of the beginning of 2022, before mass mobilization to counter the Russia’s full-scale invasion, and much more after it began) are homosexual or bisexual. Thus, they all are the target audience of potential anti-discrimination policies.

    The rights of LGBT+ military personnel in the EU and the U.S

    Since 2018, LGBT+ people have been free to serve in the military in all EU countries. NATO policy prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, and since 2002, it has extended benefits for military families to same-sex military families. Since 2019, NATO has had a Diversity and Inclusion Action Plan until 2023, focusing primarily on gender equality and nationality equality within the organization. The organization introduced the official International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia (May 17) in 2020.

    In 2021, NATO headquarters hosted the first internal conference on LGBTQ+ perspectives in the workplace.[2] Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg delivered a speech in which he noted that “every member of the LGBTQ+ community at NATO is a valued member of our staff and family.”[3]

    This inclusion was preceded by a struggle, first of all, for the recognition of the LGBT+ community as such. In this text, I will briefly focus on examples from the United States and Germany.

    American society was quite conservative after World War II, and media products that openly targeted homosexual men could not be disseminated. Therefore, health and fitness magazines targeted the audience by publishing visual materials depicting male bodies. In 1956, the Finnish artist Touko Valio Laaksonen submitted his drawings to Physique Pictorial magazine and signed them “Tom.” In 1957, they were first published under the pseudonym “Tom of Finland”, invented by the editor. Since then, Tom’s work has become iconic and greatly influenced queer culture in general and erotic art. Tom painted erotica with men of his liking: tall, strong, engaged in physical labor, in a police uniform, or the outfit of a sailor or a soldier. His works influenced the self-awareness and imagery of the homosexual community, previously dominated by male femininity. They also probably indirectly contributed to the inclusion of the LGBT+ community in power structures.


    Tom of Finland. Untitled. 1974

    Simultaneously, as part of the human rights “track”, Vietnam War veteran Leonard Matlovich became the second openly gay person to come out after Harvey Milk. Being white, Matlovich started with anti-racist activism and later realized the similarities between racial and sexual orientation discrimination. He came out in 1975, first to his superiors and then to the media, making the front page of The New York Times and the cover of Time.

    At the same time, he had to defend in court his right to remain in the army. Initially, he was offered to stay on the condition that he would never practice homosexuality again, which Matlovich did not agree to. The trial lasted until 1980, and Matlovich eventually won – he was reinstated and even promoted. In return, the army offered him to resign with financial compensation. Given the risks of being discharged again for another arbitrary reason and a possible appeal to the conservative Supreme Court, Matlovich chose to accept the money. During his military retirement, he went into business and continued to engage in activism, including fighting for the rights of HIV-positive people, which he was himself since 1986.

    In 1993, the anti-homosexual personnel policy was somewhat eased by introducing the compromise principle of “Don’t ask, don’t tell.” It was assumed that closeted homosexual and bisexual men could serve if they remained closeted, and their superiors could not question or provoke them to come out. This policy was repealed only in 2011, and only then did homosexual and bisexual people gain the opportunity to be open during their military service.


    The cover of Time magazine with Leonard Matlovich. 1975

    In Germany, the LGBT community’s struggle for recognition, particularly in the military, also has a long history, burdened by 12 years of Nazi dictatorship. The biopolitics of the Third Reich were not limited to anti-Semitism and racism; they included strict health and family reproductive behavior requirements. In general, even before the 1930s, “immorality” and conspiracy were often equated in society, and gays were described in the same negative terms as Jews. Section 175 of the 1871 Criminal Code, which explicitly criminalized sexual acts between two men, was amended in 1935 to cover all homosexual behavior, including dating and flirting. Often, SS officers disguised themselves as gay to catch real ones. Between 1933 and 1945, more than 100,000 people were arrested under the new edict of Section 175. After the fall of the Third Reich and the release of people from concentration camps, the conservative Adenauer government came to power, which did not seek fundamental changes, so people from this group were repeatedly sentenced to prison. In the GDR, homosexuality was decriminalized in 1968; Germany abandoned the Nazi version of Section 175 in 1969, but it was wholly repealed only in 1994. A long struggle for the recognition of rights preceded the repeal.

    Society’s conservatism influenced the official policy of the Bundeswehr. It was believed gays in leadership negatively affected morality and posed a security threat. In 1984, General Gunther Kissling was forced to resign because of suspicions of homosexuality. Discrimination at lower levels was much more widespread and less publicized.


    Extract from a forced medical examination, which indicates a ‘ban on promotion’. 1987

    Nevertheless, the community’s struggle for its rights continued, including in court. In the late 1990s, at least two German soldiers, Winfried Stecher and Werner Buzan, tried to defend in court their right to serve.[4]

    It was only in 2000 that the Bundeswehr allowed women to serve (earlier, they could only serve in medical corps) and openly gay people to hold leadership positions. In 2002, the unofficial group Queer BW was founded to demand an official apology and rehabilitation for those affected by this discriminatory policy. They had to wait 18 years for an apology, until 2020.[5] At present, service members who experienced harassment during their military service can seek compensation for the harm they endured.


    The logo of the Queer BW initiative

    LGBT+ military personnel in the world’s armies

    Latin American countries have not yet reached the top of inclusivity indexes, but they have been making rapid progress in recent years in the rights of the LGBT+ community. Pride in São Paulo, Brazil, is considered the largest in the world, and the marriage rights of same-sex couples in the military are ensured.[6] However, Brazilian military law prohibits sex in the service, as such. In Mexico, homosexuality has been decriminalized since the second half of the 19th century, and homosexuals have been allowed to serve in the army since 2012. However, domestic homophobia in these countries is still a significant problem. On the other hand, Argentina is a champion of LGBT+ rights in the region, which lifted the ban on homosexuals serving in the military in 2009.

    China’s policy of inclusiveness concerning LGBT+ in the military is unclear, and information on this topic is partially limited.[7] However, it is known that the Chinese army’s personnel policy seeks to attract as many citizens as possible to serve, and it is likely that closeted homosexuals are fully employed, while open homosexuals risk dismissal.

    Conservative and homophobic countries in Asia and Africa cannot tout inclusion in the military: in Uganda, homosexuals are potentially subject to the death penalty; in Iran, homosexual behavior often entails forced transition to the female gender.

    LGBT+ military in the USSR and in Ukraine

    After the fall of the tsarist regime, the new Soviet government discarded all imperial criminal law, particularly prosecuting homosexual behavior, following the German model. At the same time, the attitude towards LGBT+ people in the Russian Empire was conditionally tolerant for those times, without high-profile criminal trials (recall the Oscar Wilde trial in the UK). For public and/or influential people, public intolerance was limited at best to rumors and at worst to administrative measures (dismissal from office, expulsion from the capital). Criminal trials concerned only ordinary people and were initiated mainly based on third-party complaints.

    The new Bolshevik government moved beyond this moderate intolerance: through the direct abolition of imperial legislation, the decline of the church’s influence, and a general attitude of emancipation and liberalization in gender and sexual issues. The proclaimed gender equality and affirmative action of “women’s departments,” the legalization of abortion, the “glass of water theory” that separated sex from love, and the development of a system of “children’s hearths” (extended-stay kindergartens) were naturally accompanied by a more tolerant attitude toward homosexuality.

    Over time, the emancipatory program of the first years of Soviet rule began to wind down gradually, and in 1933, the USSR criminalized homosexuality again. The article of the criminal codes of the Soviet republics entitled “Sodomy” provided for punishment for sexual relations between men. At the same time, the prison world developed practices of establishing hierarchy through sexual domination and ritual impurity attributed to victims of such domination and to the objects of prison life they touched. These firmly entrenched negative associations with homosexuality. Following a series of camp uprisings in the early 1950s and the relative liberalization of Soviet policy after Stalin’s death in the second half of the 1950s, the Gulag system was gradually dismantled, with large numbers of prisoners released and reintegrated into society. The homophobia they brought with them from the prison environment quickly spread further.

    The Soviet army did not explicitly ban homosexual men from service. However, those convicted under the relevant criminal article were not drafted into the military, and confessions of homosexuality to a medical commission could in practice be qualified as a psychiatric disorder and exempted from service. Nevertheless, closeted homosexuals apparently joined the army on a general basis. Little research has been done specifically on this topic because of its great taboo, but it is logical to assume that in combination with hazing (a practice of bullying in the army that is extremely common everywhere), the slightest hint of homosexuality was likely to be punished at least informally.

    In independent Ukraine, criminal penalties for “sodomy” were abolished in 1991. The legal framework of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as the successor to the Soviet one, also does not contain explicit prohibitions to serve. In 2016, Ilovaisk veteran Oleh Kopko was the first person to come out in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At that time, everything was limited to an article in the media as part of the “Tolerance Journalism” project.[8] The coming out went unnoticed by the public. The second coming out in the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2018 got better coverage. Viktor Pylypenko, a veteran of the Donbas Special Forces Battalion of the National Guard of Ukraine, did it. During Anton Shebetko’s photo exhibition “We Were Here”, dedicated to LGBT+ combatants, Viktor gave a video interview in which he talked about himself.[9] The same year, the Union of the LGBT military was formed. The following year, a column of LGBT+ military personnel and their supporters participated in the Equality March in Kyiv.[10]


    Oleh Kopko


    A column of LGBT military personnel at the 2019 Pride

    The union makes more than a dozen different demands, including legal recognition of same-sex partnerships and inclusiveness of the LGBT+ community in army regulations and statutes. The need to regulate the rights of the partner in the event of a servicemember’s death has become more urgent during the full-scale war. In 2022, a petition to the President of Ukraine received 25,000 votes and was considered.

    Article 51 of the Constitution of Ukraine explicitly defines marriage as “based on the free consent of a woman and a man,” and it is impossible to amend the Constitution during martial law, so marriage equality will have to wait at least until the end of martial law.

    Despite that, there are no obstacles to introducing registered civil partnerships, a close analog of marriage. The relevant draft law, No. 9103, was registered in the Verkhovna Rada and is under consideration. However, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine does not support it, citing Article 51 of the Constitution of Ukraine and the Internal Service Statute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which do not prescribe commanders to register a couple where one or both partners are military personnel. The ministry did not specify the barriers to improving the statute. The ministry also stated that there is no data on the number of servicemembers who cannot officially formalize a same-sex partnership.[11]

    At the time of the study, there was a de facto ban on transgender people serving in the military. According to the 10th version of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10), which is in force in Ukraine, transgenderism is classified as a personality and emotional disorder (item F64 – “gender identity disorder”). According to Article 18 of Annex 1 to the Regulation on Military Medical Examination in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, personality and emotional disorders F50-F69 are grounds for declaring a person unfit or partially fit for service.[12] However, a transgender person may still serve in the military before they begin their transgender transition and receive the diagnosis. Starting January 1, 2022, the World Health Organization recommends switching to the new ICD-11 classification, where transgenderism is moved from the group of mental disorders to the sexual health conditions called “gender nonconformity.”

    In Ukraine, transition to the new classification at the time of this text has not happened yet, and the relevant changes to the regulations have not been made. Partial fitness for service in wartime allows transgender people to serve in the army. As far as the author knows, there are such cases.

    People diagnosed with HIV are officially recognized as unfit or partially fit for service under Article 5 of Annex 1 to the Regulation on Military Medical Examination in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.[13]

    The problem of homophobia, biphobia, or transphobia in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is being recognized gradually and slowly. Back in the early 2000s, for example, the official response of the Ministry of Defense to an information request from NGO Nash Svit stated, “There are currently no psychological support programs for gay and lesbian servicemembers in the Armed Forces of Ukraine due to the absence of this problem […] As for positions related to personnel training and promotion, homosexuality can be considered as a limitation in conjunction with other moral and business qualities of a serviceman.”

    However, the response to later requests was profoundly different, in particular in 2017 of the Main Department of Moral and Psychological Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: “As part of legal training of the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, issues are mandatory related to observing the rights and freedoms of servicemembers, the procedure of military service, as well as the mechanism for ensuring social and legal guarantees for these categories of Ukrainian citizens. It should also be noted that the State Program for the Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine until 2020, approved by the Presidential Decree No. 73/2017 dated 22.03.2017, provides for the necessary conditions for a gradual change in the mentality of the military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine based on European values. In order to implement the above, it is planned to amend the legislation of Ukraine to eliminate any form of discrimination in the military service.”[14]

    Research on the LGBT+ situation in Ukraine’s military service

    In early 2022, I conducted a mini-study of the situation for LGBT+ military personnel in Ukraine. It was the first study in Ukraine to focus on this issue, as the movement of LGBT+ servicemembers only recently emerged. However, the topic of unlawful treatment of colleagues due to homophobia or transphobia was raised by respondents of the study “Invisible Battalion 3.0. Sexual Harassment in the Military Sphere in Ukraine”, which involved one homosexual man and one transgender woman who ended their military service before transition. Back then, the respondents named problems, among others, such as harassment and prejudice against servicemembers by colleagues based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, in particular, a noticeable deterioration in attitudes toward a non-heterosexual person after coming out without any other reason for the deterioration, demonstratively unaddressed threats, and homophobic attitudes toward people suspected of homosexuality due to a lack of visible sexual attention to women.[15]

    As part of the 2022 study, I conducted 10 interviews with 7 men and 3 women who belonged to the LGBT+ community and were active military personnel.[16] The respondents reported that they had personally experienced homophobia and had heard of such cases. The research methodology did not allow us to establish the actual prevalence of such cases. Still, subjectively, the respondents noted them as common, as a general norm of attitudes towards LGBT+ people. The high level of homophobia, low understanding of what homosexual orientation is, and low level of general culture create at least some discomfort in the service.

    And then you go to the canteen at lunchtime. Everyone looks at you and says, ‘Oh, it’s him, it’s that one.’ And every single day, I eat and they point at me, and they say something about me, and I hear it. Then, in the smoking room, they ask such slippery questions as ‘and what?’, ‘and who?’, like trying to surface some kind of truth, but it’s my personal business whether I want to share it or not. But I’m generally irritated that they exposed me.” (Respondent 1)

    They said ‘this is how you discredit the Army, you demonstrate to others that everyone here is like that.’” (Respondent 6)

    Otherwise, a person may face dismissal, physical violence, and even incitement to suicide. The lower a soldier’s rank, the harder it is for him to be open about his orientation. Respondents do not recommend conscripts and other lower-ranking soldiers disclose their orientation at all, advising them to delete personal data from their phones, etc. Respondents now perceive homophobic problems as almost unavoidable after coming out. The military personnel responsible for moral and psychological support are currently unable to systematically provide qualified assistance to LGBT+ people due to their low general qualifications, overload with paperwork, and lack of knowledge about the specifics of the LGBT+ community, even if they want to help.

    “And if it happens that everyone is against it, well, I’m putting it mildly, if the unit commanders don’t approve it, the department and so on, it is very difficult. It will be very, very hard, and no one will help you with this issue.” (Respondent 3)

    “But I will say this, if there was direct harassment, well, I probably wouldn’t have lasted long. I would have started to break down.” (Respondent 4)

    “What exactly will happen: he can be beaten, he can be humiliated, he can be humiliated in front of the whole platoon, he will simply not be able to live here, he will be verbally insulted. I don’t know… I just haven’t encountered it directly, but, in principle, I understand from what other guys say about what they would do to a gay man – it’s just horrible.” (Female Respondent 7)

    Inclusivity for LGBT+ people in the military workplace

    The Hague Center for Strategic Studies defines inclusion as a guiding principle that maximizes the benefits and minimizes the risks of diversity.[17] It is the best option among other guiding principles compared to acceptance, tolerance, exclusion, and persecution. The Center identifies the following types of inclusive policies:

    • Leadership, training, code of conduct. The top-down approach works best in the army because of its hierarchical nature. Policy coming from the leader counteracts the risks of harassment. Mutual respect should be explicitly stated in the statutory documents.
    • Support networks and mentoring. Associations that provide support to their members can be a resource. Such associations may even be funded from the state budget in some places.
    • Combating discrimination. The prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity should be explicitly stated and enshrined in law.
    • Recognition of relationships. The state should recognize same-sex relationships through the institution of marriage and/or registered partnerships. This point is especially relevant for today’s Ukraine, where active hostilities are taking place.
    • Recognition of gender. Transgender individuals may wish to have their gender officially recognized by the state and other institutions, including the army. Procedural issues related to changing documents, access to hormone replacement therapy, and surgical sex reassignment procedures should be consistent with the regulatory framework and internal logic of military service.

    The Center notes that these practices are currently being implemented in different armies around the world in an unsystematic manner and are not tested for effectiveness, so it is difficult to identify any countries whose best practices are worth emulating. In contrast, the center’s research team formulated three strategies to provide a more focused vision.

    • Mainstreaming – developing new inclusion policies and increasing the inclusiveness of old policies
    • Managing – dedicated effort and an accountability approach
    • Measurement – tracking and evaluating progress

    In 2014, the Hague Center for Strategic Studies ranked the armies of 103 countries in terms of inclusiveness towards the LGBT+ community. Ukraine was ranked 52nd in this index (the study was conducted one time, so the index has not been updated). New Zealand ranked first, followed by the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Australia. According to the study, including LGBT+ people in the military correlates with the degree of human development and indicators of democracy and, of course, with the general public acceptance of the LGBT+ community. In some countries, such as Croatia, Israel, or South Africa, LGBT+ people are better accepted in the military than in society at large.

    Illustrations: Tom of Finland, Time, Deutsche Welle, Queer BW, Radio Liberty, Suspilne, Hromadske.

    This publication was prepared by the expert resource Gender in Detail with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

    The Resilience Program is a 30-month project funded by the European Union and implemented by ERIM in partnership with the Black Sea Trust, the Eastern Europe Foundation, the Human Rights House Foundation and the Human Rights House in Tbilisi. The project aims to strengthen the resilience and effectiveness of war-affected CSOs and civil society actors affected by the war in Ukraine, including independent media and human rights defenders.

  • Narratives in Ukrainian politics about the LGBT+ community

    Intro

    The institutional provision of equal opportunities for exercising human rights and freedoms by representatives of all social groups is an essential value of any democratic state. The fundamental principle of non-discrimination is underlying Ukrainian legislation and secures equal opportunities.

    This principle prohibits any discrimination against individuals or groups in a wide range of social relations. It also ensures equality of rights, freedoms, and opportunities; equality before the law; and respect for the dignity of every person. Accordingly, these provisions apply to and should be enshrined in national legislation and all regulations.

    More details about the legal (non-)recognition of homosexual relationships and some legislative restrictions on human rights related to sexual orientation have already been discussed in our previous materials.

    This text aims to analyze the narratives about the LGBT+ community in the external communication of national public figures, state institutions, and political parties. In addition, we analyze the legislative activities of members of the most prominent political factions represented in the Verkhovna Rada, their positions on certain bills aimed at improving the situation for or protecting the LGBT+ community, and homophobic statements and bills they initiated or supported.

    Why is this important? First, the messages and actions of the individuals holding such positions do not reflect their own values or positions but their positions as people’s representatives. Accordingly, to a certain extent, they broadcast public sentiments and “voices” of their constituents. Second, official communication and activities of national public figures not only represent but also, to a great degree, “set the tone” and influence public opinion. Their narrative about LGBT couples impacts the visibility of the whole community, its appearance in the media, and public attitudes toward it. Therefore, there is no doubt that the official communication of public figures, state institutions, and political parties is inextricably linked to public sentiment.

    This article analyzes the political narratives of 2019-2023.

    Position on the LGBT+ community in the parties’ electoral programs

    An analysis of the official position of political parties that are part the 9th Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine about the LGBT+ community should begin with the content and narratives of their electoral programs as the primary source of the declaration of their positions and ideological beliefs.

    Thus, the Servant of the People party’s program,  consisting of 16 sections and priorities as bullet-point statements in each, does not mention protection of LGBT+ rights. One of the paragraphs in the “National Identity and Civil Harmony” section states: “We will protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, ensure equal rights and opportunities for men and women in Ukrainian society.” The presence of such an item is better than the absence of any. However, a more specific item and the recognition of the problem of discrimination against LGBT+ people would be much better and increase its visibility.

    The electoral program of the Holos party includes 23 subsections and also does not contain specific references to ensuring equal rights and opportunities or providing adequate legal protection for LGBT+ people. However, in the first subsection, “What does Ukraine sound like?”, they repeatedly emphasize that their goal is to “return the person to the center of the state,” regardless of their ideological beliefs or other characteristics. However, the party’s program does not provide a specific mechanism for achieving this goal.

    The program of the European Solidarity party, like the above-mentioned parties, refers to equal opportunities for women and men and does not clearly mention protection of LGBT+ rights.

    The program of the Batkivshchyna party does not mention equal rights and opportunities for different social groups and the implementation of the principle of non-discrimination.

    Although as of September 2023, the program of the now defunct OPFL faction is not publicly available, the attitude towards the LGBT+ community that they had when they entered the Verkhovna Rada can be assumed from the words of former party member Yurii Boyko. In an interview, he clearly outlined the party’s position: “As for same-sex marriage, it is not even being discussed. This is such stupidity that is unacceptable for our Christian society.”[1]

    Thus, an analysis of the election programs of the political parties that won the majority of seats in parliament in the 2019 elections showed that advocacy for the LGBT+ community was neither a priority nor a separate area of work for any of the parties. It is worth noting that we found no overtly homophobic statements or positions in the programs analyzed. Some referred to implementing the principle of social justice and equality of all social groups in Ukraine. However, these ideas were presented as value guidelines rather than priority work areas with a specific mechanism of action.

    The existence of such references, albeit only at the ideological level, is undoubtedly better than the absence of any. However, it would be much better to specify the problem of discrimination against the LGBT+ community and actualize the issue of proper protection as a separate item in the program.

    It is quite clear why naming the problem of discrimination is necessary: as long as the problem is not stated and “highlighted,” it remains invisible to the majority of society. As long as the challenges posed by no legal recognition of homosexual couples as families are not being discussed, most of society does not even notice them. Accordingly, problems that are not verbalized and actualized cannot be solved.

    Membership of Ukrainian political parties in international liberal democratic associations

    The affiliation of a political party with international political associations, alliances, or organizations is one way, but definitely not the only way, to assess its ideological and value orientation. It is an indicator allowing us to evaluate whether a party is friendly towards the LGBT+ community, at least declaratively. One such association is the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), a European transnational political party that adheres to liberal democratic values and unites parties that share them.

    The Ukrainian political party Holos joined ALDE in 2020, the first parliamentary party of this Verkhovna Rada convocation to do so. According to Holos, to become a member of this association, a party must prove that it shares the values of liberal democracy, rule of law, tolerance, human rights protection, and the principles of a market economy. For its part, membership in ALDE provides access to networking with European parties with similar values and a European political elite.

    The Servant of the People (SP) party was the second Ukrainian political party to join the Alliance, in 2022. According to Olena Shulyak, the party’s chairperson, this decision was not spontaneous: “Joining the ‘political family’ of the ALDE party as a full member is one of the key priorities for the Servant of the People in international politics.” The issue of accession became especially relevant after Russia’s full-scale invasion. In addition to being an indicator of shared values and beliefs, membership in the association is now seen as an important political step that promotes better integration into the European political community.

    In addition to the fact that the ALDE’s unequivocal support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and integrity strengthens our country’s position in the international arena, the membership of two Ukrainian parties in ALDE also impacts decisions made within the Ukrainian political arena. For example, on May 28, 2023, ALDE adopted a resolution supporting the legislative initiative of Holos and SP MPs to submit a draft law on civil partnerships. This was the first international statement of this level calling for support for the draft law.

    Although this resolution does not de jure impose any obligations on Ukraine and is only advisory, de facto, it could influence the adoption of the draft law. The European community’s call to support registered partnerships for same-sex and different-sex couples demonstrates the importance of this issue for the Alliance and the European political community, which observes liberal democratic values. This Alliance position also legalizes the significance and relevance of this issue in Ukrainian society. For Ukraine, which is fighting for its place in this community, adopting the draft law is a logical and expected step for implementing European legislation into Ukrainian national legislation.

    Homophobic statements and legislative initiatives of individual party representatives

    Despite the fact that the programs of the above-mentioned political parties do not contain overtly homophobic positions, and some of the parties belong to liberal democratic associations, the positions of individual party representatives sometimes contrast. This is manifested in their homophobic statements, legislative initiatives, or unwillingness to support bills aimed at improving the situation of the LGBT+ community.

    Two draft laws submitted by SP MPs Heorhiy Mazurashu and Olena Lys on July 22, 2020, are vivid examples of how the positions of the party and its representatives diverge sharply. The first draft law proposes amending certain legislative acts on protecting the family, childhood, maternity, and paternity. In the draft, the authors define “homosexuality, pornography, sexual products, transgenderism” and introduce the concept of “propaganda of homosexuality or transgenderism,” although they do not yet define it. In addition, the authors propose replacing the word “gender” with “equality of rights and opportunities for women and men” throughout. In the explanatory note, the authors justify their proposal with the “danger” that “gender ideology” allegedly poses.

    The second draft law proposes amendments to the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses regarding liability for propaganda about homosexuality and transgenderism. In the explanatory note to the draft law, the authors express concern about “aggressive propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism aimed at destroying the family institution” as one of the “immoral threats of our time” as a justification for its adoption. In the note, they also misinterpret the concepts of gender and gender equality and view them as inherently “explicit or implicit propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism.”

    At the same time, in his comments to Suspilne, co-author of the draft law Heorhiy Mazurashu notes that, generally, he is “far from thinking that they [transgender people and the LGBT+ community] should be treated in any way biased, or subjected to any discriminatory actions.”[2] Commenting on the draft law to Radio Liberty, he reiterates his “calm and civilized attitude towards people with different sexual orientations and gender identities.”[3] Mazurashu explains that he is concerned about the risks of “propaganda of homosexuality or transgenderism.” Therefore, he and his colleague propose introducing a fine of 1,000 tax-free minimum incomes (UAH 17,000) for individuals and 3,000 tax-free minimum incomes (UAH 51,000) for legal entities.

    Another draft law initiated Heorhiy Mazurashu proposes amendments to the Budget Code of Ukraine to prevent spending budget funds on promoting pedophilia, homosexuality, and transgenderism. In addition to Mazurashu, the group of initiators of the bill includes other members of the SP party Anatoliy Drabovsky, Serhiy Kuzminykh, Artem Kultenko; and non-partisan MP Viktor Myalyk.In the explanatory note to this draft law, the authors appeal to the government’s obligation to develop and protect the family institution. Other arguments are that “propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism poses a threat to public 

    health,” leads to “violation of the right to freedom of scientific research,” and “violation of the right to freedom of expression and freedom of religion.” In conclusion, the authors argue that “homosexuality, transgenderism, and pedophilia destroy public morality.” As a solution, the MPs propose a draft law that would potentially strengthen protection of family, childhood, maternity and paternity and prevent budget expenditures promoting “pedophilia, homosexuality, and transgenderism.”

    In the comparative table to this draft law, the authors define what they mean by “pedophilia, propaganda of pedophilia, homosexuality, propaganda of homosexuality, transgenderism, propaganda of transgenderism.” They consider the production, distribution, and/or public use of products containing LGBT symbols to be a kind of “propaganda of homosexuality.”

    All of these draft laws were withdrawn from consideration. Human rights defenders note that their content is very similar to the narrative from Russian legislation, which considers “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations” a crime and introduces a fine for it.[4] In particular, the human rights NGO Our World commented on the above-mentioned legislative initiative as “support to Russian policy” and a willingness to “stand under the banner of the Russian-led movement for traditional values.” Although they believe that the real chances of passing this law, even at the time of its submission, were close to zero, the very existence of such legislative initiatives poses certain risks. These narratives are inconsistent with the ideological guidelines declared by the party in its election program and with the basic principle of non-discrimination enshrined in national law. Such initiatives go against the European integration process and Ukraine’s international obligations to ensure equality of rights and freedoms and combat xenophobia and intolerance.

    In addition to the human rights community, some national public figures and institutions criticized the draft law. In particular, the office of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights commented that the initiative of the draft law on fines for “propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism” contradicts constitutional norms and international legal standards and “aims to discriminate against members of the LGBTI community and violate their right to respect for honor and dignity.”[5]

    In response to this draft law, MP Inna Sovsun submitted an alternative one that proposes including in Ukrainian legislation a ban on funding programs and activities that contain signs of direct or indirect discrimination or intolerance against individuals and their groups, depending on the characteristics that such individuals or groups possess. In justifying the need to adopt the draft law, the author also mentions that her colleague’s draft law contains outdated, incorrect terms and promotes stigmatization and discrimination against people based on their sexual orientation and gender identity. However, this draft law was withdrawn from consideration like the previous ones.

    (Non)support for the draft law on civil partnerships

    Another way to check whether the actions and positions of party members are consistent with the party’s official position is to analyze their (non)support for draft laws aimed at protecting the rights of the LGBT+ community. The latest and probably one of the most visible draft laws in the field LGBT+ rights protection is the draft law on registered civil partnerships. Our previous publications have already discussed the importance of adopting this draft law and the opportunities the LGBT+ community may gain (Zavhorodnia’s first text for ERIM). In this article, we will consider in more detail Ukrainian politicians’ reaction to the draft.

    After a petition demanding to “legalize same-sex marriage” on the website of the President of Ukraine gained 25,000 signatures, MP Inna Sovsun of the Holos party registered a draft law on civil partnerships for same-sex and different-sex couples. The list of initiators includes 18 MPs: 7 from Holos and 11 from SP, including Oleksandra Ustinova, head of the Holos parliamentary faction, and Olena Shulyak, head of the SP party. At the time the draft law was registered, its author, assessing the chances, noted that “given the support of the two factions, adoption of the draft law is quite realistic.”[6] She also expressed special gratitude to Dmytro Gurin, a Servant of the People party member, who helped collect signatures from his faction’s MPs. The petition in support of the bill quickly gained 25,000 signatures.

    After considering the draft law at a Youth and Sports Committee meeting on March 7, 2023, the majority of committee members decided to support the draft law. The committee considered creating a new institution of civil partnerships as an important step towards European integration, so it recommended that the Verkhovna Rada adopt the draft law. A report by the Our World Human Rights Center notes that it was entirely unexpected that the committee chair, Andriy Kozhemiakin, a member of the Batkivshchyna faction, would support the draft law.[7] The report states that at the committee meeting, the MP said that although he supports Christian values, he perceives this draft law as an opportunity to “do something to move away from Russian bonds” and therefore supported this decision.

    The Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the EU was the second to consider the draft law at a meeting and unanimously supported it. Among the MPs who voted for it were representatives of different political factions: Mezentseva (SP), Halaychuk (SP), Vintoniak (SP), Nalyvaichenko (Batkivshchyna), Klympush-Tsintsadze (European Solidarity), and Liubota (SP).

    The Committee on Digital Transformation was the next to support the draft law. In its expert conclusion, the Committee provided several recommendations for finalizing the draft and improvements for its implementation. The draft’s author, Inna Sovsun, expressed willingness to participate in further discussions on this issue.

    The Committee on Social Policy and Veterans’ Rights also supported the draft law. Among those present at the committee meeting who voted in favor were Tsyba (SP), Nikorak (European Solidarit), Strunevych (SP), Arseniuk (SP), and Babenko (Bila Tserkva Razom). In contrast, First Deputy Chair of the Committee Tsymbaliuk (Batkivshchyna), committee member Tymoshenko (Batkivshchyna), and subcommittee chair Ostapenko (European Solidarity) abstained.

    Position on Pride parade

    Another “litmus test” for better understanding whether the value of equal rights and opportunities is only declared in the party’s statutory documents or they are backed by actions is an analysis of the parties’ response to the Pride month that took place in Ukraine in May-June 2023. Among the largest political factions represented in the Verkhovna Rada, only Holos temporarily customized its logo to reflect the symbols of Pride, thus expressing support for the LGBT+ community. Other political factions did not react to Pride month.

    Political allies of the LGBT+ community

    In the fall of 2021, the Allies in Action Coalition recognized opinion leaders, activists, and politicians who publicly support diversity and inclusion. One of the seven nominations was “The Friendliest Politician,” which was awarded to Inna Sovsun, a member of the Holos party. The friendliest civil servant was former Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights Lyudmyla Denisova. In response to this, Sovsun said that she was pleased to receive such an award, but it also means that “the competition in this nomination is very weak.”[8]

    As of September 2023, the situation has not changed dramatically. On the webpage of the Civil Partnership Advocacy project created by the NGO Fulcrum, the list of public figures who support the draft law on civil partnerships includes only Inna Sovsun (Holos) and Dmytro Hurin (SP) from among all MPs.

    Conclusions and recommendations

    Thus, having analyzed the official positions of the largest political factions in the current convocation of the Verkhovna Rada, we conclude that promoting LGBT+ rights is still not a priority for any of the factions. In general, parties declare the equality of citizens as one of their values in electoral programs, but for the most part, it is an ideological guideline rather than a clear direction of work with a defined set actions to achieve specific results. That is, parties are declaratively tolerant towards the LGBT+ community but are not ready to take active steps to support it, promote its interests, and improve its situation.

    In addition, some party members fail to follow even this position, which is demonstrated by their homophobic legislative activities. The most striking examples cited in the article are the draft laws on “propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism.”

    The draft law on registered partnerships, registered in 2023, has become a vivid litmus test for determining the values of MPs and the consistency of their actions with the party’s declared ideological beliefs. The positive results of the draft law’s consideration in four committees suggest its adoption is possible. Nevertheless, it is still awaiting consideration by the main committee.

    One more observation is the clear association of homophobia with Russian political culture after the full-scale invasion. It has become clear that the narratives of “homosexual propaganda and gender ideology” are rooted in Russia and are completely alien to the European community. Therefore, homophobia in Ukrainian politics is even more obviously perceived as a threatening rapprochement with the aggressor, while tolerance and protection of the LGBT+ community are one of the necessary steps towards European integration. Accordingly, we hope that the logical choice for MPs when considering the draft law on civil partnerships will be approximating our legal standards to international ones.

    This publication has been produced by Gender in Detail with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

    The Resilience Programme is a 30-month project funded by the European Union and implemented by ERIM in partnership with the Black Sea Trust, the Eastern Europe Foundation, the Human Rights House Foundation and the Human Rights House Tbilisi. The project aims to strengthen the resilience and effectiveness of war-affected CSOs and civil society actors affected by the war in Ukraine, including independent media and human rights defenders.


    [1] Being an ally. Who supports diversity in Ukraine and why. Focus, 30.11.2021.

    [2] We did it! My draft law on civil partnerships for same-sex and different-sex couples is already registered in the parliament and is designated number 9103. MP’s notes | Sovsun, 13.03.2023.

    [3] Situation of LGBTQ in Ukraine in 2023. Our World LGBT human rights center.

    [4] “Servant of the People” followed the footsteps of russian colleagues and intended to ban “propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism.” Hromadske, 22.07.2020.

    [5]July 22 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine registered the draft law “On amending the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses regarding liability for propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism” № 3917. Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, 27.07.2020.

    [6] “Natures mistakes”. Why the draft law against LGBT propaganda was registered in the parliament and how human rights defenders comment? Suspline:news, 23.07.2020.

    [7] MP Mazurashu explained why he initiated “penalties for propaganda of homosexuality and transgenderism.” Radio Svoboda, 22.07.2020.

    [8] Razumkov, Boyko, and Poroshenko – on marijuana and gay marriages. NV, 12.07.2019.